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ABSTRACT
THE GRAND DESIGN:
AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE
POLICY, 1960-1968

SEPTEMBER 198 9
THOMAS W. ZEILER, B.A., EMORY UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor Stephen

E.

Pelz

This study analyzed the history of American foreign

trade policy during the administrations of Presidents John
F.

Kennedy and Lyndon

B.

Johnson.

Four levels-of analysis

(international, governmental, societal, and individual)

provided a framework to explore two historiographical
problems:

the decision-making power structure of U.S.

trade policy formulation and the aims, motives, and results
of this policy.

The campaign for the Trade Expansion Act

of 1962 served as a basis for testing four models of

decision-making:
group,

bureaucratic, corporatist, interest

and inter-branch.

The models were tested in the

specific issue areas of textiles, lumber, oil, and carpets
and glass.

These commodities also were used to validate

the interpretations of the "hegemony" or the "comparative-

advantage" schools of thought regarding the aims and

effects of American trade policy.

Under the auspices of

on
the Kennedy Round negotiations of the General Agreement

vi

Tariffs and Trade, trade relations with the European

Economic Community were the overall focus of the debate

between the two schools, but bilateral trade with Japan,
Asian less-developed countries, Canada, and Venezuela
assumed primary importance depending on the commodity.
inter-branch model, and to

a

The

lesser extent pressure from

interest groups, was found to determine decision-making on

trade matters

.

The assumptions of the comparative-

advantage school generally were most accurate in describing
the motives and results of U.S. trade policy.

1
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INTRODUCTION
In the pre-dawn hours of 30 June 1967,

Special

Representative for Trade Negotations William

M.

his Washington office talking on the telephone.

Roth sat in
On the

other end of the line was his deputy and chief trade
negotiator, W
Geneva,

.

Michael Blumenthal

,

who stood ready in

Switzerland to relay news concerning last-minute

developments at the Kennedy Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade.

The Round was about to be officially

concluded and signed in just two hours.

Both men feared

another crisis that might delay the end of the trade talks,

which had their roots in policy initiated by President John
F.

Kennedy five years before and which had suffered

numerous delays, conflicts, and problems.

It was still

dark in the United States when the conference came to
close.

Roth and Blumenthal could now finally relax.

a

1

Over the next several days, the administration of

President Lyndon

B.

Johnson hailed the Kennedy Round as

a

Yet nobody noted one critical

great,

successful endeavor.

fact.

The negotiations signaled the end of America's sole

predominance over the postwar international trade order.
The 1960s were

relations.

a

critical decade in world trade

Closing the period of post-World War II

reconstruction, the era opened
the United States abroad.

a

new chapter in the role

Transformations within the

global economic system, that is, the waning of U.S.
1

of

supremacy in the world economy, compelled the country to
reassess its outworn trade policies.

Undisputedly

predominant for the past fifteen years, America now
suffered a decline in its capabilities to control the trade
order due primarily to a challenge emanating from Europe.

Established in 1957, the European Economic Community,
also called the EEC, Common Market or the Six, had provoked

two responses from American observers

.

First, this customs

union scared them because of its competitive commercial
potential in and outside of Europe and its protective,

unitary external tariff which threatened to constrict U.S.
exports.

But second, the EEC was attractive; its

tremendous market

,

promise of growth, and future political

unity could profit all traders

,

stimulate national

economies, and strengthen the Western alliance.
The Common Market prompted such a complete

reappraisal of Washington's postwar approach to Europe that

Kennedy chose a foreign trade bill, the Trade Expansion Act
(TEA)

,

as the centerpiece of his New Frontier legislative

agenda of 1962.

Along with it, he offered the "Grand

Design", a comprehensive diplomatic blueprint for forging
an Atlantic partnernship with Europe.

The economic part of

this plan was trade liberalization, an area of inquiry

suffering neglect by historians at the expense of security
matters.

Liberal trade depended on passage of the TEA,

which granted Kennedy the necessary authority to lower
2

.

trade barriers on a reciprocal basis with the Six and other

nations
The implication of these trade negotiations to

international relations and America's ebbing power reached

much further than the economic realm, however.

At the

heart of U.S. trade policy from 1960 to 1968 were

considerations which influenced the course of Western

diplomacy and the very success or failure of American
foreign policy.

Kennedy and his successor, Lyndon B.

Johnson, banked on the liberalization of trade to stem the

increased political chafing among the allies that might
scribble the Grand Design before it got off the drawing
board.

By the dawn of the 1960s, a "plural squirming

world" had replaced the American-centered trade order of
the early postwar years.

2

The way the United States

confronted its vitiated global position through its foreign
trade policy is the focus of this study.
This history addresses the central historiographical

debate in American foreign relations concerning the
motives, aims, process, effects, and power structure in
U.S. decision-making. On these issues, an "hegemony" school

of historians confronts a "comparative-advantage" school.

The former emphasizes Washington's self-interested, over-

bearing behavior in the global economic order which

profited corporate America at the expense of other
nations.^

The proclivity toward overproduction and
3

.

.

.

underconsumption in the economy impelled the government to
search for foreign markets as a "safety valve" to

depressions and other problems.
U.S.

This expansion gave the

direct or informal control of the global marketplace

through international lending agencies, military alliances,
postwar recovery programs, and the development

(or

underdevelopment) of less-developed countries (LDCs)

America had become the world's top imperialist.
The U.S., though pledging to promote liberal trade, was

deceptively restrictive, claim hegemony scholars

Washington permitted the free exchange of goods only when
it possessed a distinct comparative advantage,

while it

tried to bar imports which competed successfully with U.S.
products.

In effect,

the professed ideal of an open,

multilateral trading system, the foundation of the Grand
Design, was a rhetorical disguise to hide America's real

intention of garnering mounting profits and preserving its

dominance over Europe and others
The comparative -advantage historians argue, however,

that American magnanimity best epitomized U.S. trade
policy.'^

They offer a multi-causal analysis which agrees

with the hegemony assertion that Washington pursued trade

expansion as

a

palliative to domestic economic problems.

Yet other factors shaped American decisions,

such as

strategic aims, actions by foreign countries, humanitarian
impulses to help less fortunate nations, and pressures from
4

the electorate and Congress.

These elements kept the reins

of trade policy in government, not private, hands.

This school praises U.S. trade policy, alleging that

America

promoted mutual benefits, on the basis of

comparative advantage, for all traders in the international
order.

The Grand Design translated into an Atlantic

system,

albeit led from Washington, which accepted the

realities of the rising power status of Europe, and so

equality among all members.

Self-interest was naturally

prevalent; America required trade expansion in order to

finance its overseas military and aid commitments.

But

Western security and the prosperity or development of all
capitalist nations depended on economic growth through
commerce.

Having, in fact, experienced discrimination by

Europe before and just after the war, the U.S. tried to
ensure that trade opportunities remained available in the

international economic system.
In order to address the normative split between the two

schools, this study explores policy at four levels-of-

analysis

:

international, governmental, political economy,

and individual.^

At the international level, the study of

"regimes" serves as a medium to examine trade relations.

Regime analysis posits that nations are not autonomous
actors in an anarchical world but function in an

interdependent arena of economic transactions,
institutions, and domestic factors.
5

States form regimes

^

when they perceive that gains will most likely accrue

through cooperation rather than unilateralism.

One example

is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT)

,

the

negotiating forum for postwar trade agreements under U.S.
leadership

.

GATT provided

a set

of principles,

norms,

rules,

and

decision -making procedures for cooperation among its

members

Though liberal trade was its guiding principle,

.

GATT permitted protectionist measures to safeguard domestic

economic stability from injury due to trade barrier

reduction which clearly clashed with this aim
instance

,

.

For

the regime allowed for regional discrimination by

the EEC and exempted many U.S. farm goods from trade

bargaining

Without such exceptions

.

have joined GATT.

,

few countries would

In other words, there was no commitment

to free -trade orthodoxy; compromises between liberal trade

...m

and protectionism superceded the ideal of laissez-faire

competition.

7

This underlying tension exists

American trade policy and generates several hypothesesquestions at the international level concerning America's

maintenance of the GATT regime.

Did the U.S. maintain the

openness or closure of the regime?

Did GATT remain liberal

or become protectionist and fragmented into hostile blocs?

What international economic or foreign political decisions

affected American leadership over the trade order?

Did

America selfishly seek to preserve its dominance through
6

.

the rhetoric of liberal trade, or did Washington pursue a

more pluralistic Western power alignment through the

promotion of mutual benefits in the trade regime?

How did

other traders, particulary the Common Market, react to U.S.

initiatives?

A host of variables

at the governmental and societal

levels-of -analysis played, moreover, a large part in

determining U.S. trade policy in the international arena.
Policymakers reached decisions at the intersection of
external and internal pressures.

The decentralized and

diffused political system of the American power structure

permitted access to politically open issues like trade
g

policy from many other sources besides foreign ones
At the governmental level

,

bureaucratic politics

,

or

bargaining between departmental elites within the Executive
branch, may explain decision-making
for control over the trade agenda,

.

Individuals compete

"pulling and hauling" in

the policy process according to their organizational
affiliation.

Bureaucratic politics usually results in

a

reconciliation of these differing viewpoints and a mix of
strategies and ideas distinct from the recommendations of
any single participant.

Because a wide spectrum of

interests in America take part in trade, however, the model
falls short in explaining interest intermediation, or the

process by which resources within society are
distributed.

In other words,

7

a

multiplicity of actors,

.

not just governmental participants, take part in the policy

process
The domestic political economy level-of -analysis

describes internal socio-economic factors in trade,

including the import or export orientation of agricultural
and industrial interests and the level of protection given
to importers.

Interests divided into two sectors:

trade-

biased export-competitors and protection-biased importcompetitors

^"^

Capital-intensive firms, surplus commodity

.

producers, and Big Labor, typified the former group, which
sought lower trade barriers in order to increase access to

foreign markets

.

Import-competitors were declining,

inefficient producers which suffered competition from lowwage nations.

They urged protectionism, hoping to arrest

their deteriorating position in the domestic marketplace.

Which producers were most vocal, what they stood to gain
or lose in trade,

and by what means the two sectors

influenced governmental decisions were of critical import
in interest intermediation.

These issues are also central

to the hegemony-comparative-advantage stand-off.

The

former claims that the decision-making structure in trade
was elitist in that government and business interests

bypassed the democratic process and decisions were
determined by socio-economic standing.

12

The corporatist model penetrates elitism by exploring

capitalist organization and ideology.
8

Corporatism is the

informal or formal cooperation between the goverment and
export -minded groups in society
labor,

and agriculture.

-

big industries and firms,

The government sought to minimize

conflict between interest groups by rationalizing the

marketplace and offering them protection from the vagaries
of business cycles.

Meanwhile, like the hegemony school

argues, entrenched capital-intensive producers, by assuming

control of the trade policy process

,

preserved their

oligopolistic positions in the U.S. and international
economies.

interests

,

Skewed in its representation of societal
trade channeled benefits into discrete sectors

which ensured large profits for corporate America. 13
In contrast to the corporatist consensus,

the pluralist

framework points to an amalgam of rival private and public
actors whose divergence over trade goals exhibited a
14
fragmented and competitive decision-making process.
.

.

trade, pluralism naturally focuses on Congress,

In

since

commerce was a "pocketbook" issue on which private groups
spent millions of dollars lobbying in Washington.

Because

of its electoral accountability and role in passing or

rejecting trade legislation. Congress provided the lever
for interest groups to pressure the government."'"^

Pluralists propose a model of "regulatory politics", in
which interest groups competed for benefits from trade
policy. The passage of the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934,
the basic legislation for all postwar trade bills,
9

^

.

transferred authority for negotiating tariff levels from
Congress to the president.

This change reduced the

leverage enjoyed by interest groups in setting tariff
rates,

the most glaring example of their power being the

disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
onward,

From 1934

interests vied with each other and confronted

Congress over the allocation of tariffs in a battle which

yielded winners and losers.

The interaction between

interest groups and Congress explained the trade policy

decision-making process

.

Pluralists offer "interbranch politics" as another

paradigm

.

Bargaining occurred between the president and

Congress, which took cues from special interests but

prevented log-rolling

Though Congress represented import-

.

competitors and the president export -competitors and

broader strategic and economic interests
unison.

In trade,

,

both acted in

the president looked to Capitol Hill

when formulating trade bills, while Congress looked to the

White House, not private lobbies.
trust,

Mutual cooperation,

and sensitivity yielded the president more

discretion over trade if he responded adequately to
congressional concerns

17

These models of interest intermediation rely also on the

fourth level-of-analysis

-

the individual decision-makers'

perceptions of his external and internal environments.
This cognitive process level factors together the
10

.

experiences, values, and influences which indicated why a

leader reacted to the trade environment overseas and the

political economy at home in a certain way, and if his
response was consistent or not with practical political
considerations.

That is, the ideological orientations and

assumptions of U.S. leaders in trade affected their

domestic political agenda-setting, their negotiating
stance,

and their approach to the decline in American

power 18
The models and levels offer several testable hypotheses-

questions

m

the trade decision-making process. 19

Bureaucratic politics hypothesizes that infighting,
bargaining, and eventual compromise among Executive branch

elites characterized the decision process

.

Is an

understanding of Executive branch divisions sufficient for
understanding trade policy?

What are the differences in

trade ideology and policy preferences among bureaucratic
rivals?

Who won and who lost the debates?

Corporatists claim that collaboration between business
elites, trade sectors, and government officials skewed

policy-making and won benefits for capital-intensive groups
in the economy.

What coalitions of sectoral interests

joined their public sector counterparts to influence

decision-making?

Was there a consensus among private

interests which, working through government leaders, sought
liberal trade for the benefit of big business?
11

Did this

partnership extend to the international community through
class alliances or combinations with similar ideological

and political-economic objectives?

Pluralists assume conflict and competition was prevalent
in American society.

The regulatory politics model posits

that interest groups possessed much leverage over Congress
in the trade bargaining process.

Does trade policy reflect

those interests which had the greatest access^ economic
resources, organizational skills, or whose survival was at

stake?

Is the private sector the critical decisional

arena?

What interests pressured the government, and did

they succeed?

Interbranch politics supposes that bargaining between

a

relatively autonomous Congress and the president epitomized
decision-making.

Did Congress make a difference in debates

within the Executive branch and did the Executive branch
have a similar impact in Congress?

What did each branch

seek?

Did each accommodate or oppose the objectives of the

other,

and what accounted for their actions?

How was an

accommodation between the two eventually reached?
Finally, the individual's perceptions of the internal

and external environment and his background helped shape
policy.

Who were the key decision-makers?

trade ideology?

Did

a

What was their

What shaped their views on trade policy?

conflict exist between their trade ideology and

practical politics?
12

.

.

The conceptual framework for testing the models,

exploring the four levels-of -analysis

and addressing the

,

historiographical debate centers on the inherent dualism of
liberalism and protectionism in trade.

Especially

applicable to Kennedy and Johnson, this two-dimensional

policy is termed the "fair-trade" doctrine.

The doctrine

enabled U.S. policy-makers to reduce trade barriers while

protecting domestic sectors hurt by imports.
The first part of the fair-trade approach concerned

trade liberalization

exports

,

.

Lowering trade barriers boosted

thereby spurring national growth, funding overseas

cuommitments which burdened the U.S. balance-of-payments,
and unifying the West into a viable force in the cold war
In practice

,

Kennedy and Johnson used the fair-trade

doctrine to seek advantages for all traders

,

often

sacrificing protection of U.S. producers for the good of
the global capitalist trade order.

But through a process

of hard bargaining with America's trade partners at GATT

negotiations, America hoped to produce mutually equitable
amd reciprocal trade agreements
Yet liberal trade confronted domestic economic and

political realities.

Conditions in Massachusetts and Texas

sparked Kennedy's and Johnson's awareness of the injurious
effects of imports on several industries.

Thus, the other

half of the fair-trade doctrine hinged on protection of
import-competitors.

Kennedy adopted
13

a

novel scheme in his

.

•

Trade Expansion Act called adjustment assistance which

avoided trade restrictions in favor of unemployment
compensation and job retraining.

Since the measure would

not be put in effect until the TEA passed, however, Kennedy

backed selective restrictions of imports and promised
American prudent trade negotiations with strict adherence
to reciprocity to help declining import interests and win

meaningful concessions for exporters
Fair-trade thus required juggling local, national, and
foreign imperatives in order to expand commerce without
injury to domestic interests.

In sum,

the doctrine sought

trade based on comparative advantage while reserving to
each country a degree of autonomy to respond to domestic
pressures.

principles.

Such an approach was in accord with GATT

Fair-trade was

a

balancing act between meeting

the challenge of the Common Market by stressing the

maintenance of the GATT liberal trade regime, and
cushioning America from the effects of its declining global
power.

Guided by the doctrine, American leaders set out to

address the sweeping changes in the international economic

order

14

.
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CHAPTER

1

SEEDS OF THE FAIR-TRADE DOCTRINE,

1945-1960

American foreign trade policy in the 1960s was,
naturally, an outgrowth of the initiatives of earlier

presidents.

They built the framework and set the ideology

of the postwar trade regime,

programs gave way to
trade.

a

in which recovery and aid

policy of expanding and freeing up

But domestic economic and political pressures

constrained liberalization plans.

Falling global tariff

barriers and other controls helped increase markets for
U.S. exports, but imports rose even faster.

Protectionism

in the country heightened as Western Europe,

and later the

united Common Market

,

emerged as America'

s

chief

competitor, and as the economy showed signs of strain by
the 1950s.

Thus,

while national leaders pressed for free-

trade, they also tried to address domestic economic

problems caused, in part, by lower trade barriers.
Kennedy articulated these dual concerns with his fairtrade doctrine.

His record in Congress demonstrated a

clearly thought out policy of balancing export and import-

competing aims.

The development of the trade regime, U.S.

commercial legislation, the effects of trade on the

American political economy and Kennedy's approach to the
issues before assuming the presidency revealed the

continuities and differences between the future New

Frontier and previous administrations.
26

A survey of the

.

.

four levels-of -analysis during the period 1945-1960

therefore explains the basis of the American trade agenda
of the 1960s and how the country began to address its

declining power

America's slipping status during that decade signified
change from the immediate post -World War II era.

a

Though it

had expended enormous sums of capital and had suffered over
a

million casualties during the war, the U.S. enjoyed more

wealth than ever before once peace arrived.

In contrast,

the other pre-war powers lay economically prostrate

.

Thus

,

Washington assumed the burden of their economic
reconstruction by attempting to stabilize exchange rates
and re -build trade

.

Recovery was doubly important as the

cold war began, and steadfast allies were needed to fight

international communism.

In sum,

the U.S. emerged as the

world's chief banker, supplier of goods, and postwar

economic planner; the predominant power in the global

political economy
The trade order consequently reflected American design
of economic liberalism,

prominent.

of which three elements were

First was the traditional open door policy, or

an emphasis on seeking equal access for all nations in

world markets.

Second, to ensure the open door, the U.S.

insisted on multilateral trade agreements based on

unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment; that
the
a pledge of non-discrimination which granted to all
27

is,

.

benefits of concessions reached by two countries in

bilateral negotiations.

Third,

liberalism sought trade

based on comparative advantage but permitted exemptions
from free-trade as safeguards for domestic producers and as
a

fulfillment of obligations in pre-existing imperial trade

systems

.

Economic and political calculations undergirded these
principles.

Though its economy did not depend on foreign

trade -exports averaged only 4.3% of the gross national

product from 1945 to 1970

-

America feared a recurrence of

the trade wars which were partly to blame for worsening the
Great Depression and ushering in autarkic conditions that
led to World War II.

The cold war had a critical influence

in the push for liberal trade, too.

The U.S. advocated

free-trade not only to fuel domestic growth but because

expanded commerce enriched national economies and thus

bolstered Western security.

Seeking economic liberalism in

order to alleviate world dollar shortages, America even

permitted discrimination against its own goods through
foreign import and export controls in order to bind the

alliance

2

In 1947, America introduced the institutional mechanisms

which formalized its trade ideology and political goals.
Because of protectionist opposition at home and abroad, the
International Trade Organization, the overseer of the new

trade order, never got off the drawing board.
28

Though not

.

as comprehensive, the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT)

in Geneva,

trade negotiations,

Switzerland became the forum for

A victory for liberal traders, GATT

comprised twenty nations which agreed to trade on
basis.

a

MFN

Meanwhile, the regime permitted exceptions to the

MFN rule by allowing customs unions, free trade areas, and
loopholes by which countries might "escape" from trade

agreements in order to protect domestic producers,

Washxngton hoped to limit these exceptions.

3

The first round of GATT in 1947 initiated sweeping

tariff reductions, due mostly to the American Reciprocal
Trade Act (RTA) of 1945 which cut U.S. tariff rates an

average of 25% (the lowest in a century) and started
in world trade.

a

boom

The next GATT rounds in 194 9 and 1951, and

meetings in 1955, lowered duties but dealt primarily with
the accession of new members.

Actually, the era of large

tariff reductions ended in the early 1950s, as more

restrictive RTAs permitted only modest decreases at the
fourth (1956) and fifth (1962) GATT rounds.

By the mid-

1950s, the U.S. Congress hoped to freeze tariff levels

until the burgeoning imports from the recovering allies
were adequately addressed

4

Even though these allies discriminated against American
goods,

stagnating global commerce during the recovery

period prompted Washington to encourage trade
liberalization among the Western European powers.
29

The U.S.

.

hoped to free up the region's trade and payments system
through the Marshall Plan, the European Payments Union,

which was

a

clearing house for financing trade, and the

Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
Despite the fact that these forums existed at the expense
of U.S. exports, the three provided for the permanent

elimination of European bilateralism, removed import
quotas,

and,

integration.

meeting

a

top American aim, enhanced regional

The union of Belgium, the Netherlands, and

Luxembourg (Benelux) in 1948 and the Schuman Plan of 1952
which formed the European Coal and Steel Community,
indicated progress toward the latter goal, and the European
Economic Community marked its achievement

5

Established by the Treaty of Rome in March 1957, the
Common Market was more than

a

trade bloc.

The EEC sought

an intimate union among diverse European nations

the economies of Benelux, France,

Italy,

,

drawing

and West Germany

together by removing internal barriers to trade,
investment, and mobility of capital and labor.

Europeans

hoped the customs union, which within a decade became the
world's largest trading unit, would "spill-over" into

a

supranational federation which would henceforth discourage
a

renewal of Franco-German hostilities, build Europe into a

potent adversary of Soviet expansionism, and overcome the

overwhelming dominance of the United States in the region.

30

.

For the sake of strengthening its economic base, the

Common Market tacitly backed trade discrimination against

non-Community members in foreign trade.
a

The EEC installed

common external tariff and a deadline of 1973 by which

each nation would average in its tariff levels to this

unitary rate.

Accordingly, high-tariff France and Italy

and low-tariff Benelux and Germany proceeded to harmonize

their duties, though reduction of quantitative barriers to
imports progressed less rapidly.

The Six also expended

much effort in constructing the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP)

,

a protectionist levy and quota system.

Indeed, by

protecting its markets, the EEC served notice that in the
future, European trading rights would take precedence over

the commercial objectives of all outsiders, including

America
Backing up this determined policy was an emerging
powerful economy which gave the EEC the capability of

competing with, or out-competing, the United States and
From 1938 to 1964, the aggregate gross

others in trade.

national product (GNP) of Western Europe as

increased by 85%

a

whole

industrial output alone increased two

-

and one-half times.

By itself, the EEC generated $165

billion in goods and services, or about one-third of U.S.
production.

Yet in real purchasing power, the output of

the Six was nearly one-half of America's, and the gap was

closing rapidly.

EEC steel production, for instance, rose
31

from 36.6 to 62.9 million tons from 1952-1959, while

American output stagnated at 84.8 to 84.5 million tons.
Industrial production in the Common Market in 1960, for the
first time, bested that of the United States.

In sum, the

growth rate of all the EEC nations from 1953 to 1960 was
45%; the U.S.

lagged at 15%.

The European challenge to America in trade paralleled

the impressive gains in production.

The exports of Western

Europe as a whole outpaced the region's production and

world trade during 1938-1964.

The U.S. remained the single

largest trader nation, but the combined Six outstripped

America in trade volume by 1960.

While the growth of EEC

trade exceeded the rates recorded during the Golden Age of

Europe from 1870 to 1913, moreover, U.S. commerce grew
slower in the 1950s than during the pre-1914 period.

Furthermore, as the American share of manufactured exports

among industrial nations fell from 23.9% in 1953 to 21.3%
in 1959, the Common Market countries' percentage rose to

43% by 1959,

almost doubling from 1948.

More telling, the U.S. -EEC economic relationship was in
the midst of a transformation which favored the latter.

Washington's export edge was three times that of Europe to

America in the early postwar years.
advantage was less than double.

By 1960, this

The American world

merchandise trade surplus soared in the 1950s to $4.9
billion in 1960, but that of the Six rose also. But a U.S.
32

.

:

balance-of -payments deficit also emerged by the late
1950s,
resulting in mounting European holdings of American gold,
which,

in turn,

were a mark of increased EEC leverage in

international affairs.

The Common Market also enjoyed a

steadily growing share of exports to America throughout the
1950s,

while EEC imports declined from across the

Atlantic

g

American leaders regarded the EEC with both satisfaction
and apprehension.

Clearly, U.S. recovery plans had been

successful, since Europe now stood economically solid on
its own feet

.

construction of

The Coimnon Market represented, however, the
a

trade rival.

However minor exports were

to the functioning of the American economy, the U.S. viewed

this competition seriously, especially since trade was

means of achieving

a

top objective of U.S. foreign policy

unity within the Western alliance.
this goal.

a

The cold war prompted

The Soviet economic challenge, Moscow's

impressive industrial and technological growth, and an

effective propaganda campaign disturbingly foretold of
communist inroads in Europe and around the globe.
In the meantime,

9

signs in the Western alliance pointed

to a rocky road ahead in relations among the Atlantic

powers.

The return of General Charles de Gaulle to power

in France implied a trend toward European independence.

Paris still simmered, moreover, over what it viewed as ill

treatment by America during the Suez crisis.
33

Chancellor

.

.

Konrad Adenauer of West Germany demanded
decisions on nuclear weapons.

a

greater role in

West Germany amd France

hoped to propel Europe into a more decisive role in global
politics and in wriggling free from Americais hold.
U.S.

seemed like an occasional bully to Britain.

The

Though

London cherished its "special relationship" with the U.S.,
the American slap on the wrist during the Suez crisis had

humiliated Britain.

In trade,

furthermore, Britain formed

the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) a trade bloc in

direct opposition to the Common Market and to U.S.

designs 10
,

.

The development in 195 9 of the seven-nation EFTA

threatened America'

s

unifying strategy.

Washington

vigorously opposed the EFTA because the "Outer Seven"
resisted political integration.

The Association also had

no common tariff which linked members on an intimate

economic basis in a similar fashion to the Common Market
countries.

London's proposal in 1959 to fuse the EFTA to

the EEC also drew American fire.

The U.S.

feared that both

might gang up to discriminate against American exports and
neglect the political integration of Europe, thereby

dividing the global trade regime and undermining the
...

alliance

11

Thus, America sought the evolution of outward-looking,

"trade-creating" European trade partners instead of

preferential "trade-diverting" blocs.
34

Customs unions built

.

up their tariffs for the mutual protection of each member,

reasoned American leaders.

The EEC opposed trade

restrictions, yet there was no substantive assurance in its

treaty that such would be the case.

As economist Bela

Belassa told Congress, without multilateral duty cuts on

manufactured goods, the elimination of internal tariffs in
the EEC would lead to discrimination against U.S. exports.
Thus, Washington prodded Europe to tailor its trade

policies to the broad, unifying objectives of the alliance
instead of frustrating American designs through
12
^
protectionxsm.
.

.

.

European integration was the major, but not the only,
development in the trade regime which undercut American

postwar dominance.

The U.S. transformed Japan into a close

ally by reorienting its commerce away from the Pacific
basin,

granting its goods liberal treatment

,

and overcoming

European opposition to Japan's accession to GATT

.

trade boomed because of this benevolent treatment.
significant

,

Japanese
Most

U.S. -Japan trade began to favor the latter

Washington enjoyed

a

three and one-half time growth in

exports to Japan during the 1950s, but imports from Tokyo

multiplied more than six-fold.

Ranked thirteenth among

exporters to the U.S. in 1952, Japan climbed to second by
1960.

Complaints from American import-competitors about

the Asian invasion of their markets, continued Japanese

trade discrimination, and, in 1960, Japan's first trade
35

surplus with the U.S. since the war, compelled Tokyo to

adopt a comprehensive trade liberalization plan."^^
Trade between Canada and America also revealed fissures

by 1960.

holding

Both were each others' top markets, with the U.S.
a

distinct advantage.

The origin of nearly three-

quarters of Ottawa's imports in the 1950s, the U.S.

supplied over half of all major product groups except
textiles and petroleum.

A trade deficit with America

notwithstanding, Canada occupied roughly over half of the
U.S. market.

Washington envisioned

a

free-trade zone in

which commerce and investment promoted North American
interdependence, a policy not accepted until 1988 by both
countries, and denounced by many Canadians as U.S.

imperialism.

Ottawa also protested injurious U.S. farm

surplus disposal programs and oil import quotas.

Prime

Minister John Diefenbaker strained neighborly relations by
the late 1950s in seeking closer Commonwealth ties with
14
Britain at the expense of U.S. trade.

The less-developed countries also started to rebel

against the postwar trade regime set up by America.

Arguing that the trade interests of rich and poor nations
were identical, the North basically ignored the special

problems of the less-developed South.

The LDCs sought

exemptions from liberal trade to protect their infant
industries and development.

But GATT excluded such

loopholes, and its insistence on MFN treatment was
36

.

meaningless for the South, which had few concessions to
give in negotiations.

Refusing to join GATT, many LDCs

tried to reform the system and later resorted to import
substitution, an inward-looking concentration on developing

domestic markets by industrialization and cutting off
foreign-made goods
By the late 1950s, it was apparent that this strategy of

international isolation had failed.

Few LDCs manufactured

goods, and because many relied on only one commodity

(usually agricultural)

for export, they were vulnerable to

falling world demand and prices.

did not reduce imports.

Also,

import substitution

LDCs traded their crops for

expensive processed or semi -processed items of the North,
and these "terms of trade" failed to earn them enough hard

currency to import capital goods and construct an
industrial base

.

Industrialization stalled, trade

restrictions in the North increasingly plagued the LDCs,
and the Soviets stepped in with a plan to underwrite a

trade forum outside of GATT for the benefit of the Third
World.

In response,

a

panel of GATT experts issued the

Haberler report in 1958, which recommended that the North
not insist on reciprocity in negotiations with the LDCs and

pledge to expand Third World exports.

Poor nations

remained skeptical of the possibility of penetrating

Northern markets and competing in world trade.
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15

,

Trade expansion in the LDCs had occurred since the war,
but was skewed.

Manufactured exports were limited to

advanced LDCs, nearly two-thirds of these were Asian
(mostly from Hong Kong and India)

,

and in only a few

specialized products like textiles, accounted for merely
15% of the Third World export total.

Sales abroad did

climb from 1945 to 1960; Latin American exports rose by
22%, African by 42%,

and Asian by a paltry 10%.

Southern exports registered

a 29% increase.

Total

But global

trade patterns favored the North, which doubled LDC
exports.

Only sales from the Middle East, where oil

spurred exports by 72%, increased more than the industrial
nations

.

Between 1950-1960, the LDC share of world exports

declined from 31

.

6% to 21

.

4% while the Northern share

climbed from 60.4% to 66.8%."^^
The policies of the Eisenhower administration did not

help matters.
P.L.

The President initiated aid programs such as

480 or Food for Peace.

Yet,

these measures, along

with protective quotas on lead and zinc

,

oil

,

and textiles

retarded agricultural LDC development and exports and

helped U.S. exporters.

For instance, only African exports

made gains in the American market while U.S. sales to the
LDCs rose.

In 1960,

Kennedy indicted Eisenhower for

failing to better Soviet investments in the LDCs and for
not helping these nations diversify their crops,

common markets, and stabilize economically.
38

form

In many

.

respects, the LDCs were worse off after Ike's eight
years
in office 17

The most ominous legacy of Eisenhower's tenure,

and one

that signalled a global power shift away from America, was
the U.S. balance-of -payments deficit.

statement records the total value of

The payments
a

country's

international economic transactions in current and capital
accounts.

The former contains merchandise exports and

imports; expenditures and receipts for services such as

transportation and tourism; income from investment, and
government grants, military spending, and other
remittances.

The capital account shows outflows and

inflows of financial assets

.

A payments deficit emerges

when the outflows from both accounts result in an excess of
debits over credits.

A settlement must be made to balance

out the accounts, and often takes the form of gold flows.

Specifically, gold is drained in the case of a deficit.

It

was the concern over gold outflows, caused by the payments

problem, that worried Eisenhower,

A deficit undercut

America's ability to fund its overseas commitments.
Indeed, the U.S. ran a payments deficit almost every

year since 1950.

But until a jump to $3.5 billion in 1958,

the deficit had been no more than $2.1 billion from 19501957.

Gold reserves dropped $2.3 billion in 1958, in

contrast to the annual outflow of $200 million since 1950.
Furthermore, only in 1957, an exceptional year for U.S.
39

8

exports due to shortages in Europe induced by the Suez
Crisis, did the merchandise trade surplus of the mid- to

late 1950s climb above the marks set a decade before.

In

addition, a quick domestic recovery from recession in 1958

prompted a high demand for imports in America.

Thus,

the

excess of exports over imports dropped to $3,4 billion in
1958 and hit bottom at $1.1 billion in 1959, though rising
in 1960 to $4.9 billion.

Nevertheless, the overall

payments deficit in 1959 amounted to $4.2 billion and only
slightly improved in 1960 to $3.9 billion.

demanded action.

The deficit

1

Taking the payments balance out of the red was
Eisenhower'

s

primary aim in foreign economic policy by the

late 1950s, but his remedies foundered.

He tied foreign

loans to purchases in America, promoted aid and military

burden-sharing among the allies, and encouraged surplus
farm disposal.

In trade, he urged export expansion and

helped form the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to facilitate Western cooperation on
economic problems.

Washington also initiated the Dillon

Round of GATT in 1960 which brought unimpressive results
two years later.

These efforts to reverse the payments

deficit generally fell short and required the country to
rethink, with an eye possibly toward curtailing, its

foreign policy goals.

40

.

America's difficulties in financing objectives abroad,
increased friction with friendly nations, and changing
trade patterns which warranted an overhaul of the regime
were major themes in international trade.

In effect,

causes of the erosion of U.S. power were predictable.

continuation of immediate postwar supremacy was

a

the
The

virtual

impossibility, especially once the reconstruction of the

industrial countries had been completed.
1950s,

But by the late

an erratic domestic economy exposed further evidence

of waning predominance.
In fact,

sluggishness epitomized the U.S. economy as the

1950s closed.

Growth slowed, outbursts of inflation

occurred periodically, and joblessness worsened relative to
the full employment levels in other nations

conditions had serious implications.

Such

.

Feeble productivity

at home undercut production of goods necessary for export

and also for domestic consumption.

Indeed,

if this trend

were reversed, the U.S could build a larger trade surplus
and hence reverse the payments deficit.

Kennedy,

in order

to highlight Republican failings, pointed out and perhaps

exaggerated these problems.

But Eisenhower also wished to

boost growth and employment, while he lamented the halting
recovery of the economy in 1959 from recession

20

A factor hindering growth was trade competition, which
whittled away U.S. dominance in overseas markets.
merchandise trade surplus shrunk, so did exports of
41

As the

.

machinery, transportation equipment, chemicals, textiles,

and steel.

The U.S.,

for instance, became a net steel

importer by the late 1950s and European restrictions boded
ill for future trends.

Farmers also sought more exports.

Under development in the EEC was, however,

a

restrictive

agricultural system which threatened to curb the sizable
bulk of American farm sales.

For example, the Common

Market aimed to replace U.S. wheat in Germany and Benelux

with Italian and French grain,

American rural protests

over these restrictions were somewhat disingenuous since

exporters enjoyed

a

system of government protection from

low world commodity prices.

competitors

,

though,

as the decade ended

Along with other export-

farmers pushed for more access abroad
21

Imports received much of the blame, though, for economic

problems.

Farmers demanded curbs on foreign goods despite

the fact that imports declined throughout the 1950s.

Many

manufacturers felt the impact of European and Japanese
recovery and pressure from the LDCs in the form of low-

priced imports

.

Cotton textile imports, for instance, more

than tripled from 1950 to 1960.

Import-competitors claimed

such trends caused drops in production and worker lay-offs,
and that this stagnation further burdened the struggling
economy.

Most critical to the future trade policy of the

1960s was, however, that their grievances, some calculated,

others more legitimate, received much play on Capitol Hill.
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Congress, in essence, qualified the commitment to

liberal trade.

In general,

legislators had learned from

the onerous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 that free-trade was

essential to peace and prosperity.

Unlike Britain's

unilateral trade liberalization in the 1860s, however.
Congress made sure that the U.S. lowered tariffs solely on
a

reciprocal basis under the Reciprocal Trade Acts starting

in 1934.

Furthermore, Congress took as its base-point for

duty reduction the high Smoot-Hawley level, and not a more

reasonable reference, and also circumscribed the trade

liberalism of postwar presidents by attaching protective
clauses onto RTA bills. 23
These clauses were wide -spread

In 1947

.

,

the "escape

clause" became a formal mechanism in trade negotiations and

along with the "peril point" provision, it emerged as a

permanent part of the trade program by 1951.

The escape

clause, pursuant to investigations by the U.S. Tariff

Commission, permitted withdrawal of concessions from a

trade agreement which might injure an industry.
point set a point at which such

a

The peril

concession, in the form

of a tariff cut, threatened injury.

The extension of

Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in 1948, in
addition, imposed limits on commodity imports regardless of

prior agreements through a waiver from GATT, which

contradicted GATT principles.

Congress weakened but

retained in 1954 the Buy American Act of 1933, which gave

a

preference to American bidders for government orders.

The

national security clause of 1955 permitted escape from a
trade agreement if an import reached such quantities that
it impaired the country's defense effort.^"^

The RTAs of the 1950s were so loaded down with these

devices that protectionists gained leverage in trade
policy.

Eisenhower hailed his 1955 bill as

a

"tremendous

victory" for free-trade, but it called for tariff cuts of
only 15% when earlier RTAs provided for larger reductions.
The RTA of 1958 was even more of a retreat from liberal

trade.

The bill enabled any domestic industry, regardless

of whether it was crucial to U.S. defense, to seek

protection under the national security provision, and

empowered Congress to override a presidential refusal to
invoke the escape clause.

This RTA granted authority to

reduce tariffs by a meager 20%.

Liberal traders blasted

the 1958 legislation, aimed at negotiating with the new EEC

over the next four years, as "the most protectionist

measure ever passed by Congress in all the Reciprocal Trade
renewals since 1934

.
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Eisenhower's difficulty in winning enough authority to
make tariff negotiations with Europe and other GATT members

worthwhile was

a

critical development.

By the late 1950s,

the trade regime responded less than before to U.S.

prodding.

Congress made liberalization efforts, which were

necessary to unite the West, aid LDCs, and inject the

American economy with a dose of export growth, more
problematical.

Protectionists clashed with those who

accepted more imports as

a

requisite for boosting exports.

Recognizing the tricky balance between protectionism and
tariff reduction were many congressmen who criticized
Eisenhower's outworn, ineffective, and to some,
disappointing, approach to liberal trade policy.

Among

them was Senator John F. Kennedy.

Kennedy was the consummate fair-trader.

He formulated

his presidential trade policy while in Congress by

reconciling the economic, and political, realities in

import-competing Massachusetts with the national program of
liberal trade.

Foreign commerce, wrote future economic

advisor Paul Samuelson, was an issue on which Kennedy had

focused attention because of New England'

s

problems with

imports and consequent pressure from his constituents.

Yet

the senator understood the importance of free-trade, noted

economist and frequent Kennedy correspondent Seymour E.
Harris, and was convinced it was essential.

Indeed,

Kennedy explained that deciding where to stand on trade
matters in Massachusetts required a "split personality".
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He also found trade policy a sensitive subject in a

state where some segments of the economy favored low duties
in order to buy raw materials more cheaply,

like oil, while

other groups sought protection for traditional,

increasingly inefficient industries like textiles.

Kennedy

voted in favor of the RTAs throughout his congressional
career, but such support was qualified and he urged

protection for regional industries through

a

special

delegation of New England senators.
On the protectionist side of fair-trade, Kennedy blamed

imports for deterioration in key sectors of New England's
economy.

In soft goods,

for instance, he not only

criticized government policies which ignored the movement
of factories to the low-wage South but also the rising

inflow of low-wage imports which had diminished textile
New England lost 150,000 jobs between 1929 and

production.

1950 as hundreds of mills closed.

As a response, Kennedy

denounced Eisenhower's inaction in limiting textile imports
from Asia as

"lack of comprehension or mis judgment " or

a

"indifference".

Reservation"

,

He demanded quotas and backed the "Geneva

which permitted

a

raise in textile duties

when GATT provided insufficient protection

28

imports were again among the

In the fishing sector,

reasons Kennedy cited for industry troubles

.

He noted that

lags in research and development and scarcity of some

species caused stagnation

.

Yet after constituents informed

him of the sizeable yearly increases of fillet imports, he

blamed rising imports from northern Europe for the drop in
sales by American fishermen of groundfish and ocean perch
in 1952.

Without protection, he concluded, the old fishing

industry of Massachusetts would soon be extinct.

Kennedy

did not seek higher tariffs in instances such as these

merely for the sake of "unjustifiable protection from
foreign competition".

Instead, he argued "that there are

certain industries which by their nature are unable to
compete with imports on
I

a fair basis.

In those situations,

feel that a tariff to equalize competition is

necessary

.
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The depressed state of certain interests taught Kennedy

early in his career that protection was

a

practical

necessity from an economic and political standpoint, and
thus he frequently fought for import relief.

He lodged a

complaint with Eisenhower, for example, after the President

refused to uphold

a

Tariff Commission report which

recommended import restrictions on fish.

The RTA was "not

designed to crucify the ancient New England fishing
industry", Kennedy proclaimed, but it had permitted so much

"cutthroat competition" from northern Europe that major
30
ports were fast becoming "dead" cities.

The remedy was

simple, he told a Massachusetts labor organization.

"We

know that our fisheries, our jewelry, and certain other
industries need protection if they are not to be offered as
a

sacrifice to the theoretical principle of free trade".
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This pragmatic view of trade, the basis of the fair-

trade doctrine, portrayed Kennedy as a protectionist early
in his political career.

"Everyone recognizes the

desirability of free trade between nations

...

as an

ideal", he asserted in 1952.

The complete removal of trade

barriers was possible only when the prevention of injury to
U.S. producers was certain.
a "one-way street" with

Tariff reduction could not be

America bearing the burden.

Without import relief, America would merely "be putting the
cart of the ideal before the horse of our own bread and

butter "^^
.

In effect,

Kennedy argued that theory did not mesh with

the hard facts of depression in New England or in global

trends in foreign trade.

Contrary to popular belief, the

U.S. possessed low tariffs comparable to the Benelux and

Scandinavian nations

.

Consequently, American imports had

more than quintupled over the past twenty -five years while

European protectionism had outlasted its necessity

Kennedy complained that "a cardinal principle" of
international trade had been violated; America was "being
33
subjected to unfair and unequal discrimination" abroad

When economist Charles P. Kindleberger called Kennedy

a

protectionist, the senator tempered his tone but replied
that his trade views were more complicated than the label
implied.

He opposed unfair discriminatory trade practices

against American goods, that is, an import policy which

jeopardized the welfare of New England.
Though he appeared as

protectionist, Kennedy at bottom

His position on foreign trade policy was

was not one.

grounded in

a

34

a

New Deal faith that government should cure
48

economic distress.

Seeking a consistent balance between

national and local interests, the senator believed the
federal government had an obligation to modify U.S. trade

policy when imports threatened entire industries.

He

sympathized with Eisenhower's dilemma of reconciling "the
conflicting national interest" of freer trade with the
"legitimate needs" of a few domestic interests.

President Franklin

D.

Just as

Roosevelt had overseen the transition

to a war economy, however,

so Eisenhower must give

assistance to those hurt by the nation's trade policy.
He found a means for national aid in a government

financed program of "adjustment assistance" which became
one leg of his fair-trade doctrine.

He borrowed the remedy

from David McDonald, head of the United Steel Workers.

Adjustment assistance provided for compensation or
retraining for workers, loans for businesses, and
development aid to areas adversely affected by imports.
The Eisenhower administration rejected the plan, as did

other anti-big government conservatives.

Kennedy fared no

better when he introduced adjustment assistance as

a

bill

alongside successive RTAs and the Area Redevelopment Act in
the 1950s.

Despite such opposition, Kennedy supported adjustment
assistance throughout his political career.

He argued that

the provision was not a subsidy, but merely consolidated

existing federal aid programs into one act.

Recognizing

that liberal trade was embedded in U.S. foreign policy,
his

program was

a

third alternative to tariff hikes or cuts

which would not result in the "mutilation" of the RTA.

The

escape clause had failed to protect producers, he claimed,
since only three of forty-three applications for relief had

won protection.

Instead relegating industries to "suffer

in silence" because of the national interest in lowering

tariffs, the President had

a

viable option. Adjustment

assistance was a compromise, permitting "the constantly

increasing international trade so essential to the economic
health of the United States without jeopardizing the
welfare of affected industries and their employees".
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Most important, adjustment assistance allowed Kennedy to
be consistent in trade policy

.

He could advocate

protection for injured interests but remain in the

mainstream of New Deal ideology as an adherent to liberal
trade.

By no means a doctrinaire free-trader, he told his

constituents nonetheless to be realistic, for regardless of
local attitudes, the postwar trend in foreign trade was

toward less restrictions

.

Even in the case of the fishing

industry he opposed excluding imports, arguing instead for
a "fair

and equitable" quota with which to prop up

fishermen. "In all frankness", he wrote a voter, he

approved of liberal trade.
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High tariffs, he emphasized in revealing the free-trade
leg of his fair-trade ideology, provided only a temporary
50

solution to production for American industry.

Indeed,

while "indiscriminate competition" from other nations

should be avoided, America must encourage trade

liberalization and enhance economic cooperation in the
world.

In sum, Kennedy supported the RTA because he was "a

firm believer in subsequent international agreements by

which other nations have been enabled to sell their
products in the United States, as we sell our products
abroad.

World trade can never be a one-way street".

His father's profitable liquor importing business

demonstrated the financial benefits of lower tariffs to
Kennedy.

As ambassador to England, Joseph Kennedy had

helped negotiate the Anglo-American trade agreement of 1938
which reduced restrictions on a reciprocal basis between

Washington and London.

He spouted free-trade dogma in

claiming that liberalization would end economic conflict,
increase the standard of living, and unify the democracies.
There was, meanwhile, no doubt that lower tariffs would

enhance the sales of imported liquor, of which the
^
^
was a major concessionaire.
ambassador
.

.
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Such personal gains aside, his son understood that the

harmful effects of trade restrictions damaged the American
economy as a whole.
injury.

Thus, though cognizant of import

Senator Kennedy usually rejected the notion that

low tariffs were the culprit.

He argued instead that

competition from the South and factors of inefficient

production, such as outmoded plant facilities, expensive

transportation and power, lack of diversification, and
scarce capital investment, were the key causes of economic

difficulties.

On those occasions when he backed a tariff

hike, he preferred it be of temporary nature and adjusted

downward once its need had been fulfilled.

"^"^

Though sensitive to the potential political backlash
from this liberal trade bent, he had no qualms in telling

producers that they exaggerated the impact of trade
competition.

Kennedy disputed protectionist contentions

that imports worsened domestic employment, especially since

nearly a third of New England's jobs relied on low-priced
raw material imports such as oil.

Even in the region, he

perceptively claimed, the profits from exports of most
firms overcame losses incurred from imports

depress imports", he said,

reductions in exports.

.

"If we

"then there will also be

Foreign countries cannot buy our

goods unless they have entry for theirs "

42
.

Such was the

rationale behind the fair-trade doctrine.
At the heart of this belief in the advantages of

reciprocal trade was his interest in foreign affairs

.

The

harmful effects of restrictions on American foreign policy
and international relations far outweighed the benefits of

protectionism.

His father's service in England during the

high-tariff era of the 1930s had demonstrated to Kennedy
the dangers of economic nationalism which had caused a
52

schism between America and Europe.

Joining other postwar

leaders, he advocated liberal trade to reduce the chances
of future political conflict,
In the 1950s,

the danger was international communism,

and here Kennedy viewed free-trade as a means to combat
Soviet economic competition.

Protectionism would undermine

America's ability to meet Russian advances with attractive
trade opportunities for members of the Western alliance.
"It is a fact",

emerged in 1958,

he wrote a constituent as the Common Market
"that American rigidity would probably

force European nations to seek trade outlets in Communist

bloc countries with resulting adverse political

consequences

,
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The creation of the EEC and EFTA and relations within

the Atlantic community were of paramount importance to the

liberal trade part of Kennedy'
1954,

for instance

,

s

commercial ideology

.

In

he opposed a rigid adherence to the Buy

American Act; U.S. employment had to be weighed against the
economic needs of America'

s

allies

When the European

.

trade blocs planned to raise trade barriers to outsiders,

Kennedy urged them instead to "create an environment" in
which other nations would willingly reduce restrictions in

tandem with Europe.

Giving this logic an institutional

base, the senator backed American membership in the

Organization for Trade Cooperation,

a

forum which would

give the U.S. a "decisive voice" in promoting a liberal

trade order and perhaps slow the decay of U.S. global

power 45
In the LDCS as well,

commerce became one of Kennedy's

chief concerns and provided further evidence of his

adherence to liberal, fair trade.

After visiting the

Middle East and Asia in 1951, where he saw firsthand the

vulnerability of the South to Soviet influence, he
suggested that the U.S. should concentrate aid also on the
LDCs and not just on Europe.

Kennedy sought to close the

"economic gap" between the South and North also through aid
and commerce because, as he noted, the Third World had not

really shared in the tremendous growth in world trade

during the 1950s.

While he cited U.S. recessions for

lowering the prices of LDC commodities and thus worsening
their terms of trade with the North, he generally indicted

Eisenhower for a lack of imagination in foreign economic
programs 46
As possible solutions, Kennedy recommended reducing U.S.

tariffs and quotas, easing Export-Import Bank restrictions,
and negotiating international commodity agreements to boost

prices of Third World goods and raise revenue for
development.

He also backed the formation of regional

economic blocs along the integrationist lines of the EEC in
order to enhance stability and self-sufficiency in the
South.

He also proposed an end to unilateral exporting

schemes in wheat.

By not cooperating with other Northern

agricultural producer nations in exporting farm surpluses,

America increasingly alienated its friends, disrupted
global commodity trade, and in the end, opened the way to
Soviet dumping of these goods as political pressure on the

LDCs 47
.

Undergirding these modifications of trade and aid
programs were the unifying economic and political purposes
of the fair-trade doctrine.

In the long-run,

a lack of

growth in the LDCs due to decreased exports would

deleteriously affect the economies of the industrialized
nations by slowing down their expansion, too.

Very likely,

stagnation would set off mutually self-defeating trade wars
in the North,

similar to those of the 1930s.

Thus, Kennedy

urged an increase for the real income of the Southern
nations by ensuring that international trade channels were

held open.

By accelerating growth in underdeveloped areas

through aid, assuring market access, and lessening import
restrictions, the North could show the LDCs "that the

democratic process is

a

persuasive method of creation, not

frustration"
By the late 1950s, Kennedy had developed his trade

perspective into

a

coherent fair-trade doctrine.

Lowering

trade barriers took precedent over protectionism, yet he
sought to prevent injury to certain domestic industries.

While he knew expansion of world commerce was important, he

refused to give unqualified support to
55

a

free-trade policy

which jeopardized public welfare.

His answer was a "double

attack" of adjustment assistance undergirded by the
Area

Redevelopment bill, which would address inherent economic
problems not caused by imports.

In 1959, he co-sponsored

labor legislation which offered protection, but not tariff
relief,

from low-wage imports

i

When the last RTA of his senate career exited the Senate
Finance Committee in 1958 in diluted form, however, Kennedy

expressed his disappointment as
trade.

a

firm advocate of free-

He eventually voted for the bill, but had earlier

made known his complaint that the RTA was too rigidly

protectionist in its grant of bargaining authority for
negotiations.

The Common Market now a key concern in

trade, Kennedy rejected the "sledge-hammer approach" of

protectionists in attaching "dubious" restrictions on

presidential authority to lower tariffs. 50

Decisively in the camp of liberal traders, Kennedy saw
trade as a crucial element in U.S. foreign policy of the
1960s,

especially in maintaining America's position in the

international economy

.

clear", he told a voter.

" I

have long made my position
"We must have a reciprocal trade

policy if we are to preserve our relationship to foreign
governments and if we are to encourage our domestic
industry to produce for foreign markets".

51

The "somewhat

jaded battles" between protectionists and liberal traders

were irrelevant since every nation possessed high and low

duties.

Protectionism, in sum, was no longer viable in an

increasingly interdependent world, he warned, for such

policy would create

a

a

vacuum for Soviet economic and hence

political penetration into the Third World and also weaken
the economic base of the Western alliance.

He remained

convinced that liberal trade helped "cement together the
nations of the free world".

A pragmatic, calaculated, but also fair trade strategy
should guide U.S. policy.

In GATT negotiations, Kennedy

candidly declared that Washington should not be
If

philanthropic".

If

hard bargainers" and demand equal concessions from other

nations.

Instead, he expected Americans to be

But toughness must be mixed with the recognition

that the basis for a permanently healthy domestic economy

rested on the U.S. also giving up concessions

.

Lowering

duties helped America since other nations earn dollars with

which to purchase a more U.S. goods.

Increased trade thus

led to a rising standard of living for all.

In effect, the

"great merit of the trade agreements system is that it
53
permits all parties to the agreements to benefit".

On the presidential campaign trail in 1960, Democratic

Party candidate Kennedy also shunned protectionism.

He

planned to "get the country moving again" by boosting
output among producers at an annual rate of 5%, because

growth was the "best protection" against displacement from
imports.

Noting America's lagging growth among
57

industrialized nations since 1953, he warned against
"economic slackness" because competition would be "keener"

during the decade ahead.

Witnesses at

a

hearing on the

U.S. -Common Market relationship echoed this exhortation.

Congressman Mike Monroney (D-OK) said, for instance, that
the country had become "overly fat and a little self-

satisfied" in the 1950s,
competition.

unconcerned about foreign

A failure to modernize, provide good service,

or gear products to European demand had lost America its

preeminence in the typewriter and small automobile markets
to a more "lean, thin, and hungry" EEC.

Yet debate during the campaign on trade necessarily had

more domestic overtones since Kennedy and Republican

candidate Richard M. Nixon knew that free-trade had no

voter appeal in import -competing areas

Kennedy spoke with

.

caution, particularly in the South, not only because

textile firms there had suffered during the past decade,
but because he expected electoral difficulties in the

region over the Catholic and race issues.

Textilemen

groaned that both candidates were "free traders", but
singled out Kennedy for criticism.

While he had indeed

denounced Eisenhower for increasing imports, they
commented, the candidate's record showed that he would

"broadly boost, not restrict, imports."
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The Democratic platform offered, however, more

protection than it was credited for, although less than the
58

Republican plank.

The Democrats resoundingly endorsed the

RTA as the means to meet the challenge of EEC, help the
Third World, correct the payments deficit, and unite the
West against communism.

They adopted adjustment assistance

to protect domestic industries.

The Republicans, though

pressing for liberal trade, supported more protectionist
devices,

including increased use of the escape clause,

national security provision, and voluntary import quotas.
This platform perhaps made Kennedy appear less willing to
act for import-competitors, though aides also worried that

his isolated protectionist remarks, such as requests for

voluntary textile quotas, might be construed as
inconsistent with the liberal trade.

Yet Kennedy knew that

his seemingly contradictory stance was an inherent part of

the tricky balancing act of satisfying foreign, national,

and local needs through fair-trade
The campaign was the culmination of a congressional

career which juggled liberal trade with

declining but vocal domestic interests.

a

sensitivity to
In effect, most

national leaders had done the same, for the postwar trade
regime under GATT permitted protectionism at the same time

negotiations to lower commercial barriers were underay.
Coming from a state that epitomized the troubles with
rising imports, Kennedy accepted trade restrictions as

political fact of life.

a

He clashed with the Eisenhower

administration on this score, since the President naturally

fostered national over regional solutions to the import
problem.

But Kennedy and Eisenhower agreed on the merits

of free-trade for economic and international reasons.

Differences between Kennedy and the administration
existed, however.

As a New Deal adherent, the senator

accepted the notion of Big Government.

Thus, while the

conservative Eisenhower relied on traditional, yet
ineffective devices such as the escape clause and peril
point as a means to protect import-competitors, Kennedy

proposed the social security safety net of adjustment
assistance as a remedy.

During the 1960s, this measure

changed the concept of import injury by the extent to which
domestic interests could be subjected to liberal trade.
Nonetheless, it actually provided more protection than the

escape clause

,

which under Eisenhower had been invoked only

rarely
In essence, Eisenhower remained entrenched in

increasingly obsolete, and at times insensitive, methods of
dealing with imports.

By the end of his tenure,

ironically, he had provoked a wave of protectionism that

undercut his authority to lower tariffs in the RTA.

Kennedy and the vanguard of the Democratic Party initiated,
on the other hand, an imaginative program which addressed

contemporary conditions in the domestic economy and
international trade regime.

Their willingness to apply

even doses of government aid and laissez-faire trade
60

competition

exemplified

a

workable American policy for the

future
Such trade management underscored Kennedy's forward-

looking vision in foreign affairs which confronted

America's declining predominance across the globe.

While

Eisenhower fostered free-trade with Europe, an intimate
Atlantic community, and Third World development, his
actions seemed tired and oftentimes fell flat.

Kennedy,

while seeking the same goals, hoped to adopt more forceful,

dramatic ways of meeting the challenges to U.S. power with

overhauled aid, trade, and general foreign policies.

In

trade, he planned to attack competition from the EEC and

inherent flaws in the LDC system, hoping to adapt America
to its vitiated world economic status through energetic

measures

,

not modifications of outworn ones

Kennedy took to the presidency an expertise in foreign
trade which he had acquired first-hand

.

The purpose of his

new administration, he announced, would be "to make
effective the concept of responsible trade among free
nations by means which will promote the economic prosperity
of all peoples while ensuring equitable conditions of

competition for our own industries".
in November,
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The victory secured

1960, the President-elect set out to achieve

this fair-trade objective
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2

A NEW FRONTIER IN TRADE, 1960-1962
President Kennedy set out immediately to give substance
to his fair-trade doctrine.

With an eye on sending

a

trade

bill to Congress in 1962 once the Reciprocal Trade Act
(RTA)

of 1958 expired, the administration addressed

America's trade program.

Though committed to a liberal

trade regime, the President approached commerce and other

matters affecting the domestic economy with extra caution.

After all, his slim victory at the polls denied him

a

legislative mandate that would have allowed an immediate
overhaul of the RTA.

He therefore recognized that to

attract Congress to his objectives in trade, he must press
for liberalization but protect import-competitors,
The new leaders in Washington accepted that the rise of

Europe and other trade partners, and the consequent decline
in American foreign economic power, necessitated a broadly

revised trade policy.

Indications of the change in

relative power were abundant in 1961.

The Kennedy team

hoped to recapture the initiative in trade liberalization
that Europe, and even the LDCs, had seized from Eisenhower

and strengthen American leadership among the allies.

Developments in 19 61 presented the administration with an
opportunity to address the challenges of the trade regime,

especially those from the Common Market.
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Thus,

decision-making in trade policy reflected both

legs of the fair-trade doctrine.

Kennedy^

s

adherence to

the doctrine and his method of reserving the ultimate

decisions for himself essentially predetermined trade

policy during his presidency.

Eliminating much of the

previous administration's ponderous foreign economic policy
bureaucracy, he informally tapped certain bureaucrats and
aides for policy options."^

Yet,

their opinions served as

mere reminders of the foreign and domestic complexities of
trade policy, not as attempts to control decisions along
the lines of the bureaucratic politics model.

The actual

decision-making stemmed from Kennedy's own calculations
concerning the pervasiveness of congressional protectionism
and his desire to encourage international cooperation in

free-trade
The bureaucracy exemplified these two inherently

divergent policies.

The views of Undersecretary of State

for Economic Affairs George W. Ball, a friend of EEC

founder Jean Monnet, represented the liberal traders.

Nicknamed "Mr. Europe", Ball linked free-trade to amicable
international relations

.

Though in agreement, Kennedy

feared a backlash from Ball's dogmatic avowal of trade
liberalism.

Some congressmen criticized the State

Department for granting too many concessions to other
nations at negotiations.

Needing someone to mollify Ball's

provocative stance, Kennedy found Secretary of Commerce
82

Luther H. Hodges.

The President's first appointee, this

former governor and textile industry spokesman astutely

gauged of protectionist sentiment and enjoyed considerable

popularity with import-competitors.^
With Hodges as a shield against protectionists, Kennedy
and Ball sought trade liberalization in order to reverse
one of the President's biggest obsessions:

deficit.

Treasury Secretary

C.

the payments

Douglas Dillon, a Wall

Street investor and former State Department official,

concurred that the deficit and subsequent gold drain were

pressing matters, and Kennedy asserted that the deficit was
"not a joke", especially for a world leader. The problem

threatened domestic programs, might reduce overseas
commitments, and gave gold-hording nations like France the

leverage against U.S. designs.

A trade surplus was

insufficient to balance the debit in the capital account,

causing an average deficit of nearly $3.5 billion between
1960-1963.

Pervading economic discussions at the White

House, the deficit reportedly scared Kennedy as much as

nuclear war because it hurt not only U.S. prestige but
capabilities at home and abroad.

3

The deficit also posed a domestic dilemma for the New

Frontier.

Recovery from recent recesssion would increase

imports and worsen the deficit, but correcting the deficit

required a cut in imports.

Kennedy admitted that he could

reverse the deficit by raising tariffs, and later confessed
83

that his liberal trade bill would not, by itself, solve
the
problem.

But this remedy was protectionist, and was

unfeasible because of its bad effects on trade and general
foreign relations.

Instead, he set wage and price

guideposts to prevent inflation and keep U.S. export costs
competitive.

But the deficit demonstrated that America was

no longer the predominant global economic power, and could

not shape its domestic stabilization policies without

considering the international repercussions.'^
While protectionists claimed that trade restrictions

would alleviate the payments crisis, the administration
disagreed.

In a report commissioned by Kennedy during the

transition from the Eisenhower presidency, Ball argued that

protectionism created only "ephemeral" gains by preventing
long-term adjustments to

global trade patterns and

instigated nations to close markets and raise tariffs.

In

that event, Americans would opt to invest abroad than pay

these higher duties through exports

.

The resulting

scenario of capital and job flight, Kennedy frequently
warned, was a worsened deficit.

His fears were warranted.

Attractive market opportunities and the threat of high
tariffs in Europe had doubled U.S. investments in the EEC

between 1959 and 1960 to nearly $1 billion, with increases
ranging from 100% in Belgium and Luxembourg to 165% in West
Germany

5
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The solution to the deficit problem included a
free-

trade program written by Ball which became the foundation
of the administration's trade bill.
a

The proposal advocated

reduction in barriers, increased access to European

markets, and promoted multilateral institutions to boost
trade,

A form of competitive cooperation with Europe was

the key to Ball's plan,

America, as only the "strongest of

the strong", could not expect "an unquestioning response to
our demands for a common policy" from the EEC.

Thus,

Kennedy must initiate an overhaul of the obsolete RTA to
help the U.S. compete with the Six.

In doing so,

he could

prevent the Atlantic community from dissolving into two
separate trade or political systems, and might even lure

Britain and the rest of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)

nations into the Common Market.

Then,

a

unified

alliance economy would possess the resources to enable
Europe to share the financial burden of defense and LDC

assistance programs that Washington had borne for so long
and which had adversely effected the deficit.

This plan

was the economic leg of Kennedy's "Grand Design".

Kennedy tacitly endorsed the Ball recommendations out of
the recognition that American power would slip still

further if exports and other measures did not right the

payments balance.

He agreed that protectionism provoked

retaliation from abroad, could turn the trade surplus into
a

deficit, and thus add to the dollar woes.
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The payments

deficit would be more burdensome in the decades
ahead, he
predicted. "If we're not able to export substantially
more

than we import", he warned three weeks after the
inauguration,

"we're going to either cut all assistance to

countries abroad or begin to draw our troops home".'^
The stubborn deficit showed that America' undisputed

reign over the world economic order had ended.

The Common

Market now compelled adjustments in America's trade and
financial dealings overseas, in

a sense

reversing the adage

that when the U.S. sneezed, Europe caught a cold.

America suffered recessions,

While

growth rate that was one-

a

third of the EECs, and 7% unemployment, Europe, and even
stagnating Great Britain, performed better.

West Germany

claimed that there were five job openings for every one

person unemployed and boasted

a 1%

jobless rate.

Italian

and French chemical, steel, and appliance manufacturers

reported such booming sales that they had to turn away
orders.

g

That the U.S. must accept a more pluralist

international order and ensure that it remain open through
liberal trade was a foregone conclusion for Kennedy

Debate over U.S. ratification of the Convention of the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)

in early 1961 demonstrated Kennedy's acceptance of a

mutually beneficial trade regime.
nations,

This body of eighteen

soon to include Japan, provided an institutional

foundation for an Atlantic partnership in trade.
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Protectionists in Congress, however, opposed the potential

meddling in U.S. policy which might result from the OECD
They revealed the political pitfalls involved in pressing
for liberal trade and kept Kennedy conscious of the role

import-competitors played in his fair-trade doctrine.
Trade was the major point of contention in the

ratification process.

Smaller nations, seeking to increase

their access to markets in larger countries, noted

unhappily that the U.S. and others had relegated the OECD
to a mere consultative role in trade.

Congress insisted on

this vitiated function by refusing beforehand to let the
OECD substitute for GATT, which it had never formally
approved.

Protectionists zeroed in on the Code of

Liberalization of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, the precursor to the OECD, which entailed a

promise among Europeans not to discriminate against each
other.

If carried over into the OECD,

the Code would bind

Americans to trade agreements without approval from
Congress, and thus undermine the RTA'

s

authority.

As a

result of pressure against such "constitutional

encroachment", Eisenhower refused to attach the Code to the

completed OECD Convention in December I960.

9

Kennedy carefully circumvented the trade issue in his
public pronouncements on the OECD.

He showed a special

interest in the forum, though reportedly believed that it
was too weak to be of significant use.
87

But he recognized

that Eisenhower had left him with a sure winner in

international affairs since every ally had endorsed the
OECD,

and that its ratification was a certainty in

Congress.

Noting the sentiment that the Code had stirred

up in Congress, however, he promoted the OECD as a

facilitator of cooperation on foreign aid burden-sharing to
help the deficit and as an organization which would
encourage Western unity.

"'"'^

Administration forces rallied behind this rationale, but
protectionists remained skeptical.
Rusk, Ball,

Secretary of State Dean

and Dillon pledged repeatedly that decisions in

trade would be outside the domain of the OECD.
for ratification,

said Senator William Fulbright

The reason
(D-Ark.)

during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, was to
win the cold war through economic cooperation.

But letters

to Fulbright against U.S. membership numbered ten times

more than those in favor and showed how deeply rooted was

protectionist sentiment regarding the OECD.
Department, asserted Congressman W.

J.

The State

Bryan Dorn (D-SC)

had already been "outfoxed and outtraded" in previous
negotiations

.

Now,

decisions which would effect American

imports and exports would be reached at OECD headquarters
in Paris,

"completely out of the range of eyesight or

influence" of Congress, added James

C.

Davis

(D-GA)

11

Opposition to lower trade barriers was at the bottom of
these comments.

Indeed, many interests backed the OECD,
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including the National Association of Manufacturers.

But

import-competitors, ranging from piano manufacturers to

milk associations feared that the forum would precipitate
large-scale tariff reductions.

Ardent protectionists

declared that efforts to end restrictions should be
corralled in Congress.

Other producers accepted the

inevitability of freer trade yet sought

liberalization policy.

a

moderate

An electronics industry executive,

for instance, appealed to Kennedy not "to rush pell-mell

down the road to free trade" without some form of "shock

absorbers" for industry 12

Antagonism toward the Common Market also surfaced.
Fulbright informed southerners that their farm exports to
the EEC could be expanded through discussion in the OECD.
Yet many producers feared that the Six, by unfairly

refusing products from low-wage nations, would force the

United States to shoulder the burden and increase its
intake of these highly competitive goods.

The U.S. was

also naive in hoping the Common Market would consider

American interests when fashioning its import policy, added
liberal traders Seymour Harris and John K. Galbraith.

They

thought Kennedy was too anxious to accommodate the EEC by
not criticizing its selfish trade policies.

13

Yet Kennedy had already recognized that though Europe

might be overly-restrictive, reducing tariffs was the only

realistic way to open the EEC to outsiders.
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This view was

at the heart of his plans for Japan and the LDCs
in the

OECD.

To be sure, Americans hoped to restrict Japanese

exports and complained that Tokyo's low wages unfairly

lowered the price of its exports and had caused its exports
to the U.S. to double from 1956 to 1961.

But producers

ignored the fact that the U.S. maintained

a

the Japanese of almost $800 million.

surplus with

Admittedly in need of

liberalizing its import policy, Japan still worried about
"signs of regression" in U.S. trade policy.

Visiting to

Washington in June, 1961, Premier Hayato Ikeda declared
that his businessmen were losing enthusiasm for the

American market.

Other officials asked how the U.S. could

square restrictions toward Japan with the demand that

Europe lower its trade barriers? 14
The answer was that to a large extent, Kennedy had to

respond to Congress, which was very sensitive to import
injury, while pressing for free-trade.

Thus, he promised

Ikeda an "orderly expansion of trade", stressing at the
same time that the U.S. could not expect to just sell

overseas and never buy goods from abroad.
the table on Ikeda'

s

He could turn

frustration with American policy by

attacking Japan's foreign exchange controls which penalized
U.S. exports.

Yet Tokyo remained the best customer of

American farm exports, an important consideration now that
the EEC's restrictive agricultural policy was nearly in
place.

Meanwhile, Japan needed markets to sustain its
90

growth rate and, most important, curb

a

desire for trade

outlets outside the Western alliance, particularly in

Communist China.

"^^

Walt Rostow of the State Department suggested that the
U.S. champion Japan's membership in the OECD as it had

backed Tokyo's entry into GATT

.

Presently defining its

role in international politics, Japan might be angered by
its exclusion from this club of industrial nations.

exports also curbed, Japan could turn to China,

a

Its

Kennedy

nemesis, or form a peaceful, inward-looking version of the

former Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The EEC felt Tokyo was "not

ready" for full membership status, however, and delayed

Japan's entry until 1964.

Prohibitively restrictive of

Asian imports, the Six feared

a

Japanese presence in the

OECD would begin a flood of low-cost goods into Europe.
This position clashed against U.S. plans to divert such

products from America, which imported twice as many goods
from Japan than Europe, to the thriving Common Market.

1

The OECD could advance this aim.

Trade diversion applied to LDC exports as well.

The

colonial independence movement of the past few years had

provided the initial impetus for the globally-oriented
OECD.

The U.S. hoped that Europe would assume a greater

share of funding assistance programs and buy more Southern

products.

Ball promised Congress that the OECD would

expose those rich nations which refused to meet their

responsibilities in LDC trade and

Fair-trade meant

aid.^^'^

that low-cost Third World exports, because they
oftentimes

easily outsold goods made in the North, would be
spread

equitably among the industrial countries.
This forceful approach to Europe and sensitivity to

concerns at home earned congressional approval of the OECD
on 16 March 1961.

A special "interpretation" by Congress

discarded the Code of Liberalization and relieved America
from any obligations made in trade agreements.

Careful not

to provoke anxious congressmen, Kennedy concentrated his

remarks on the themes of Western economic cooperation and

unity on which free-traders and protectionists alike
agreed.

To be sure, the administration believed that

America must take an active part in OECD operations and
supported the target growth rate of 50% in the members'
collective GNP over the next decade.

1

Overall, the OECD

became a symbol of multilateral cooperation among nations
who enjoyed equal standing with America for the first time

since the war.
The OECD episode was a test run for Kennedy's trade

plans

.

Import -competitors battled for the first time

against supporters of the New Frontier'

s

liberal trade

policies, even though the former group expected to lose

this round

.

Regardless, protectionists indicated that new

trade legislation would encounter a much bigger fight,

a

prospect Kennedy feared because he hoped to face the Common
92

Market with substantial negotiating authority.

The EEC had

accelerated its timetable for putting in place its common
external tariff by

1

January 1962, and offered an initial

cut of 20% if America responded with reciprocal reductions
at the GATT talks which were already underway.

Revitalizing the RTA program demanded action, wrote
Professor Jacob Viner in an assessment of the
administration's first one hundred days of foreign economic
policy.

Regardless of its recent tariff cut proposal, the

EEC was still a preferential trading bloc with the

potential for building a restrictive tariff wall.

Worse,

Kennedy had not yet indicated the concessions on imports
the U.S. might offer to meet the European demands at the

trade negotiations, protectionism was on the rise in
Congress, and the RTA was soon due to expire.

international trade regime had reached

a

The

crossroads.

1

The President answered the call by setting up the

administrative machinery to write a new trade bill.

He

concurred with aide Richard Neustadt^s plan to direct the
bill from the White House under a task force.

A search

began for candidates to head the group who were well-versed
in the technical as well as political aspects of trade,

respected by Congress, and preferably Republican to assure
a

non-partisan approach.

Howard

C.

The administration settled on

Petersen, a former undersecretary of war, a close

friend of Ball's, and now a Republican banker interested in

foreign trade.

Like Kennedy, Petersen held a hard-nosed

view of trade.

He faulted America as much as Europe for

agricultural barriers, high tariffs, and restrictions
against LDC goods, but criticized the EEC common
tariff

because it diverted many products to the U.S. market.

Urging acceptance of the principles of just compensation,
comparative advantage, and realistic access to markets,

Petersen declared that "most of all, we shall have to
create the fact and appearance of fairness" in trade.

Petersen debated Ball over the bill.

Both agreed on

authority to halve tariffs over five years, but differed on
the extent of safeguards from imports.

Petersen revised

the peril point, or the import level which permitted escape

from a tariff agreement, because its elimination would
invite the wrath of protectionists.

Ball removed the peril

points as part of his plan to junk entirely the RTA.

Their

major point of contention was when to present the bill to
Congress.

Ball said Petersen's suggestion of 1962 was too

early to offer a radical departure in trade policy.

He

feared that provoking protectionists might hurt Democratic

Party prospects in an election year.

Kennedy also needed

more time to educate the public on the link between freer
trade and American economic health.

Above all. Ball

delayed so as not to upset Britain's chances of entering
the EEC.

21
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Its trade on the Continent threatened,

its leadership

role in European politics undercut, and its economy
mired
in a state of stagnation, Britain had announced
this course
in August,

1961.

Many British citizens opposed accession

because of the potential loss of sovereignty, farm
subsidies which kept prices high for farmers but acceptably
I

low for consumers, and the preferential trade system of

which the Commonwealth nations depended for duty-free
access into British markets.

Prime Minister Harold

Macmillan pledged to protect these interests, but knew that
the future of Europe lay not with the British-led EFTA, but

with the blossoming EEC which had already drained U.S.
investment capital out of England.

He also believed his

country could step in as a leader in the event that Charles
de Gaulle did not survive the Algerian crisis or German

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer retired. 22
While the Six in general encouraged Britain, de Gaulle

doubted British sincerity in upholding Common Market goals,
especially economic and political integration.
made the application suspect.

History

England had not only stayed

aloof when the EEC was formed, but had been decidely

hostile to the Six.

London's deep commercial and political

ties to the Commonwealth and the United States bothered de
Gaulle, who wondered about Britain's committment to a

wholly European bloc.

Once a member, de Gaulle feared,

Macmillan might lean more toward Atlanticism and boost U.S.
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preeminence in Europe, destroy the purpose of the
EEC, and
subvert French leadership on the continent.
The Kennedy administration recognized Gaullist

suspicions as a legitimate concern.

London stressed a

"special relationship" between the U.S. and Britain,

founded on their affinity in military, political, and
economic affairs.

Though soured over the Suez incident and

recent U.S. opposition to the EFTA, Britain hoped that

relations would blossom under the anglophile Kennedy.

wish was mere illusion.

This

Kennedy and Macmillan were on

friendly terms, but the appointment of "Europe-first"

proponent Ball implied
binds in trade.

a

loosening of the Anglo-American

Kennedy reportedly pleaded ignorant when

the Prime Minister referred to the special relationship.
In effect,

the U.S. sought a special relationship not with

the UK, but with all of Europe in a united Atlantic

community 24
Thus, when the British sounded out Ball in late March,
1961,

concerning the accession, he told them that America

would applaud the move on the condition that London accept
the political integration of the EEC as a step toward

Western unity.

Contrary to the claims of de Gaulle,

British anti-Common Marketeers, and hegemony scholars,

Washington desired but had not forced the entry on London.
Some Americans,

such as Galbraith, even opposed accession

because Britain might worsen the U.S. payments balance by

adding to an even stronger high-tariff bloc in
Europe.
Ball and Kennedy thought the opposite; membership
would
keep the EEC open.

Nevertheless, before Macmillan visited

Washington in early April, Ball cautioned Kennedy that the
Prime Minister might seek the "best of both worlds"

advantages through a loose association without

-

trade

a full

commitment to European integration,^^
The President was aware of this possibility, but was

also enthusiastic about the application.

He accepted the

judgment that a more competitive Europe might hurt U.S.

trade interests, yet was confident that if the EEC expanded
trade with other nations, the benefits of membership would

outweigh the potential economic problems.

Accession would

prevent the Six from turning inward and restricting access
to outsiders, as Britain would act as America's

"lieutenant" in Europe to counter Gaullist nationalism.
But without a doubt, entry would also serve British and

European aims.

Although "in every case" it might not be in

American economic interests to back Britain, Kennedy added,
"we believe

[the UK] builds a stronger Europe"

These hopes dampened when Britain qualified its

application.

Just after his visit with Kennedy, in which

he had expressed his willingness to plunge Britain into

Europe, MacMillan retreated to the "old grooves" of British

policy.

Due to intense pressure at home, he suggested that

the President press for transitional arrangements for UK

agriculture, the Commonwealth, and the EFTA during

Kennedy's meeting with de Gaulle in June, 1961.

De Gaulle

rebuffed Kennedy's representations, claiming that
he had
known all along that Britan would attach strings to
its

application.

27

At best, the meeting aggravated de Gaulle's

suspicion that Britain would be Kennedy's "Trojan horse" in

Europe
Though sympathetic to the political constraints on
MacMillan, the administration was irked by his

qualifications.

The U.S. could not permit the Commonwealth

to have the same preferential access in the EEC as French

overseas territories, while other LDCs suffered

discrimination.

MacMillan hoped to "slide sideways into

the Common Market", argued Ball, by emphasizing economic

and not political imperatives.

But in doing so, Britain

provoked nationalist sentiment in the EEC, thereby
undermining cohesion within the alliance and jeopardizing
Kennedy'

s

primary consideration of political unity

28

In sum, Britain countered American plans for building a

North Atlantic concert.
U.S.

For broad political reasons, the

accepted that the EEC with Britain would be an even

more effective competitor.

This view showed that America

did not seek a partnership solely on its own
some scholars have claimed.

29

terms, as

While MacMillan seemed

reluctant to sacrifice for the Western alliance, Kennedy
sought terms acceptable to the entire Atlantic community.
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In any event,

Ball anticipated problems at the EEC-UK

talks, begun in October,

1961,

the trade bill until 1963.

and thus urged a delay in

He reasoned that new U.S. trade

legislation, by opening the way for reciprocal reductions
in EEC barriers, might give British opponents of
accession

grounds to declare that membership was unnecessary once

greater access to the Continent became a reality.

Also,

the Six might feel pressured by a new RTA, based in part on
the hopes of an enlarged Common Market, and cancel the

negotiations.

Petersen and the President disagreed. Ball

was being an alarmist about the fragility of the UK-EEC

talks which might be might be pushed along if America had

new trade negotiating authority, believed Petersen,
Kennedy needed this power immediately, he continued, as
events in the Dillon Round of the GATT soon revealed.
The Dillon Round was the first test of whether America

and the EEC could agree on refashioning the trade regime of
the 1960s.

Americans took to the negotiations in September

1960 the authority to reduce U.S. tariffs by 20% under the

RTA of 1958.

Because of peril point restrictions, however,

most observers predicted America would not reach even this

meager percentage cut.

Since Europe would not trim its

tariffs without reciprocal advantages in U.S. markets, GATT

Secretary-General Sir Eric Wyndham White pronounced that
the Round would at best serve as a launching point for more
31
major progress in trade liberalization in the future.

Like the other 22 participants, America
expected

problems because GATT had never before dealt with

union of such magnitude as the Common Market.

a

customs

The focus of

the talks was the EEC common external tariff, which
the Six

offered to cut by 20%.

Ball saw this offer as indicating

the EEC's determination to pursue a liberal course, but

Eisenhower and then Kennedy believed this reduction might
not be equitable in all cases since cuts might expose

sensitive industries or not lower EEC tariffs sufficiently.
Moreover, before multilateral reductions could begin, GATT
rules obliged the Common Market to grant compensation to

outside suppliers of products which might be burdened by

higher duties after the Six had adjusted their individual
rates to the EEC common external tariff on
1962.

1

January

32

The breaking of such "bindings" on these prior tariff

commitments, of which the U.S. claimed amounted to 1100
rates valued at $2 billion, obligated the Six to cut duties
on other products.

But they resisted.

In setting their

external tariff, they averaged the high French and Italian
rates with the lower German and Benelux duties which, they
declared, essentially lowered the overall aggregate tariff

level of the EEC as a whole and thus compensated outside

exporters to Europe.

The U.S. disagreed.

After haggling,

America pried concessions on bound duties in the EEC
totaling almost $1.6 billion on 991 rates.
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The Six said

that this phase of the talks, extended four
months past the
initial deadline, was now over. Dissatisfied
with EEC
offers on agriculture, which were deferred to the
next

phase of the Round, Washington grudgingly acquiesced
to
this position. 33
The complex field of agriculture,

U,S

,"001011101:1

in fact, would plague

Market trade relations throughout the 1960s.

The EEC's common agricultural policy, a particularly rigid

protectionist system that penalized efficient exporters
such as the United States, was a major culprit.

The CAP

promoted internal free-trade in farm goods, but subsidized
exports and subjected produce from outside Europe to

a

minimum import price through a "variable levy"
(supplemented in some cases by tariffs)

,

which boosted the

price of these goods above the cost of EEC-produced
commodities.

The levy promoted inefficiency; the Six,

expecially France which possessed almost half of the EEC's
arable land, needed more time to modernize farming

techniques and overcome U.S. and Commonwealth comparative
advantages in trade.

The CAP, which relegated imports to a

marginal role of filling the decreasing gap between EEC

production and consumption, was anathema to suppliers
reliant on European markets.

GATT head Wyndham White

blamed the "inward-looking" CAP for the "bleak" outlook of
the Dillon negotiations

34
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The CAP was not the sole culprit in stemming

agricultural trade, however.

European farmers hoped to

transform outsiders into minor suppliers in the region.
The EFTA excluded farm and fish products from tariff-

reduction schemes and, contrary to GATT rules, bargained
only on a bilateral basis.

The United States, suffering

from a chronic production-consumption imbalance, had

constructed the biggest government subsidy in the world fo
farm goods.

By the 1960s, however. Congress grew more

reluctant to allocate funds, and an American comparative
advantage in commodity trade gave export expansion through
free market mechanisms a greater importance

Because of the balance-of -payments crisis, agricultural
trade was critical to the New Frontier.

Kennedy took much

interest in farm exports as a partial solution for the

deficit and set out early in his administration to attack

protectionism overseas.

He instructed Secretary of

Agriculture Orville Freeman to initiate an export drive as
one weapon to reverse the "marked lag" in trade barrier

reduction abroad.

The President urged an end to these

restrictions "to keep the door of the Common Market open

American agriculture, and open it wider still"

36
•

True to

his fair-trade doctrine, he sought increased farm exports

because America held a comparative advantage over other
nations
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t

Kennedy knew that the CAP was

a

prerequisite for

European integration, but hoped to guarantee access
for
U.S.

agriculture during the compensatory phase of the

Dillon talks.

Since the EEC bought nearly one-third of

these exports, of which the variable levy penalized 40%, he

pressed EEC Cominission President Walter Hallstein to
consider outsiders' interests before the CAP was in place
in early 1962.

But Kennedy also knew that America would be

lucky to hang on to its existing markets, much less

increase access, especially since European farmers demanded
a

greater share of regional trade.

The Six, on the

understandable grounds that the unfinished CAP excused them
from setting tariffs for major commodities, would probably

promise only to maintain access for selected U.S.
37
^
exports

Kennedy hoped this pledge would satisfy American
farmers.

Freeman warned him about the difficulty of

selling the tough controls envisioned for domestic farm

program if it appeared that the U.S. had traded
agricultural for industrial concessions at the Round.
Southern peanut, rice, tobacco, poultry, soybean oil, and
cotton producers were upset by the CAP

;

feed grains, wheat, and dairy exporters.

so were Midwestern

This bad feeling

could spill onto Capitol Hill, where powerful House and
Senate members would champion not only the cause of their

constituents but expect the administration to fight EEC
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farm protectionism on the LDCs

"The politics that flows

.

from the potential loss of significant agricultural
markets, especially in the light of the need to
sell the

Congress a Trade Expansion Act and

a

long-term supply

management farm program", noted Freeman, "is obvious".
His hands tied by Common Market policy, Kennedy agreed

to the EEC offer to maintain America's historical level of
access.

He sent Charles Murphy of the USDA and Petersen to

make "a strong representation" on this score to the EEC.
They received assurances of access from the Six under

"standstill" agreements, but the Europeans refused to

compensate the U.S. for bindings broken on one-third of its
farm exports.

The USDA suggested suspending the Round as a

signal of American displeasure, but Kennedy abandoned the

issue for the time being.

He viewed the EEC's offer as a

concession which met an important U.S. demand.

In any

event, he expected to fight the CAP another day once his

new trade bill gave him more bargaining authority.

39

Besides, if he had pressed the EEC, he risked a collapse
of the negotiations in the more promising industrial

sector.

On manufactures, remarked a trade official,

40
getting a damn sight more than we're giving away."
.

.

"we're
The

EEC still offered to cut its external tariff on a

reciprocal basis by 20% in broad, "linear" sectors.

Washington welcomed the linear approach, used by the EEC in
internal duty reductions, as

a

replacement for the

104

cumbersome method of negotiating tariff cuts on
each item
within a sector. Ball declared however, that the
U.S. had
no authority under the RTA of 1958 to proceed with
such

across-the-board cuts.

In the end,

though the Six attached

numerous exceptions to the linear provision, America could
offer concessions on only one-fifth of the EEC's requests
on manufactured goods.

41

Since the Six recognized the limited authority of the
RTA,

yet exected some showing of reciprocity, Kennedy

proposed more concessions to forestall
Round.

a

collapse of the

A comparison of tariff rates on seven types

of non-

agricultural products showed most EEC duties ranged between
25-40%, while many American rates were much lower but also

much higher.

U.S. tariffs above 30% applied to 7% of the

value of these goods, for example, while only 1% of

Europe's duties were in this category.

Stymied by peril

points, which effectively emasculated his authority to

reduce tariffs by 20%, Kennedy permitted negotiators to
ignore the limits and grant concessions on $76 million

worth of non-sensitive imports.

Since the U.S. still gave

substantially less than the EEC, the Six withdrew over 100
items from the bargaining table.
7

March,

The Dillon Round ended on

1962 with duty cuts of 10% instead of the

unambitious initial 20% goal.

42

The results, though disappointing, were not fruitless.

The difficult talks on agriculture had won an EEC promise
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to maintain the status quo on farm imports and
stimulated

efforts to produce an agreement at the next GATT round.

Both sides made significant concessions on manufactures;
Europe on transportation equipment, electrical and
industrial machinery, and chemicals and the U.S. on
machinery, electrical apparatus, steel, and most important,

European automobile imports which had jumped in the past
couple of years.

The Six offered once again to reduce

their common tariff by 20% when America possessed new

negotiating authority.
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Most important, the talks publicized the need for

revised trade legislation.

The Round revealed the

anachronistic nature of the item-by-item approach to tariff

negotiations and thus helped to persuade Congress to accept
the linear method in Kennedy^

s

trade bill.

The President

exaggerated the gains won by American negotiators in order
to maintain domestic support for trade negotatiations with

the Common Market.

Yet he concentrated on the "hampering

features" of the RTA which undermined the U.S. position at
the Round.

"Our negotiators were grievously short of

bargaining power", he said, and though the EEC had
understood this fact, "we cannot be expected to bargain
effectively in the future under the limitation of the
present law"

44

His position showed a fair-trade bent.

By dropping

below the peril points, with substantial political risk, he
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tried to forge an acceptable trade agreement with
the
Common Market. He had abandoned hope of prying open

the

EEC's agricultural market any further because Europe
was
not yet ready to give more, and took what he could in the

industrial sector.

Overall, the President implicitly

recognized that problems with the EEC in farm exports, and
America's inability to respond adequately with cuts in
industrial tariffs, meant that Europe had managed to

bargain with the U.S. for the first time on an equitable
basis.

In order to meet this new European bargaining

power, he set out to replace the inadequate RTA with his
own trade bill.

Some public feelers helped Kennedy begin this process.

Returning from Europe, Congressman Hale Boggs (D-LA)
asserted that an extension of the RTA would be "grossly
ineffective" in future negotiations with the EEC.

He held

hearings in December to propagandize for new trade

legislation

.

Former State Department officials Christian

A. Herter and William L.

along the same lines on

Clayton had appealed to Boggs
1

November.

While Europe moved

forward, America "drifted backwards" under the RTA into

protectionism, potentially causing allied friction,

disarray in the Third World, and ultimately, the West to
fail against "relentless, irreconcilable,

communist expansion, they wrote.

[and]

merciless"

A U.S. -EEC "partnership",

forged by U.S. trade policy, could avert this occurrence.
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At this time, the administration disavowed the

partnership idea and the closed regional system it implied
in order to stress trade based on the most-favored-nation

principle.

But in its descriptive qualities, the Boggs-

Herter pamphlet mimicked the administration's stance.

No

longer could American economic health determine foreign

trade policy, explained Ball to the National Foreign Trade
Council.

Khrushchev boasted that communism would win the

cold war through growth and economic competition, and

rising Soviet-EEC trade was just one indication of his
mission. 47

Businessmen

m

the EEC and EFTA, moreover, had

abandoned their old trade and investment patterns.

They

recognized the Common Market as an "inescapable fact", he
added,

which placed America on "the threshold of

a

new

trading world" in which there was no place for economic

nationalism

.

Thus

,

Congress must give the President the

tools to bargain with the Six and maintain the U.S.

......

initiative

m
•

^
^
international
commerce 48
•

•
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The momentum generated by the Boggs

,

Herter /Clayton, and

Ball sorties wiped out any doubts about a "bold" trade bill
for 1962.

Kennedy hinted in early November 1961 that

Congress could expect

a

bill which provided for large

reductions in U.S. trade barriers to meet the challenge of
the EEC.

Some domestic interests might be hurt, he

admitted, but the country must trade fairly by buying as

well as selling.

Kennedy already sided with Ball on the
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outline of the bill and agreed with Petersen on 1962
as the
time to proceed.
Characteristically, he had reached these

decisions before he met with Ball, Petersen, Hodges, White
House aide Theodore Sorensen, and trade task force member

Peter Jones at Hyannisport on 24 November to discuss the
bill. ^9

Naturally^ their central concern was Congress.

Petersen

admitted that since 1962 was an election year, legislators
might be ultra-sensitive to import-competing constituents
and choose to oppose a liberal trade bill.

Seymour Harris

urged Kennedy to beware of the doctrinaire free-traders,
because if the President shrugged off protectionists by
overstating the case for liberal trade, he would be "taking
a large political gamble and probably a losing one" with

his bill.^°

Regarding the politics of trade, Kennedy needed no
prompting.

He appointed the respected Hodges to shepherd

the bill in Congress and refused to erase the peril point

because of its importance for protectionists.

But,

cognizant of congressional behavior, Kennedy opposed

postponing or weakening his bill

.

Lawrence

0'

Brien, his

liaison with Congress, promoted a departure from the RTA
after encouraging talks with House Ways and Means Chairman

Wilbur Mills, whose committee would hear the bill*

Believing that much of the New Frontier's stalled
legislation in 1961 was the result of delaying tactics by
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the President, O'Brien pressed Kennedy to make
the trade

bill his top priority in Congress.

The President agreed,

believing the feeble RTA of 1958 had been the result of
Eisenhower^

s

unwillingness to attack protectionists.

Kennedy, whom advisors agreed understood Congress as well
as anyone,

decided to take the offensive for "a big one".^^

The President announced in early December his intention

of sending a trade bill to Congress.

Speaking before the

National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the

American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO)
legislation.

,

he noted the reasons for his

The deficit, the EEC, aid to poor nations,

and the cold war provided the impetus for a refashioned

trade policy.

In essence, America had no other choice but

freer trade, for protectionism would chase capital and jobs

from the country.

Above all, restricting trade would

further "diminish our stature in the Free World".

Americans must accept that U.S. economic supremacy was

a

thing of the past, he said, and no "part of the world
market is any longer ours by default" because "the

competition grows keener"
To slow the loss of U.S. dominance and its leadership

around the globe, there was one answer:

free-trade.

He

did not seek to abandon the traditional safeguards for weak
industries or lower American trade barriers unilaterally,
but relied on adjustment assistance as a remedy for import
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injury.

Drawing the battlelines for protectionists,

however, Kennedy boldly promised that imports would
rise,

though not as much as exports, he hoped.

The nation could

not tolerate inefficient industries; they were "standing in

the way" of progress in American domestic and international
plans.

Trade based on comparative advantage must become

accepted practice in American policy.

America must therefore approach negotiations with common
sense.

Surely no country would lower its trade barriers

unless the U.S. offered concessions which were in their

economic interest to accept.

In order to induce every

member of the Atlantic community to share military,
economic, and political burdens, American domestic

interests must accept that the purpose of tariffs was to
"cushion adjustments", not to "shut off competition".

The

AFL-CIO and NAM might grumble, and some advisors wince at
this straight forward declaration for liberal trade, but

they should have also recognized it as the foundation of
Kennedy'

fair-trade doctrine 52

s

On 25 January 1962, the President sent his trade bill to

Congress.

It was novel,

even in name.

In order to detach

the legislation from the outworn Eisenhower RTAs, and to

promote

growth as an overriding factor in foreign trade,

the administration christened the bill the Trade Expansion

Act (TEA)

.

It aim to afford "mutual benefits" to all of

America's trade partners, especially the EEC, boost LDC

exports, and assist, but not protect, import
-competing

industries.

A "wholly new approach", the TEA "could well

affect the unity of the West, the course of the Cold
War,

and the economic growth of our nation for a generation to
come", Kennedy proclaimed,

For international trade negotiations, the TEA provided
the President with four kinds of authority to be used over
a

five-year period ending 30 June 1967.

linear,

In all four,

the

or sectoral tariff -cutting procedure replaced the

onerous item-by-item method.

First, there was a basic

authority which enabled the President to reduce tariffs by
50% of the rates existing on

1

July 1962 on a most-favored-

nation, or non-discriminatory, reciprocal basis.

Such a

drastic cut gave U.S. negotiators bargaining power to
induce the EEC to grant wider access and fair treatment to
outsiders' goods and crops.

Second, the TEA provided for

the elimination of tariffs of 5% or less.
The third authority was the "dominant supplier"

provision, directed specifically at the Common Market.

products in which the EEC and the U.S. combined for

8

On

0% or

more of world exports, the President could exceed the 50%

basic authority and eliminate all tariffs.

This zero duty

clause addressed the "commonality" and unique "trade

partnership" between the Six and America in that
collectively, they held an overwhelming competitive

position on certain goods.

These products were ones in
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which both sides sought more access and accounted
for $2
billion in U.S. exports. The dominant supplier
applied to
other nations under the MFN rule, but the provision

signified Kennedy's over-arching concern with the Common
Market as he shifted trade policy from a multilateral to

a

regional focus as part of his Grand Design.
The dominant supplier turned out to be a mis judgment.

Ball and Kennedy could not hide their intention of making

British membership in the Conmion Market more attractive to
the EEC through the zero duty clause.

Without the UK

figured in, very few products (aircraft and margarine and
shortenings) existed in which America and the EEC combined
for 80% of global sales.

Thus, the Six could abort the

clause if they refused Britain entry.

The duty free

measure might irk de Gaulle and several congressmen who

perceived the authority as
EEC.

a

veiled attempt to buy off the

The policy appeared as if America indeed sought to

push Britain into the EEC as its "trojan horse".
The fourth authority promoted Third World exports.

TEA decreased the trade disparity between rich and poor

nations by applying MFN treatment to all countries, not
just the North.

The bill also included reductions of

restrictions on tropical agricultural and forest
commodities supplied by the LCDs and not produced in
significant quantities in America.

The latter proviso

alleviated the fears of U.S. import -competing sugar,

The

cotton,

and other commodity producers.

Kennedy cloaked the

LDC authority behind the humanitarian aim of raising
Third

World exports to

a

level which would provide a self-

sufficient income
The provision would also help Latin American exports

climb over CAP barriers and gain greater access into the
EEC.

Kennedy sought curbs on the preferential tariff

treatment accorded the African territories of EEC nations
and the Commonwealth once Britain joined the Six.

Most

Latin American products entered duty-free into the U.S. but

suffered discrimination in Europe.

Opening up the EEC for

Latin America was in America's interests, too, because

greater opportunity in Europe might reduce the U.S. intake
of LDC crops

.

Nonetheless, Kennedy'

s

representation for

Latin exporters was also generous and far-sighted 54
In order to meet the barrier reduction goals of the four

authorities, and promote trade based on comparative
advantage, the TEA restricted the use of domestic
safeguard, or protection provisions

The bill introduced

.

new criteria which changed the "no-injury" philosophy of
the RTA.

The previous definition permitted the escape

clause even if imports were only partly responsible for

injury of any segment of an industry

.

The TEA required

proof that imports directly caused and were the main factor
in persistent idling of a firm,

or the inability to turn a

profit, or unemployment in an entire industry.
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In effect,

the TEA made resort to the escape clause more
difficult

than under any previous RTA.

Furthermore, the Tariff

Commission would still hold peril point hearings, but would
only recommend, and no longer make, peril point

determinations to the President.
By no means did the TEA abandon safeguards.

national security clause, which permitted
industry to withdraw from

a

The

defense-related

a

trade agreement deemed harmful

to the country's security, remained intact.

The TEA also

allowed escape when "indirect" competitive products, or
import substitutes, displaced domestic production.

For

instance, imports of glace cherries were competitive with
U.S. raw cherries and therefore could be restricted.

Non-

tariff barriers, including inducing other nations to

establish voluntary export restraints, could be used if the
President found serious injury from imports

.

As a

temporary resort, he could also raise tariffs up to 50% of
the rate existing on

1

July 1934 on dutiable or duty-free

goods 56
,

Adjustment assistance, however, would provide an
alternative to trade barriers as the solution to import
relief.

This plan, developed by Kennedy in the 1950s, gave

the President flexibility to cut tariffs by relying on

safety nets.

The President, advised by the Tariff

Commission, determined eligibility for adjustment

assistance

.

Unemployment compensation, re -training, early

retirement benefits, and relocation aid was available
to
workers.
Farmers, manufacturers, and firms received

technical advice on planning and implementing adjustments
to imports, tax benefits and loans with liberal

depreciation and amortization allowances, and aid to

modernize and diversify plant facilities.
even resort to temporary tariff hikes.

Industries could

Aid flowed also

through other legislation, such as the Area Redevelopment
program, and cease when the injured party had recovered. ^'^
The program was a realistic fair-trade compromise

between protectionism and free-trade.

Adjustment

assistance substituted for high tariffs, explained Kennedy,
yet eased the burden of duty reductions on producers and

provided an option to the seldom-invoked escape clause.

It

also embedded the principle of comparative advantage into
U.S. trade policy.

The trend toward freer global trade

offered more opportunities in the long-run for exporters,
and would make import-competitors more competitive instead
of postponing hard choices through protectionism.

The

"accent" of the TEA was on "adjustment" more than
"assistance", he noted, in order to "strengthen the

efficiency of our economy, not to protect its
inefficiencies"
The Trade Expansion Act was the culmination of Kennedy's

experience over the past fifteen years and the most
revolutionary reciprocal trade legislation since 1934.
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The

bill signified a major departure in tactics in
postwar U.S.
trade liberalism.
Though it cushioned the impact of freer
trade at home like the old RTA, the TEA offered direct

government aid as a substitution for protectionism.

Kennedy appraised the global transformations affecting

American commerce and the political limits of pressing the
principle of comparative advantage on Congress.

The TEA

thus reflected a fair-trade balance of aid and free-trade.
By doing so, the bill furnished opportunities unparallelled
in U.S. trade history for adjusting America to a trade

regime in which it was no longer the sole leader.

Kennedy recognized the changes wrought by the Common
Market, the payments deficit, and Soviet rivalry, and asked
for the tools to meet these challenges.

America faced a

choice between a stronger domestic and global economy or

endless recessions, deteriorating growth, and a fractured

alliance of Western nations.

Columnist Joseph Kraft wrote

that economic dilemmas at home, rising LDC demands for aid,

and European drift toward an independent course in economic
and nuclear policy awaited the U.S. if Congress rejected
the TEA.

America would simply "default on power;", he

59
warned, and "resign from history".

Surely, Kraft noted that the administration had not made

great strides in injecting U.S. power sucessfully

throughout the globe during its first year.

Kennedy

suffered setbacks in his European policy, the most

noticeable being the Berlin wall in August and a
troubled
relationship with de Gaulle and Adenauer made apparent
in
June.

The meager results of the Dillon Round, caused by

the conflict over agriculture and U.S. peril points,

revealed a possible split over trade matters between the
allies.

Furthermore, the Third World and Japan pressed

increasingly for access into Atlantic markets and attacked
U.S. protectionism.

Kennedy recognized the significance of the Common Market
and its potentially harmful impact on U.S. trade.

The

payments deficit, the creation of the OECD, and the results
of the Dillon Round were manifestations of European

equality in commercial power relative to the United States.

Kennedy feared that West Germany and France, the

predominant powers in the EEC, might use the Six against

American political designs for an open and united Atlantic
community, especially by rejecting UK membership.

Yet he

also winced at Britain's pursuit of attaching conditions to
its entry and further upsetting his European policy.

The TEA addressed these problems.

To Kennedy, the bill

was the logical outgrowth of postwar U.S. foreign policy,

aimed at building a concert of Western nations through
free-trade.

He now meant to use the prospect of

liberalized access to the American market to help the whole
system.

In effect,

nations represented

a trade
a

coalition of rich and poor

segment of the international arena
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where the West might make great strides in defeating
communism, poverty, and the potential for war.

In defense

policy, Kennedy used U.S. military aid and other
carrots to

foster closer relations between the U.S. and its allies.
In foreign economic policy he employed the Trade
Expansion

Act
The primacy of the TEA propelled it to the top of the

administration's legislative agenda of 1962,
advisors,

Some

such as Arthur Schlesinger, believed that other

programs deserved more attention.

Critical of the mystique

surrounding the TEA, he missed the intention of the
legislation.

The bill was the hallmark of the New

Frontier's foreign economic policy,

a

problems and future circumstances.

It thus warranted the

panacea for present

almost evangelical promotion by Kennedy.

Thus,

considering

its sweeping provisions, there was truth in the President's

statement that as "NATO was unprecedented in military
history, this measure is unprecedented in economic

history

.

Without a doubt, moreover, the need for

a

legislative

victory explained the TEA'S top billing in 1962.

The first

year of the New Frontier had yielded Kennedy few

significant gains despite his desire to change things.

His

narrow electoral win in 1960 was not a mandate from the
people which might ease his legislation through Congress,
as Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan later

enjoyed.

Kennedy believed that the issue of trade, if

advertised effectively as

a

crucial part of American

economic health and international unity, might present
him

with a much-needed major victory on Capitol Hill.
The TEA was a calculated risk, however.

Most of

Congress might accept liberal trade, but protectionists
were an obstacle, as the OECD debate had shown.

The

gutting of traditional safeguards under the TEA aggravated
them,

and even those private interests amenable to freer

trade opposed opening U.S. markets "willy-nilly" to
imports.

Democratic and Republican legislators alike now

considered the ill effects of trade on producers and
workers at home rather than voting

a

party line on trade

bills, as had been more the case in the 1950s.

The Wall

Street Journal in November 1961 reported that protectionist

sentiment in Congress had never been higher.

Other

business experts predicted that protectionism "on Capitol
Hill will clash head-on with the Administration", making
the TEA campaign the "biggest" and "bitterest" battle over

trade since the Hawley-Smoot high tariff debacle of 1930.

A victory for Kennedy was not

a sure thing.

6

He therefore

set out beforehand to remove the most vocal and influential

import-competing protectionists from the path of his trade
bill.
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CHAPTER

3

THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: TEXTILES AND LUMBER

The passage of the Trade Expansion Act depended on how

effectively the President mustered votes from Congress.

Kennedy counted on support from Midwestern farm states,
which sought an increase in agricultural exports, and
industrial states in the East, Midwest, and Far West which

traditionally backed liberal trade.

But in 1958,

Eisenhower had relied on these states, too.

Though he won

his trade bill. Congress limited his ability to lower trade

barriers by attaching a plethora of safeguards and

weakening his authority over tariffs.

Kennedy demanded

much more authority, and from a similarly protectionist
Congress

Kennedy aggressively approached Congress.

Realizing

that his bill undermined the traditional protection of

previous U.S. trade policy, the strong, organized

protectionists had already served notice of their intent to
mount a vigorous campaign to defeat the TEA.

Many of them

--were not strident protectionists who opposed free-trade out

of principle, but merely sought aid for industries which

had suffered under rising imports in recent years.

Textile

and lumber interests, both with powerful support on Capitol
Hill, were two examples.

Kennedy hoped, like Eisenhower,

that free-traders would overwhelm the protectionists.
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Yet

he tried to satisfy the latter'

s

demands before the TEA

came to a vote and neutralize large blocs of

protectionists
This tactic of wooing legislators provides a test case
for models of interest intermediation.

Corporatists point

to a consensus of government and private sector decision)

makers in forging textile and lumber trade policy.

Bureaucratic politics points to competition between
departments and officials in molding policy choices and

influencing presidential decisions.

The interest group and

regulatory politics models offer Congress as the arena
where trade policy is determined.

Centered on Capitol Hill, with the administration on one
side and interest groups on the other, the decisions on

textile and lumber indicated an accommodation between the

President and Congress consistent with the regulatory

politics model.

Pushed by their constituents, the textile

and lumber blocs confronted Kennedy and demanded relief

from imports.

He satisfied enough of these legislators

with special assistance programs, but not to the extent

wished by import-competitors.

The President based aid on

one leg of the fair-trade doctrine, yet such help signified
a tactical compromise.

His attention cleared the way for

congressional acceptance of the TEA and made possible the

international leg of the doctrine.

That is, Kennedy

protected some industries in order to achieve his overall
145

goal of lowering trade barriers under the principle
of

comparative advantage.
The administration confidently predicted victory for
the

TEA but off the record worried about its prospects.
senator estimated only

40

One

votes for the TEA in the Senate,

while support in the House was lacking.

The President's

congressional liaison office reported that supporters of
the 1958 trade act had turned lukewarm in recent years.

Polling Congress, Theodore Sorensen told Kennedy that the
TEA needed bi-partisan support to win.

But Congress had

stalled the New Frontier in 1961, prompting Congressional

Quarterly to predict an "uphill struggle" for Kennedy
legislation in 1962,
The 87th Congress was the most conservative since 1954

because of a coalition of Republicans and Southern
Democrats. Wilbur D. Mills (D-Ark.), chairman of the House

Ways and Means committee which would hold hearings on the
bill,

supported Kennedy but was tough on imports.

Harry

F.

Byrd (D-W,VA)

,

Senator

whose Finance Committee would also

hear the bill, was a protectionist and disliked the new
President.

Kennedy missed the leadership of free-traders

Sam Rayburn, the House Speaker who died in 1961, and Lyndon

Johnson in the Senate, got on badly with the new House
Speaker John W. McCormack (D-MA)

,

and was weakened by

Senate floor leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who lacked

Johnson's power.

Partisan politics, moreover, inspired
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Republicans to veto legislation on which the
President had
risked much of his prestige. By rallying against
the TEA,
they hoped to seize control of Congress and hamper
the New

Frontier as

a

way of derailing Kennedy's re-election bid in

1964.^
To win the TEA, Kennedy also had to overcome

protectionism as an effective force in Congress.
Congressman John

H.

Dent

(D-PA)

,

who claimed that Kennedy's

view of trade was a one-way street of exports where imports
were ignored, led these forces in the House.
counterpart, Prescott

S.

Bush (R-CT)

,

His Senate

railed that the TEA

permitted a "reckless destruction of jobs" with little
insurance except for the "untested" and "dubious"
adjustment assistance measure.

Since 1962 was an election

year, Kennedy feared that even members of Congress with

import-competing constituents, who sided with free-trade,
might join the protectionists in order not to upset voters
at home

Imports encumbered the President's task of removing the

cotton textile industry, the largest protectionist
interest,

from the opposition's camp and enhancing the

prospects of the TEA.

From 1958 to 1960, imports of cotton

goods increased by nearly two and one-half times; in dollar
value, a jump of over 76%, or $119 million.

Meanwhile,

since exports rose only slightly, the cotton textile trade
surplus, which had been $125 million in 1958 shrank to $19

million two years later.

These high imports and sluggish

exports curbed production and depressed the industry.
instance,

For

128 mills closed across the nation and employment

reached an alltime

low.*^

His senate experience and the campaign of 1960 compelled

Kennedy to address these problems.

As a senator, he had

described Eisenhower's textile import policy as "shabby"
but the presidential politics of trade required some

balance.

During the campaign, Kennedy relied on

a

regional

strategy of winning the South, New England, and big

Northern industrial states.

A protectionist policy on

textile imports would appeal to the former two, where the
industry was strongest.

Fair-trade might win votes from

the latter, where states such as New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and Ohio ranked high as exporters but had

industries which had suffered import injury.

During the

campaign, he pledged to South Carolina Governor Ernest

Rollings, who made good on a pledge to deliver his

consitutuents to the Kennedy cause, that

a

solution to the

cotton textile problem would be a "top priority objective"
5
of hxs administration.
.

.

.

His commitment was sincere but based on a keen

appreciation of the industry'

s

political strength.

One of

the nation's largest manufacturing employers, the cotton

textile industry amassed approximately 94% of its workers
in 16 states.

Over half of these employees hailed from
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four deep-South states -Alabama,
Georgia, and North and
South Carolina - and another 7% came
from Virginia and
Tennessee.
Due to 140 mill closings since
1951, these six
states had suffered an average drop in
textile jobs of

nearly 17%, and the South as a whole a
loss of 14%.^
Kennedy's textile program centered on cotton

manufactures in order to win TEA votes from
southern
congressmen, most of whose districts were filled
with
cotton textile mills. Howard Petersen and House
Majority
Whip Carl Albert calculated that the President
needed
support from Southern Democrats since he could not
depend
on Republican votes.

Though Kennedy did well in the South

in 1960, he surmised that a trade policy which hurt
the

region, especially an industry with

"political muscle"

like textiles interests, would bode ill not only for his
TEA, but for agricultural,

civil rights, and social

spending bills which would face congressional committees
led and dominated by southerners.

Opposition from mill

owners to free-trade had a great effect on Southern
congressmen, noted a Georgian businessman, and even many

legislators from non-textile districts were philosophically

protectionist and thus sympathetic to restraints on
imports.

7

The South was not Kennedy's only worry, however.

Every

New England and Mid-Atlantic state except Vermont,
Maryland, and Delaware, in addition to Ohio and Illinois,
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were among the top 16 states with
textile employment.
They, too,

demanded special consideration regarding
import

limitations on cotton, wool, and synthetic
textiles.
employment down 61% since 1951 and 12% from
1958,

with

or 15,000

New England had experienced 278 mill
liquidations in
all textile categories.
In the Mid-Atlantic
jobs.

states,

47% of

the workers had lost their jobs since 1951
and in Illinois
alone, 27%.
Kennedy expected some opposition among

congressmen from these states to a liberal trade
program.^
Six votes on trade between 1948 and 1961
showed the

depth of protectionism in the textile bloc.

In the 16 top

employment states were the 132 congressmen and 32 senators
who would vote on the TEA.

In the House,

61%,

or 81 of the

members in these states voted against the RTA at least
twice and 38%, or 50 voted protectionist in 1958.

In

addition, many of the 128 members of a new, 35-state bi-

partisan textile group did not come from the major textile
states,

including all but one of the 22 congressmen from

Florida, Mississippi, South Dakota, and West Virginia.

House members who had conditioned their support for the
last RTA on assurances that textile imports would not

injure the industry were now upset that the opposite had
occurred.

9

In the Senate,

only seven out the 32 members of the 16

textile states voted for a restrictionist amendment to the
1958 RTA and only nine sided with a similar amendment to
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the minimum wage bill in 1961.

Yet,

34 senators,

including

at least one member from all
but one of the top 16 textile

states,

one each from Alaska, Kentucky,
Mississippi,

Oregon, South Dakota, and both from
Texas and Wyoming,
signed two letters to the President
expressing their
concern over textile imports. Senator
Edmund Muskie (R-ME)

warned that without a "realistic solution
to the problem of
textile imports", Kennedy faced "real difficulty"
on the

Trade Expansion

Act."'-'^

Behind Congress was a powerful and vocal lobby
of
textile interests.
Since 1958, when major hearings

on

textile imports began. Congress heard repeated
grievances
from "Big Textiles", such as Burlington Industries,
J.P
Stevens, and Cannon Mills, against imports.

They were

members of the peak political cotton textile organization,
the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute (ACMI)

represented 80% of the industry.

,

which

The ACMI compelled the

National Cotton Council, an association of growers who sold
cotton to mills, to support protectionism.
was the Textile Workers Union of America.

enjoyed leverage in Congress

Joining them
These groups

.

Textile protectionism varied in degree, but the majority

within the bloc sought import restrictions.

Congressman

Dent held hearings throughout 19 61 on a variety of import-

competing products, including textiles.

He explained that

protectionism for the industry was not new, quoting Senator
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Kennedy's remarks about cutting imports
when certain
industries faced extinction. Textilemen
supported freer
trade, but not when competition was
"unfair" due to

low-

cost and low-wage production abroad. Indeed,
administration

members remarked that Americans most feared
imports of
labor-intensive manufactures from the Third World.
Interest group pressure prompted a subcommittee headed

by Senator John

O.

Pastore (D-RI) to recommend import

quotas, modernization efforts, and federal assistance
to

help the industry.

Pastore admitted that the industry's

health was cyclical and pledged support for the TEA, yet
implied to the ACMI that inaction on textile imports might
lose his vote.

He urged a reappraisal of the import

situation by the cabinet-level Inter-agency Textile

Committee (ITC)

,

which under Eisenhower had rejected all

the subcommittee's suggestions.

Kennedy had pledged

a

Textilemen remembered that

"comprehensive industry-wide remedy"

and had backed Pastore'

s

recommendations.

Now they urged

him to make good on his campaign promises
Kennedy tried to head off such pressure, but events
overtook him.

Just weeks after Rollings, the textile bloc,

and the industry recommended a textile import quota bill In
February,

19 61,

he appointed Commerce Secretary Hodges, a

veteran of service to the textile industry who, as Governor
of North Carolina, had called for quotas on textile

imports, to lead the ITC and find a solution to the import
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problem.

Before Hodges could act, the Amalgamated
Clothing
Workers of America announced a boycott in
February
1961 on

cut cloth from Japan unless the U.S.
established quotas.
The President warned that such action
only invited

retaliation from other nations and worsened
the payments
deficit.
The union stopped the boycott, but labor
groups

remained uneasy about the inflow of imports

•'"'^
.

Meanwhile, the textile bloc and the ITC suggested
import

restrictions.

Representatives Carl Vinson (D-GA)

,

a key

source of Southern support for the New Frontier, W.J.
Bryan

Dorn (D-NC)

an enemy of the administration, and a nucleus

,

of protectionists formed the 128-member Textile Conference

Group.

After talking with Kennedy on

27

March 1961 about

imports, the Group wrote him a letter which predicted

congressional rejection of a new trade bill unless there
were safeguards for textiles.

In April,

the ITC reinforced

this and the Pastore subcommittee position.

Bureaucratic

politics mattered little; the protests of free-trader
George Ball, a member of the ITC, were swept aside.

recommended

a

Hodges

system of controls modeled after the 1957

voluntary export restraint on Japanese cotton textiles

which slashed Tokyo's sales to America by a quarter after
1956.-^^

On

2

May 1961, Kennedy bowed to congressional and

industry pressure and proposed a seven-point agenda of

assistance for the cotton textile industry.
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He called for

government aid to help the industry
modernize and become
more competitive, including revised
depreciation
allowances, loans, and research and
development programs.
He asked for a study of the two-price
global cotton price
system and the possible imposition of
an eight and one-half
cents "equalization fee" on cotton
textile imports.

A

barrier against raw cotton imports made
textile
manufacturers captives of higher domestic cotton
prices,
while foreign manufacturers bought cotton
at the lower

world market cost.

The fee would balance out the

differential.
The seven-point plan also opened up the
possibility of

easier resort for cotton textile manufacturers to the
escape and national security clauses of the RTA as well as

permitting industry's to seek federal aid.

Most important,

Kennedy directed Ball to arrange a meeting under GATT to
negotiate a protective trade agreement.
Kennedy hoped, would build

a

The program,

fair-trade regime in cotton

textiles by protecting domestic producers and slowly

expanding LDC exports.
Ball began organizing a GATT trade regime for cotton

textiles.

Believing that LDC development depended on

export expansion of their lucrative but scant industrial
exports, Ball urged the North to ease restrictions on light

manufactures such as textiles.

America's objective of

Behind the plan was

decreasing U.S. imports from poor
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nations while increasing Third World
access into the EEC.
Ball sought a fair-trade arrangement
by protecting Northern
textile industries without cutting off
textile exporters Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Pakistan,
and the United
Arab Republic - from Atlantic markets. "^"^
Ball advocated two aims as he shuttled
between the LDCs,
Europe, and North America to round up participants
for the
GATT meeting.
First, he sought to ease severe restrictions
in importing nations by a more equitable
distribution of

LDC cotton textile exports.

Ball focused on compelling the

EEC to take its fair share.

Second,

and somewhat

disingenuously he believed, the U.S. sought voluntary
export restraints so that the North could "stabilize" LDC

exports in an expanding but "orderly" fashion.

He opposed

unilateral quotas, planned to discuss only cotton goods,
and set import levels higher than expected by the U.S.

textile industry.

When prodded for a more restrictive

policy by the U.S. textilemen. Ball grew hostile toward
them.

Ball's response obviously did not appease textile
interests, who reacted angrily to the details of the plan,

and disturbed the politically sensitive Myer Feldman, the

President's aide on trade matters.

Wool,

synthetic, and

apparel manufacturers and unions and the ACMI expressed

dissatisfaction that the GATT talks would be limited to
cotton textiles and would base future textile imports on
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the high 1960 level.

a letter signed by the House and

Senate textile blocs denounced the
Kennedy solution as a
"piecemeal and totally inadequate
program" that could only
embarrass the President's long-term
trade proposals.
Senator Pastore added that the alternative
to satisfactory
quotas was certain defeat of the projected
trade bill by
the concerted efforts of the textile
bloc.^^

A generally uncooperative international
community also
threatened to upset the plan.

Only Canada and West

Germany, both with textile problems similar
to those of
America, endorsed the GATT conference without

qualifications.

Japan and the LDCs, with comparative

advantages in cotton textiles, feared that the U.S. and
the
EEC would turn any agreement into a global quota system
and

therefore severely restrict their exports.
Kong,

Japan, Hong

and India to a lesser extent backed a multilateral

quantitative scheme, though a voluntary export agreement

between the former and the U.S. and British bilateral
limits with the latter two already existed.

But they only

supported a regime that would assure more liberal trade and
curb export restraints.

20

Skepticism was the feeling in Europe.
letting in more textiles from Asia.

Britain chafed at

Under accords with

Hong Kong and India, London had accepted more cotton goods
and,

to the detriment of its Lancashire mills, became

importer by 1958.

The British posited that cautious.
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a

net

bilateral negotiations, not

global multilateral regime,

a

would better serve the interests
of all nations.
To
appease Kennedy, however, Britain
supported "orderlyimport growth but only when other
nations accepted
comparable shares of textiles from Japan

and the LDCs.^l

Britain and the U.S. accused the Common
Market of
muffling discussions on liberalizing textile
imports.

Four

members of the EEC still withheld
Most-Favored-Nation
treatment from Japan, thus discriminating
against its
goods.

While imports from Japan and the LDCs totaled
34%

and 26% respectively of American textile imports
in 1960,
the Six took in a paltry 9% from these nations,
well below
even the EFTA' s intake.
The Common Market "agreed on the

principle" to ease quotas, but domestic pressures prompted
France, Belgium, and Italy to request a weak textile regime

which would preserve their ability to invoke future
restrictions.

Prior to the textile negotiations in Geneva,

Assistant Secretary of Commerce Hickman Price, Jr. noted
the foot-dragging by all the Six but West Germany.

The

Economist warned that "the prospect of a liberal outcome at
Geneva does not look good".
Nevertheless, the GATT parties reached a settlement

under a Short-Term Arrangement on cotton textiles in July
1961 which satisfied the Kennedy administration.

nations agreed that, starting

1

The 17

October 1961, any textile

importer suffering import -related "market disruption" could
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ask an exporter to cut back textile
shipments to the levels
of the previous year ending 30
June 1961.
If the exporter
refused, the importer could apply for
a waiver from GATT to
restrict imports.
This new safeguard was a novel
concept
in discrimination against the LDCs
The U.S. also attached
a clause which, pending the
establishment of a Long-Term
Arrangement, would assure that the EEC "share
fairly" in
.

the growth of cotton textile imports.

The new regime

stretched the fair-trade doctrine but provided
for the
continued, albeit slower, growth of Third World

exports.

Still,

all sides attacked the cotton textile accord.
It

indeed impressed American textilemen and Congressmen
Vinson
and Dorn by its recognition that import restrictions were
in order.

But they considered it as merely a "first step",

and wanted Kennedy to end the two-price cotton system,

reduce and police the quotas, and limit other fibers.

The

EEC was lukewarm but grudgingly increased import quotas by
60%.

Hong Kong expressed uncertainty about which

categories of textiles would be affected while Japan

predicted that restrictions on its exports would allow Hong
Kong to fill the gap at Tokyo's expense.

Japan called the

Short-Term Arrangement a "backward step in world trade"

which ignored its voluntary export restraint with the

United States, and warned of retaliation, especially
against America. 24
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U.S. trade policy lay at the
root of Japan's unhappiness
with the GATT agreement.
Tokyo complained that Americans

used Japan as a scapegoat for
their more complex problems
Of inefficiency and for the
harm done by other nations to
U.S. textile interests.
Japan was America's major source
of cotton textile imports, occupying
approximately
one-

quarter of the U.S. market.

Yet these imports comprised

less than 1% of U.S. production in
1960 and actually shrunk
by 5 million square yards from 1958
to 1960, while the
sales of Spain, Portugal, Egypt, and
France as a group rose
3.3 billion, Formosa, Korea, Pakistan, and
India 1.2

billion, and Hong Kong 321 million square
yards.

On the

well-worn issue of unfair labor practices,
moreover,
Japan's wage rate in the textile industry was as
high or
higher than all of the aforementioned countries
except

France
The U.S. -Japan trade relationship also favored
America.

The United States suffered a deficit in cotton textile

trade due to Japan's comparative advantage, and economic
and military aid to Japan cut into America's favorable

overall commercial balance and worsened the payments
deficit.

But except for a slight deficit in 1960,

Washington enjoyed an export surplus with Japan, its second
biggest customer next to Canada, every year since the war
until 1965.

Meanwhile, the booming Japanese economy

created a large demand for imports and worsened Tokyo's
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payments deficit.

A major customer of American
cotton,

moreover, Japan's purchases were
three times larger than
its sales of textiles to the U.S.^^

Kennedy and Ball warned of the dire
implications of
clamping down on Japanese imports.
America could not cut
off textile imports and expect "anything

but ruin for our

cotton exporters", said the President.

Thus trade with

Japan must be a matter of "balance",
especially since that
nation took in more U.S. cotton than America's
total

textile imports from the entire world.
politics also were critical.

International

Premier Ikeda had hinged his

leadership on economic growth and close ties to
America.

Restrictions would undermine these goals and might force
Japan to turn to China as a source of raw cotton.

Kennedy

abhorred communist China and hoped to avoid this outcome. ^"^
None of the arguments swayed U.S. textilemen, who

complained about Japanese textile dumping.

The

administration both resisted and acquiesced to this
pressure, renewing the 1957 bilateral cotton agreement

under which the U.S. raised its import quota ceiling 6%

instead of the 30% demanded by Tokyo.

The textile industry

grumbled even over this hike, to take effect in January
1962, but that was all they could expect.

more than

generous and, most important,

Kennedy's reputation as a liberal trader.
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The deal was
a

blow to

in November 1961,

contrary to Japanese interests,

Kennedy also ordered the Tariff
Commission to study the
equalization fee, which would raise the
price of cotton
textile imports by eight and one-half
cents
in order to

balance out the higher prices textilemen
paid for U.S.
cotton.
The industry deemed the fee crucial
to textile
votes for the TEA.
The Commission rejected the measure
in
September 1962, after the TEA vote, but
Kennedy immediately
ordered the Department of Agriculture to
find a solution to
the iniquitous "two-price" system.
This request boosted
the administration's claim that it was doing
everything

possible to assist the industry.
The TEA,

in fact, was the overriding influence on the

textile program.

Kennedy preferred protection rather than

risk a "boomerang action" from textilemen and their

congressional allies against the TEA.

Ball warned other

industries not to interpret the restrictive Short-Term

accord as

a

general rule in U.S. trade policy and Petersen

lamented the lack of international and national priorities
among the White House staff on trade.
was accustomed to ward politics.

But Kennedy himself

"The mentality was

Boston", said Petersen. "You want the votes, you give the

guy the post off ice".

"^"^

Relentless pressure from Congress forced Kennedy to
deal.

Textileman Robert Stevens wrote Senator Pastore

blasting the TEA because Kennedy seemed willing to "sell

down the river" whole segments
of U.S. industry.
The
watchdog House Textile Conference
Group and a letter on 23
January 1962 from over one-third
of the Senate criticized
the projected provisions of a
Long-Term Cotton Textile
Agreement, to replace the Short-Term
accord.
The textile
bloc wanted ceilings on imports with
no increases unless
U.S. consumption of textiles rose
and the inclusion of all
fibers.
Congressmen, consistent with regulatory
politics,
had made their offerings. Now they expected
cooperation
from the President.
Votes on the TEA were
at stake.

Kennedy did not completely meet these stringent
aims,
but produced a five-year Long-Term Arrangement
(LTA) that
came close.
The U.S. proposed to abolish cotton textile

quotas after five years, but on this point liberalism
ceased.

The LTA would freeze imports in 1963 and 1964

followed by

a

controlled rise in quota levels based on the

concept of market disruption over the next three years.

Citing the inordinate growth of textile imports as the
reason for these limits, the administration admitted that
the plan might be interpreted as sheer camouflaged

protectionism.

Yet the LTA sought to pry open European

markets and spread the burden of imports among all Northern
nations 32
The international community reacted coolly to the

Arrangement.

The Asian nations were gratified for the

increased access into the EEC but still feared the
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potential for greater restrictions.

Since a rise in

imports would affect the Common
Market more than any of the
other 19 participants signees,
the Six began to hedge on
liberalizing their textile trade
policy.
Fearing a
doubling of imports over the next
five years, the EEC
recommended a more liberal use of the
escape clause to
invoke the market disruption clause
than desired by
Washington. Kennedy resisted any change
in the LTA.^^
Fair-trade required that the Common Market
significantly
increase its share of cotton textile imports
in the new
regime
As approved on

United States.

9

February 1962, the LTA favored the

By diverting foreign textiles bound for

America to Europe, the accord allowed a possible
"standstill" of cotton textile imports, announced the

administration.

Dissatisfied with the LTA, however, every

nation except the U.S. and Britain delayed signing the
accord for nearly seven months, or just before it took
effect on 30 September

1962."^'^

American treatment of Hong Kong boded ill of textile

policy in the future, believed these nations.

Refusing

restrain its textile exports to America, Hong Kong paid
price.

When Kennedy prohibited importation of eight

categories of cotton textiles in April 1962, a third of

Hong Kong's textile workers reportedly lost their jobs.
Though the U.S. did not adequately demonstrate market
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a

disruption under the terms of the
GATT textile agreements
or intend such a serious blow,
Washington claimed that Hong
Kong would make up for its loss
by its competitive
superiority.
At home, the LTA cleared the way
for the trade bill.
March, 1962, the administration
claimed that it had

m

realized, or would soon fulfill, all
seven points of the
textile program, sought a decision on
the industry's

request for relief under the national
security clause, and
pledged to apply the textile plan to other
fibers.
Such
aid earned an acknowledgement from the journal
Textile
World that the President had "gone to bat for
the
industry".

The National Cotton Council announced its

support for the trade bill because of the "exceptional

treatment" given by Kennedy.

Victory was definitely his,

however, when the ACMI thanked Kennedy on 31 March 1962
for

his "unprecedented degree of thoughtful consideration and

constructive action for textiles".

The ACMI then endorsed

the Trade Expansion Act."^^

Congress revealed the political effectiveness of the

seven-point program.

Business Week wrote of Kennedy's

neutralization of the congressional textile bloc.

Senator

Pastore appreciated the cooperative efforts of government
leaders in reaching the LTA and the resulting standstill on
imports.
TEA.

Congressman Vinson told textilemen to back the

When some industry leaders persisted about government
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neglect of imports, Vinson slapped
them for their
ingratitude.
He asserted that the President
had placed the
industry "in a unique, preferential,
and beneficial
position - a position not enjoyed by
any other segment of
American industry" and acquiesced to
Commerce Secretary
Hodges' s request to keep the textile
bloc "in
line" for the

upcoming vote on the TEA.^"^
The criticism by free-traders of the
LTA also told much
about Kennedy's adept political maneuvering.
Importer

William Bernhard cynically applauded textilemen
for their
political "efficiency" but warned Kennedy that
further

concessions to protectionist industries might turn
the TEA
campaign into a disastrous "economic Bay of Pigs".
Importer Jerome Pitofsky had expressed his shock when
the

ACMI endorsed the TEA, the first time to his knowledge
that
the headlines of the textile industry's newspapers

proclaimed support for a liberal trade bill.

Pitofsky

asked what "backroom political deal" by Kennedy had been

necessary to accomplish "the miracle" of textile industry
support for the TEA?-^^

Kennedy's textile program, an

accommodation based on inter-branch politics, was the
answer
Unease from TEA proponents also surfaced in Congress.
In June 1962, Kennedy signed a bill which allowed the

President to limit cotton textile imports from non-signees
of the LTA.

The bill aimed to slow down U.S. textile
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imports in 1962, which exceeded
1961 levels, by applying
the Arrangement to all textile
exporters.
The legislation
wooed textilemen but stung liberal
traders.
Congressman
Thomas B. Curtis (R-MO)
disgusted by the "raw political
deal" which epitomized Kennedy's
textile program, denounced
the "gross inconsistency" of the bill
to free-trade.
,

Senator Paul Douglas

(D-Ill.)

asserted that the textile

bloc "in a very genteel fashion has held
a pistol to the
head of the President", extorting concessions
for its vote
on the TEA."^^

Though morally right, the charge (which the

administration denied) that Kennedy bought off the
textile
bloc to pass the TEA, was naive. Vinson had warned
of

growing unrest in the textile bloc over the TEA and
urged
the President to carry out the terms of the LTA without

modification or dilution.

But Kennedy had told Senator

Pastore that though freer trade was in America's interests,
he would stand by the protectionist aspects of the seven-

point program.

Thus, meeting with 11 senators led by

Pastore, and supported by Finance Committee chairman Byrd,
just four days before the senate vote on the TEA, he

reaffirmed his intention of freezing textile imports more

effectively
The President reaped the rewards of his textile policy.
On 11 October 1962, the TEA passed by large margins and

garnered substantial textile bloc support in both houses of
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congress.

The 16 top textile employment
states yielded 158
of a possible 213 votes in
the House, or almost threequarters, and 28 out of 32 votes
in the Senate in favor of
the bill. Many bloc members
were confirmed liberal traders
or voting the Democratic Party
line, so they would have
backed the TEA regardless of the
textile program.

Yet the tally also reveals extensive
Republican

opposition.
1962.

The party had resisted the New Frontier
in

In Eisenhower's first RTA in
1953, moreover,

the Democrats backed him.

95% of

By contrast, three-quarters of

the Republicans supported Kennedy's first
trade bill.
Thus, the

4

"nays" in the Senate and

40

House came from Republican stalwarts.

of the 55 in the

They either retained

vestiges of traditional GOP protectionism or hoped
to
embarrass Kennedy by rejecting the centerpiece of his
legislative agenda.

The textile strategy did not matter in

their case.
Most significant, 87 out of the congressmen who had

joined Vinson's 128-member Textile Conference Group and 28
of the 34 senators who had signed the textile letter to the

President voted for the TEA.

Thirty-eight congressmen

voted against it, but well over half of them were
Republicans, as were five of the six opponents in the
Senate.

The other nay vote came from Strom Thurmond (D-SC)

who soon switched parties.

In addition,

77 members of the

House bloc and a majority of the Senate bloc opposed

protectionist amendments or motions
to recommit the old
RTA.
Also, 14 senators opposed an
attempt by Senator Bush
to restore the broad powers
of the peril point, which
was

defeated by only a handful of votes.
The vote also showed regional
trends of support.
Kennedy won over Southerners. For
instance. White House
staffers expressed amazement that
Congressman Dorn of North
Carolina, who had voted for only 4 of
43 administration

bills during 1961, acted "totally out
of character for him"
and "not only voted for us, but worked
with a large number
of members" to gain their support.

Eighty-two of 105

House Southern Democrats followed Congressman
Vinson and
supported the bill, including all of those from
Georgia,

Tennessee, and Virginia and a predominant majority
from

Alabama and North Carolina.
voted for the TEA.
of those opposed,

In the Senate,

19 out of 20

New England backers tripled the number
including Senator Pastore, whose

subcommittee had led the fight for protectionism on
textiles.

The concessions on textiles were not the sole

reason for the favorable outcome, but as many observers
claimed, they were a major factor.

'^^

Thus, the seven-point program attained its objective.

The LTA indeed violated GATT principles by restricting
trade.

Liberal traders recognized the hypocrisy in the

administrations'

s

professed aims for freer trade when

measured against the international agreements on textiles.
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Perhaps Kennedy had over-stretched
his fair-trade doctrine,
but he had good reasons. Among
these were his sympathy
with the textile industry and,
most prominent, the battle
he faced in Congress over the
TEA.

The only other explicitly formulated
concession offered
by Kennedy to an import-competitor
was an assistance

program for the softwood lumber industry.
Northwest

(Washington, Oregon,

the "Inland Empire"

The Pacific

and northern California) and

(Montana and Idaho)

lumber interests

appealed for restrictions of lumber imports
from British
Columbia, Canada.
These were states which Kennedy had lost
in the presidential election and needed in
order
to offset

Republican foes or possible Southern flight from the
New
Frontier.
Some pine and hardwood regions mobilized behind
them.

Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD)

,

for instance,

imports had placed the industry "in

a

said that

serious fix" for

"precisely the same reason that the textile mills" were in
trouble.

Like textilemen, lumber interests tested Kennedy's

political skills in preserving free-trade under the TEA.

Recognizing that the problems stemmed as much from U.S.
laws and government policies which curtailed timber cuts,

hindered transportation, and raised prices for lumbermen as
they did from Canadian exports, Kennedy sought to placate
the industry with federal aid and revamping goverment
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procedures.

Included was a pledge to seek
some sort of
voluntary export restraint from
Ottawa, but merely as a sop
to lumber interests. Kennedy by
no means intended to
disrupt the profitable U.S. trade with
Canada through a
restrictive accord.
In its international and
domestic
aspects, his lumber import plan was a
mark of his fairtrade doctrine.

An flood of cheap softwood imports from
British Columbia
to the prime U.S. East coast market
instigated the lumber
problem. Almost four-fifths of U.S. forests
were softwood,
of which the West coast supplied 70% of
Eastern consumption
in the 1950s.

But Canada, the world's leading softwood

exporter, depended on America to buy more than half
of its

production.

This reliance was critical after 1954, when

competition from the Soviet Union, Finland, and Sweden

began to shut out Commonwealth Canada from its traditional
market in Great Britain and as Canadian consumption leveled
out during the 1950s while production rose.

Thus,

a

burst

of Canada's softwood exports from 1959 to 1963 seized over

57% of the U.S. market.

Ten years earlier, British

Columbia occupied 15% of the Atlantic market, while West
coast lumbermen held the rest.'^^

Now, the trend had

reversed.
This situation affected U.S. production.

The 1950s had

been a "boom" period in production due to construction
surge,

reported the National Lumber Manufacturing
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Associatxon (NLMA)

Domestic consumption fluctuated,
but
remained even, despite occasional
lags in housing starts.
.

By 1961, however, production
fell by 5 million board feet,
or 16%, from the 1959 figure.
Only once in the 1960s would

production climb above the 1959 total.

Such sluggishness

was especially serious for Oregon
and Washington, where the
forest industry accounted for 60%
and 40% of the

manufacturing payroll respectively.

Employment in the

industry fell 44% between 1947 and
1961, making many
counties in lumber states candidates for
the new Area
Redevelopment program.
Lumbermen blamed imports for their problems.

Declining

U.S. production and soaring consumption had
attracted

Canadian lumber at the expense of American mills.

Despite

an upswing in housing in 1962, claimed the
new Lumbermen's

Economic Survival Committee, imports had caused prices
for
lumber to fall, creating a simply "awful" state of affairs.
The Simpson Timber Company of Seattle, for instance,

estimated

a loss to

million

year because of competition from Canada. An Idaho

a

West coast sawmill communities of $10

banker remarked that he had never witnessed

a

decline in

the industry, similar to that of 1960-1962, since the Great

Depression.

The cause clearly was "foreign competition",

wrote Congressman Jack Westland (R-WA) to President

Kennedy

46
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In reality,

however, Canadian imports were
a symptom,
not one of the many causes, of
these lumber problems.
Canada enjoyed several advantages in
the lumber trade.
in
order to correct its worsening balance-of
-payments deficit
with America, Ottawa devalued its
dollar in June 1961,
which made imports more expensive and
exports cheaper.
The
currency reached a sub-par value of 92.5
cents (U.S.)

before being stabilized by the International
Monetary Fund.
The depreciated Canadian dollar had a
"devastating" effect
on U.S. lumber interests, admitted the State
Department.
Regardless, to aid its payments woes, Canada later
adopted
an import surcharge affecting many U.S. products "^"^
.

Canada had other advantages.

British Columbia

experienced its second most active year in logging history
in 1961, and lumbermen there lobbied for higher export

quotas which at present restricted their sales abroad.

Lower wages and operating costs and a more liberal

allowance of national forest cuts relative to the United
States helped Canadian lumbermen.

In 1962,

Canada had the

lowest stumpage prices in its postwar history, thus mills

paid less for timber from British Columbian forests than
Americans.

Meanwhile, Japanese buyers, willing to pay a

premium for logs, had driven up the cost of timber for U.S.
mills.

The nominal U.S. tariff on softwood lumber,

especially relative to Canada's, also added to Canadian
48
^
competitiveness
J.

-
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Transportation laws also gave British
Columbia an edge
over U.S. lumbermen.
The method of selling cars of
lumber
in transit, the "free-hold"
system, allowed for cheaper

Canadian railroad costs.

Of more impact was the U.S.

Merchant Marine Act of 1920, or the
Jones Act, which
required the goods bound for domestic
markets

to be shipped

in U.S. vessels.

Northwest lumbermen paid the more

expensive American rate of $36 per thousand
board feet
while British Columbia sent its lumber to
the East coast in
world charter bottoms at $6 to $11 below the
U.S.
rate.

In

addition, the number of ships engaging in
intercoastal

trade had declined since the mid-1950s, leaving
American

lumbermen without adequate service.

For instance, only one

vessel ran every 45 days from Portland, Oregon to Puerto
Rico.

Not bound to U.S. ships, Canada doubled its share of

waterborne shipments to the Atlantic Seaboard and Hawaii
and monopolized service to Puerto Rico.'^^
The lumber industry urged the administration to address

some of these problems in early 1962.

Over 50 industry

spokesmen, including the NLMA and lobbyists from softwood

areas in the South, Southwest, and Northwest,

7

U.S.

senators, and 14 congressmen visited Secretary of

Agriculture Freeman on 21 February 1962.

They requested an

orderly program of timber sales at fair stumpage prices,
more access roads, and more efficient administration in the

National Forests, which were the major sources of timber.

A letter from nine senators to
Freeman and congressional
hearings in April prompted an
investigation of lumber
conditions by the USDA.^*^
Like textiles a year earlier, the
lumber import issue
thus appeared on the national stage
of trade problems.
A
^""^^

Crow-s Lumber Digest regarding Canadian
softwood

exports found unanimity among producers and
wholesalers
that palliatives were necessary; the former
group placed
more weight on tariffs or quotas as the answer.
Both
groups backed a modification of the Jones Act,
continued

prohibition of the railroad free-hold, and

a

requirement

that the Buy American preference be used on homes
insured

under the Federal Housing Act (FHA)

.

Imports were also the

major topic at the annual meeting of the West Coast
Lumbermens Association (WCLA) in March. ^"^
The WCLA and NLMA concurred on two remedies.

First,

Congress should amend Section 22 of the Agricultural

Adjustment Act to qualify forest products for quantitative
import limits in trade agreements, as enjoyed by other

commodities.

Second, they recommended a 10% duty plan

under which tariffs on softwood lumber would be removed

altogether until a time when imports from either Canada or
the U.S. reached 10% of domestic consumption.

At this

point, the importer could assess a duty of 10%.
The plan was a thinly veiled protectionist measure.

A

removal of lumber tariffs would not harm America, since its
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duty was minimal.

More revealing, since Canadian
imports

had already reached 17% of U.S.
consumption, the 10% duty
would go into effect automatically.
Northwestern and
inland Empire interests had drawn
the line of protectionism
clearly for the President.
The congressional bloc championed
the recommendations.
In the spring and early summer
of 1962, Congresswoman Julia

Hansen (D-WA) introduced the Section 22
amendment, House
members Walt Horan and Thomas M. Pelly
(R-WA) the 10%
B.

plan,

and Hansen and Congressman Clem Miller
(D-CA) a provision
which would have discriminated against
lumber exporters by
requiring a country-of -origin label on all wood
product
imports.
Senator Mundt tried to attach a protective timber
import agreement on to the same bill that subjected
non-

participants of the GATT textile Arrangements to quotas.
All of these measures met eventual defeat over the

next two

years thus, in part, undermining the interest group
model. 53

But, they alerted Kennedy to disgruntlement on

Capitol Hill which might transfer to the Trade Expansion
Act

Kennedy listened most attentively to lumber problems
because the TEA was moving through Congress at the time.
His task, as in the textile case, was to reach a fair-trade

balance of assistance while keeping open the channels of
liberal trade.

Lumbermen noted the difficulty of

considering quotas while Congress debated
175

a

trade expansion

program, but they argued that
barriers were permissible
under the concept of the TEA.
The President, however, did
not want to enmesh himself in
another difficult and
restrictive international agreement
like the LTA, if
avoidable

Sending Secretary of State Rusk to
Seattle to
investigate the import problem, Kennedy
reminded lumbermen
that trade restrictions on Canada were
not in U.S.

interests.

Ottawa held an advantage in lumber trade,
but
the U.S. enjoyed an overall trade surplus
ranging from

$58

million to $1.25 billion from 1945 to 1968.

This surplus

was halved between 1960-1962, but by 1965
approached the

high 1960 level.

In material terms, America supplied

almost 90% of Canada's agricultural implements and over

one-third of its steel and iron.

Canada was America's

single most important customer; their trade comprised the

largest volume of merchandise exchanged by any two nations
in the world.

Thus, the administration stressed that federal

assistance, and not trade restrictions, which might cut off
this lucrative trade, was the best way to help lumbermen.

Though sympathetic to West coast problems. Rusk said that a

voluntary export restraint by Canada was the most that
could be realistically expected. Harsher measures might

provoke retaliation and upset bilateral cooperation in
defense and economic matters.

Sensitive to U.S. domination
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of their economy, Canadians,
under the politically

unpopular Prime Minister John Dief
enbacker
protectionism as a symbol of independence.

,

had hinted at
The import

surcharge and a reportedly restrictive
revision of the
Canadian Tariff Law were two outward
manifestations of this
sentiment.
Ottawa's support of the TEA hinged,
moreover,
on America's commitment to free-trade.
Limits on lumber
imports might provoke Diefenbacker to
oppose U.S. designs
to lower trade barriers under the TEA.'^^

Howard Petersen pressed the free-trade line.
Restrictions, he summarized, should be a "last
resort".
Commerce Department figures revealed that softwood
imports
from Canada amounted to only 13% of U.S. consumption,
which
meant Western lumbermen supplied a healthy 87% to
America.

A more "durable solution" than limiting imports, he wrote
Senate lumber bloc leader Wayne Morse (D-OR)

,

was domestic

and export measures aimed at increasing total demand at

home and abroad.

Under the fair-trade approach, the

administration placed "primary reliance on encouraging
domestic industries to become more competitive by the
adoption, where necessary, of appropriate domestic

measures" and not by the "essentially negative step of

restricting imports".
These explanations fell on deaf ears within the
industry.

Not all of the forest products industry opposed

the trade bill; pulp and paper manufacturers, multinational

loggers^ and plywood wholesalers, hoping to boost their

exports, supported Kennedy. But the NLMA disliked the TEA

because it abolished the escape clause, lowered the already
minimal tariff on lumber imports, and offered inadequate
help under the adjustment assistance measure. When the NLMA

advocated the 10% plan, several representatives of the

hardwood and plywood industries in the Mid-West, South, and
New England, which opposed imports from Canada, Japan, the
Philippines

,

and Finland, supported its position
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Private sector efforts incited congressional appeals.

Legislators weighed free-trade with rising unemployment
among their constituents which would inevitably occur under
the TEA.

They also considered their chances in the

upcoming November elections.

Thus,

Senator Morse, the

chief critic of lumber imports, cringed at

a

handbill

presently circulating around mills in his home state of
Oregon.

It advertised that foreign workers should apply to

Morse for jobs lost by American employees if the TEA
passed.

Though supportive of the TEA and realizing that

imports were not whole cause of lumber problems, he thought

possible some "conscionable compromise" with Kennedy, whom
he perceived was sympathetic to the import problem.

Just weeks before the House vote in late June on the

trade bill, however. Congress still expressed

dissatisfaction with administration offerings.
Protectionists rallied.

Fresh from the textile battle,
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Congressman John Dent claimed he would vote for the TEA
only when Kennedy informed him of the fate of the possibly

several thousand unemployed lumber mill workers.

Others

recognized that the TEA would help expand lumber imports to
Europe, but until that eventuality, they sought some

emergency restrictions.

Trade journals reported that

Kennedy now faced the "greatest barrage of protectionists
against Canadian lumber that has ever been fired" from

Capitol Hill.
Most noteworthy was the bloc of 43 congressmen from

various areas, but concentrated in the West and South, who
wrote Kennedy a "lumber letter" on 12 June 1962.

The

letter urged federal aid and quotas and surely concerned

him since the lumber bloc issued it just two weeks before
Congress voted on the TEA.

voted against the 1958 RTA.

Eighteen of the signees had
Yet the overall House tally on

the TEA revealed that among the bloc, only Washington state

legislators cast a majority against the bill. The lumber
letter adherents also split along party lines, explaining

why 17, or 40% of the 43, rejected the TEA and 19 voted for
the major protectionist amendment.

The House vote showed

that interest groups had not prevailed on Congress, but the
import problem worried Kennedy because the Senate was

really the main seat of lumber bloc discontent.
In the Senate,

6

most of the lumber bloc, including close

friends of the administration such as Democratic whip and
179

Inland Empire representative Mike Mansfield,
were sensitive
to the NLMA proposals for import limits.
Senator Warren

Magnuson (D-WA)

,

a

free-trader and chair of the lumber

hearings, complained that quotas were not under

consideration even though softwood interests had suffered
import injury.

The most fervent opinion came from Morse,

who pledged to fight the administration on the TEA to

ensure that the lumber industry would not suffer.

He was

impatient with the President's delays on lumber especially
since Kennedy had acted so swiftly for textilemen. "I

cannot vote for the President's foreign trade bill," Morse

pronounced, unless "we get comparable justice for lumber as
was given the textile industry" under a "fair" trade

program. 62
On

26

July 1962, Kennedy hoped to meet this requirement

by proposing a six-point program of assistance for the
lumbermen.

He ordered an increase in loans and new

depreciation schedules to upgrade mills and promote
productivity.

The plan provided for more access road

construction and efficient transport of logs in the

National Forests, an immediate increase in cuts in Bureau
of Land Management areas,

and a study by the USDA on the

feasibility of raising allowable cuts in the national
forests

.

Kennedy sought to modify the Jones Act to

overcome the high cost or lack of ships available for U.S.

producers and ordered government agencies to buy more
180

American lumber.

in trade,

he promised talks with Canada

and a prompt Tariff Commission investigation
on imports
that had been requested earlier by the industry.

Private sector reaction was positive.

In fact, the only

real criticism came from the free-trade Committee for
a

National Trade Policy which claimed that the prospective

restrictive agreement with Canada, Buy American preference,
and Tariff Commission action were inconsistent with the

principles of the TEA.

Most lumber groups expressed their

gratitude to Kennedy and their congressmen, although they

warned about laxity with Canada regarding import barriers.
The NLMA still wished to tack to the trade bill authority
for an emergency quota, but thanked the President anyway at

the TEA hearings for his program which addressed all of its

previous complaints
Congress, too, was appreciative, and turned its

attention from Kennedy to Canada as the main target.

Before both houses of Congress, Representative Hansen

analyzed each provision of the six-point program and

described the administration's tireless efforts on behalf
of the industry.

She argued especially that Kennedy had

undertaken every action legally open to him under the
present RTA by urging a Tariff Commission investigation and
swiftly naming a negotiating team to Ottawa.

Morse

exemplified the shift from pressure on Kennedy to an attack
on Canada the day the President signed the TEA.
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possible to the United States in light of Canada's
apparent
increasing failure to correct its payments deficit
with

its

neighbor and the world as

a whole.

Demand had mounted in

America for lumber, moreover, and Canada had not
exactly

begged East coast builders to buy its lumber.

Ottawa

feared the same occurrence Kennedy had dreaded: a return to
the "bad old days" of Smoot-Hawley

It was ironic,

.

thought

Canada, that America's best customer should find itself the

scapegoat for U.S. domestic economic problems, too.^^
Thus,

at the talks,

Ottawa manuevered around U.S.

requests for restraints.

The Canadian government noted

that it had never adopted a voluntary export restraint, and
only once

(for zinc)

had it permitted an industry to do so.

In words that could be attributed to the President of the

United States as much as Canadian producers, the latter
hoped that "the U.S. lumber industry will not persuade
liberal-minded Washington to play once more the same kind
of disastrous protection against the country's main

customer" as it had during the Great Depression.
In the end,

g9

nothing came of the succession of

negotiations, or subsequent talks with Prime Minister
Diefenbaker, over the next two years.

Canada was stubborn,

but it seems clear the Kennedy administration did not push

too hard for restrictions, either.

Both sides merely

pledged to reach an agreement of "mutual interest" without
consenting to quotas.

Kennedy therefore received credit
183

with U.S. lumber protectionists for seeking
restraints yet
in no way jeopardized profitable
relations with
Canada or his liberal tr i.]*- m".i1s.'^°
t

At home, the Senate bloc rewarded Kennedy by
easily

passing the Trade Expansion Act.
9

The voting record of the

senators who visited Freeman in February 1962 gives an

accurate indication of the success of the six-point
program.

These legislators, all from the Pacific Northwest

and Inland Empire states, voted unanimously for the TEA.
The

2

senators from Alaska, active on the import issue,

also favored the bill.

The bloc voted against the Bush

amendment to restore the peril point by

a

total of 10 to

1

and unanimously opposed three other protectionist measures.
Again,
support,

other reasons are plausible for the bloc's

including the fact that all but one of its members

were Democrats supporting party legislation.

Yet,

both

parties had soundly defeated Mundt's proposal to negotiate
a

protective lumber agreement similar to the textile

accords and Wayne Morse, the most outspoken member of the
bloc,

voted for the TEA.

Less than half of Kennedy's

legislative requests for 1962 passed Congress but thanks to
adept presidential politicking, the TEA did not become one
of the casualties.

7

Progress on the six-point program also played
swinging votes.

In early September 1962,

a

part in

the Senate

amended the Jones Act to permit mills to ship lumber on
184

non-American vessels to Puerto Rico if no U.S.
vessels were
available.
In January, 1963, Georgia-Pacific
became the
first company in 43 years to load lumber on a
foreign
vessel bound for a domestic port.

In October 1962,

the

USDA announced an increase in allowable cuts from the 42
national forests in the five lumber states by 547 million

board feet.
its land.

The Bureau of Land Management followed suit on

Loans through the SBA and Area Redevelopment

Administration were available upon request for any
producer, the Defense Department had awarded 95% of lumber

procurement contracts to U.S. firms, and funds for building
access roads were allocated under the Highway Act,'^^

Kennedy satisfied the industry by making good on his lumber
program.
In lumber,

Kennedy not only received unanimous support

from injured producers but averted a restrictive trade
agreement.

When the Tariff Commission in early 1963

rejected the industry's plea to invoke the escape clause,
the first case heard under the TEA, the administration

removed the threat of retaliation against Canada.

Under

the new concept of injury, the TEA required that a tariff
or quota could be applied only if an industry showed its

injury was caused by

a

former trade concession.

The

Commission pointed instead to Canada's depreciated dollar,
its cheaper shipping and rail rates, and higher U.S. timber

prices as responsible for American lumber hardships.
185

73

In conclusion,

the fair-trade design helped lumbermen

without diverging from trade liberalism.
the next five years under the TEA'

s

In fact,

during

authority, the trade

regime in lumber and bilateral commercial relations
in
general, benefited Canada.

Softwood imports from Canada

rose throughout the 1960s, and jumped in 1968 by
16%, the

biggest increase of the decade, after the U.S. eliminated
its lumber duty at the Kennedy Round of GATT

.

That same

year also marked the first time since the war that America

suffered

a

trade deficit with Canada.

'^'^

Kennedy championed a policy of seeking mutual benefits
in the global trade regime.

The U.S. became so generous

with Canada, however, that it lost its trade surplus.
Surely, the views of the comparative-advantage school are

more than accurate in this case in that American leadership
was beneficial for all.

Textile trade is more important for assessing aims and

outcomes because the U.S. created

a

restrictive regime.

The LTA regime of the 1960s was not representative of trade

liberalism nor an example of the comparative -advantage

principle at work.

Yet Kennedy's program was a compromise

in a long-disputed problem in world commerce and a clear

instance of the fair-trade doctrine in practice.

The

reasoning behind import restrictions had some foundation,
since several nations had virtually flooded the U.S. market

with cotton goods.

Their superior comparative advantage
186

caused

a

quickening decline in the American textile

industry

Fair-trade meant that the burden of such injurious
imports would be equitably distributed among trading

partners.

Kennedy also interpreted the doctrine to mean

that there was no point in liberalizing trade if lower

barriers destroyed

a

domestic or foreign industry or, most

critical, derailed passage of the TEA.

The cotton textile

accords were the fairest approach possible, considering the

economic factors and, above all, the domestic restraints on
Kennedy.

In sum, America forged a mutually acceptable

textile regime which actually helped the LDCs
One target of American protectionism was Hong Kong.

That nation had captured approximately 28%, of the U.S.

cotton textile market by the 1960s.

exports shot up 67.8 million yards,

Its cotton textile
a

stunning thirty-two

fold increase from 1958 to 1961, and nearly $11.2 million
in value.

This rise was crucial to Hong Kong's cotton

textile industry which employed 45% of the country's

manufacturing workers, accounted for 50% of industrial
exports, and made the textile industry the top export
sector.

expanded.

Throughout the 1960s, textile jobs and exports

Hong Kong's overall production also rose,

diversifying the economy and fueling a climb out of LDC
status.

The LTA provided the nation with more market

opportunities in Europe, Canada, and Australia and America
187

took an increasingly larger share of Hong
Kong's exports,
and at just a slightly slower growth rate.
Thus, Hong Kong
quickly rebounded from the U.S. restrictions of
April 1962,

became the most successful textile exporter under
the LTA,
and benefited additionally from the free-trade effects
of

the TEA."^^
In general,

U.S.

leadership created a regime which made

world cotton textile trade less restrictive than would have
been the case without the LTA.

The thirty-country pact

compelled importers to relax restrictions over the next
five years.

America led all nations until the mid-1970s in

filling its quotas and importing cotton textiles from the
LDCs

.

Under authority from the TEA, the U.S. cut its

tariffs on various cotton textile categories by 21%. at the

Kennedy Round of GATT

.

Partly as

a

result, Asian textile

exports to the U.S. increased by half in value during the

second half of the 1960s.

In addition,

U.S. textile and

apparel imports tripled from 1961 to 197 0 and over the same
period, the ratio of imports to domestic consumption more

than doubled until the Nixon administration slowed the
increases by imposing more stringent quotas under bilateral
accords in 1971 and the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) of
1974."^^

The regime also served to increase access to the Common

Market and boost LDC export markets throughout the world.
While the EEC lagged behind America in liberalizing
188

barriers, the Six reluctantly increased
access and admitted
that the new burden was not excessive.
Only Japan's share
of the cotton textile market declined,
but Tokyo would soon
make up the losses in other sectors. During
the period
1961-1965, the LDCs' share increased from 21
to 24% and
their exports to the developed nations outpaced
the overall
growth rate for all countries by 4%. The renewal
of the
LTA in 19 67 slowed this increase somewhat and
an outburst
of American protectionism at the end of the
decade led to

the limits imposed by the MFA.

Yet as a result of the

Kennedy initiative, the LDCs share of cotton textile
markets in the North expanded to 28% by 1969 and brought

a

more equitable sharing of imports within the North than

before the accord.
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Thus, America sought and largely achieved mutual

benefits in global textile and lumber trade.

The cases

validate the argument of the comparative -advantage school

because these products were one in which the country had
suffered import injury and could have easily raised

prohibitive trade barriers.

The concessions might have

jeopardized, but did not indicate a retreat from, Kennedy's
goal of free-trade, as the hegemony school charges.
Instead, they constituted a fair-trade compromise compelled

by the pluralist decision-making process in U.S. trade
policy.
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In essence,

the American political system determined

decisions on trade.

The ultimate motive behind Kennedy's

actions on textiles and lumber was politics.

The Trade

Expansion Act, his top priority legislation for
1962, was
in the hands of free-traders and protectionists on
Capitol

Hill.

Blocking its passage were large blocs of legislators

who represented equally large and powerful import
-competing

interests.

Congress wanted concessions from Kennedy before

giving him the TEA in return.

Bureaucrats formulated and implemented policy, but were
not central to the decision-making process.

Despite

differing priorities, Hodges and Ball held the same views
on textile and lumber policy.

The Commerce Secretary, as a

former textileman, was sympathetic to industry complaints.
Since his job was to usher the TEA through Congress, Hodges

championed free-trade over protectionism and did not break

with the State Department line.

Ball fought the textile

accords and limits on lumber imports, eventually losing out
on the first and winning the second.

Still, he followed

Kennedy's wishes in both instances, even devised the cotton

textile Arrangements, and did not compete with other
officials to change presidential policy.

These bureaucrats

agreed on free-trade, the need to pass the TEA, and the
tactics of concessions to domestic interests to do so.
sum,

Kennedy'

s

In

fair-trade doctrine molded decision-making

and precluded bureaucratic infighting on the TEA.
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A combination of government and economic
elites did not
control policy-making, either.

Appeals for protection came

from labor-intensive industries which
promoted, contrary to
Kennedy's policy, import restrictions rather
than export
expansion.
Thus, not only were there sharp differences
in

private and public sector aims, but corporatism is
not
applicable because the rising export sector of capitalintensive firms did not dominate decisions.

In addition,

private interests did not work through the administration,
they exerted pressure through Congress.

corporatist analysis of

a

Thus,

again, the

supposed consensus between the

government and textile and lumber elites is off base.
Interest group pressure on Congress was important in

pushing legislators to pressure the President.

But neither

textilemen or lumbermen got key requests granted by the
administration.

In the case of textiles.

Congress refused

to force Kennedy to make the LTA more restrictive, include

other fibers in the accord, or provide an equalization fee

before the TEA came to a vote.

Lumber interests could not

prevail in winning their 10% import limit plan or in the
end,

restrict Canadian softwood sales.

Furthermore,

legislators with textile and lumber constituents, backed
the TEA bill even with the knowledge that lower trade

barriers might injure these industries and, consequently,
hurt their chances of re-election.

Interest groups

therefore won concessions but not full satisfaction.
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Instead, the modus vivendi reached by
Kennedy and

Congress, according to the inter-branch
politics model, was
the basis of decision-making.
The congressional textile
and lumber blocs pressed for help; Kennedy shrewdly

responded because he needed their vote.

These blocs heard

the complaints of their constituents but then, with
some

autonomy on the issues, reached bargains which satisfied

them but oftentimes not the voters they represented.

The

process boiled down to horse-trading between Congress and
the administration, in which both sides laid their cards on
the table, reached an accommodation, and folded up and

returned home.

In any case, Kennedy's tactics,

called

brilliant by experts and aides alike, cut out "the heart"
of two major protectionist coalitions and preserved the
U.S.

aim of promoting liberal trade.

In short,

trade policy.

7R

horse-trading confirms the pluralist nature of

A difficult issue such as trade, as well as

the President's weak position on Capitol Hill, forced him
to compromise by using, in correspondent Carroll

Kilpatrick's words at the time, "favors, pork, patronage,
and charm" to win the TEA.

The activist Reverend Theodore

Hesburgh even linked the trade bill to civil rights.

He

claimed that Kennedy skirted the issue in 1962 out of

a

fear of losing southern votes on the TEA.
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Not validated

by other sources, this analysis nonetheless seems plausible

especially after considering the great lengths the
192

President went to woo various congressional
blocs.
His
relationship with Congress overrode all
other concerns.
In part,

appeasing the textile and lumber congressional
blocs enabled Kennedy to take the negotiating
authority won
under the TEA to the Kennedy Round of GATT
and bargain with
the Common Market.
These blocs were two of the critical

obstacles to the trade bill, but they were not the
only
ones.

Coal and oil producers and carpets and glass

manufacturers also stood in the way of the TEA, and

required the President's attention to ensure a legislative

victory
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assistance under the TEA would also apply to the industry.
37

Cong. Carl Vinson to Hickman Price,

16 March 1962,

Cotton-General-3/62, box 21, Feldman files. See also

"Administration's Coup on Textiles", Business Week no. 1695
(24

February 1962)

:

34;

Telephone Conversation with Senator

Pastore, undated. Brief ing-St. Dept -Commerce, re Geneva
.

Textile Conference,

9

February 1962, and Sen. Pastore to

Seabury Stanton, 23 February 1962, Textiles-Letters of
Commendation, box Pastore-General Files-Textiles, Pastore
papers; Carl Vinson to Robert

T.

Stevens,

24 March 1962,

attached to Lawrence O'Brien to Vinson, 28 March 1962,
LE/FO 3-3 3/21/62-4/5/62, box 479, WHCF-JFK; Carl Vinson to

Myer Feldman, 15 March 1962, box 55, Petersen files;
Secretary Luther Hodges to Cong. Carl Vinson, 22 March
1962,

Cotton-General-3/62, box 21, Feldman files.
38

Textile Industry Hearings II

,

William

J.

Bernhard,

American Chamber of Coxmnerce for Trade with Italy, 66-67;
TEA-House

,

Pitofsky, American Association of Apparel and

Textile Importers, 2736-2737.
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39

"Cotton Textile Imports", Congressional
Quarterly-

Almanac 18

(1962):

346-348;

"Congress, President Present

Mixed Record in 1962", Congressional
Quarterly -w^^icl y
Report 20 (19 October 1962): 1937.
40

Myer Feldman to Senator Jacob Javits (R-NY)

,

3

October 1962, LE/FO 3-3 8/26/62-10/20/62, box
479, WHCFJFK; Rashish Oral History,

24-25; Congressman Carl Vinson

to the President, 15 February 1962,

Industries (oil, shoes

and textile) -Background Materials, box 14, Petersen
files;

Congressman Carl Vinson to the President, 13 June 1962,
attached to the President to Vinson, 27 June 1962, LE/FO
303 6/1/62-8/25/62, box 479, WHCF-JFK; Textile Industry

Hearings II

,

Pastore,

144;

The Wool Textile Problem,

attached to memorandum from Undersecretary George Ball,

4

March 1963, State-2/63-3/63, box 88A, POF; Senator Pastore
to Senator Norris Cotton (R-NH)

,

27 August 1962,

Meeting of Senators with President-Friday, Aug.

Textiles31,

1962,

box Pastore-General Files-Textiles, Pastore papers.
41

Henry Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien,

Memoranda-7/1/62-7/9/62, box

3,

2

July 1962,

Wilson files. See also

Thomas D. Blake to the President, 23 July 1962, LE/FO 3-3

7/16/62-7/31/62, box 480, WHCF-JFK; Henry Wilson to

Lawrence O'Brien,

2

July 1962, House Material-

Miscellaneous, box 31, O'Brien files; House and Senate
Support for Key Presidential Programs, 87th Congress
Session, October 1961,

-

1st

10/61, box 50, POF. For a survey of
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regional and Party voting on the TEA, see
Barrie, "Congress
and the Executive", 263-272.
42

United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2nd
session,

Degree of Republican Opposition on Key Issues,
undated.

Legislative Files-9/4-14/62, box 52, POF; House of
Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session: Total Support,
undated.

Support for Key Presidential Programs, box 32,

O'Brien files; Myer Feldman to the President, 10 October
1962,

box

Eisenhower, Dwight D -12/14/61-9/8/63 and undated,
.

2 9A,

POF;

Luther Hodges to Myer Feldman,

August 1962,

6

attached to Memorandum for the President from Feldman,
August 1962, Trade Negotiations, 3/62-10/63, box

10

26,

Feldman files; "House Extends Defense Productions, Export
Control Acts; Enacts Kennedy Trade Bill After Defeating
Substitute", Congressional Quarterly-Almanac 18
618-619,

688;

History,

82;

Harris Oral History,
Bauer,

Public Policy

,

79.

Pool,

60,

63;

(1962),

Hodges Oral

and Dexter, American Business and

The House vote was 298-125

80-90 against and Democrats 218-35 in favor)

.

(Republicans

Southern

Democrats (SDs) voted 82-23 in favor. Senate Republicans
voted 22-7, Democrats 56-1, and SDs 19-1 in favor. The
House defeated the Mason motion 171-253 with SDs against
37-69.

The Senate rejected

thf^

Bush amendment 34-45, SDs

voting 9-10, and Lhe Curtis 20-63 (SDs 1-19, Dirksen 28-56
(SDs 5-16)

,

and Prouty amendments 21-54
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(SDs 1-16)
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1962,

Congreaaiuncti

t<ooord-aenai-.e,

alao White,

M'-,^^.

v.

108,

Th» Maku.M

..r

i
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^e May

6,

Preaid^m

ho

,

I960,

420-421.

Softwooci

i

u.nber

includes pine, spruce, fir,

and hemlock.
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Darius Adams and Richaid Haynes,

Luml.or Trade:

The

Internat ional

Fore;:^

(Vgaahington,

103;

U.S.,

Lumber

T

tiitfect

h.C.!

,

ed.

Hoger A. Sedjo

for the Future,

Kfc.-.,Mi.ces

Senate Committee on

Cojiunerce,

Jno

,

,

i^JLil),

The Impact of

mp orta on the United States Softwood Lumber

XaduaLiy,

Part II

,

Cong.,

flVth

Rettig, Potlach Forests,

Inc.,

2nd aeas.,

463-464

Lumber Hearings-II Lewiaton or Olympia
Bureau,

.

.

of Restrictions" in U.a,

L'roduota Trade

!

"n S -Canadian

Commodity Yearbook,

Research Bureau,

1972),

1972

200;

1962,

C.

(hereafter cited as
)

/

Commodity Kesearch

(New York;

U.S.,

Edwin

Commodity

Department of Commerce,

Business and Defense Services Administration, Impact of

Imported Canadian Lumber on the United States Lumber
liidustry
9,

,

January 1962,

29

Peteraan files; h.n.,

Statistics,

1962

Organization,

box

yearbook of Forest Products

Food and Agricultural

(Rome:

1962),

hiimber Industry Backgro\ind,

ix and 1963

(Rome:

Food and

Agricultural Organization, 1963), vii.
45
62

"1950-1960 was

(29 May

1961):

The Impact of

20;

huitil'oi-

Lumber Industry, Part

Boom Decade for Lumber", Timberman

a

U.S.,

Senate Committee on Commerce,

imports on the United States Softwood
I

,

B7th Cong.,
209

2nd sess

.

,

1962,

Exhibit A-2, 46 and Exhibit A-1, 45 and
Representative Clem
Miller (D-CA), 4-5 (hereafter cited as
Lumber Hearinas-I K"Commerce Dept. Reviews Past Year; Sees
Uptrend", Crow-

Lumber Digest 40

(8

February 1962)

"Soaring Sixties

45;

:

Turn Soggy in Housing", Timberman 62

(29

May 1961): 17;

Commodity Research Bureau, Commodity Yearbook, 1963
(New
York,

1963)

,

200 and Commodity Yearbook,

1972

,

202; Myer

Feldman to the President, 24 July 1962, Lumber Industry,
box 102, POP; Historical Statistics of the United States
pt.

II,

46

,

671.

Myer Feldman to the President, 24 July 1962, Lumber

Industry, box 102, POF; Lumber Hearings-I

,

Robert Dywer,

Lumbermen's Economic Survival Committee; Lumber Hearings-II
Lewi St on

;

James to Senator Wayne B. Morse [D-OR]

February 1962, Papers of Wayne

B.

,

8

Morse, University of

Oregon, Eugene Oregon (hereafter cited as Morse papers)

Melvin O'Neal, Idaho First National Bank; Senator Jack

Westland to the President, 22 February 1962, White House
Congressional Replies-6/9/61-10/23/62
47

,

box 13, Petersen files

"Canadian Dollar Marked Down to Speed Recovery",

Foreign Commerce Weekly 66
Hearings-I

,

(17

July 1961)

Report, State Department,

Lumber from Canada",

2

9-30,

and

:

5;

Lumber

"Imports of Softwood

Griffith Johnson,

G.

Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 105,
113;

"Canada Applies Surcharge to

3

Import Schedules

Affecting U.S. Exporters; Lists 650 Items", International
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^^^^^^^

68

July 1962):

(9

6-7,

Canada removed the

surcharge in March 1963.
Loggers

m

British Columbia Ask for Log Export

Boost", Timberman 63

(February 1962): 54; Lumber Hearinas-

Mortimer Doyle, NLMA, 38 and Joseph Miller,
Western
Forest Industries Association, 81-83; Adams and
I,

Haynes,

"U.S. -Canadian Lumber Trade",

109

(Figure 4); Report on

Pacific Northwest Log and Lumber Exports to Japan,
attached
to Richard McArdle to Senator Wayne Morse, 16 February
Lumber Industry Correspondence-2/16/62-5/24/62, box

1962,
9,

Petersen files; U.S., House Subcommittee on Forests of

the Committee on Agriculture, Serial X: Export of Logs to

Japan

,

49

87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, Morse, 2-4, 14.

Lumber Hearings-I

,

Report, State Department,

"Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada", 27 February 1962,
30.

The "free-hold" delayed transit of lumber cars, giving

speculators time to dump lumber at prices below cost or

hold out for a higher price.

The U.S. Interstate Commerce

Commission outlawed the free-hold in 1960, though railroads
then delayed by a circuitous routing system. Ottawa dropped
the free-hold in 1962. See also "Wanted: Equal Shipping
Rates", Crow'

s

Lumber Digest

Lumber Hearings-II Olympia
Co.

,

40

(25

William

January 1962)
G.

Reed,

:

3;

Simpson Timber

to Clarence D. Martin, Jr., Undersecretary of Commerce

for Transportation,

9

January 1962, 301-304, and Richard

Ford, Washington Public Ports Association, 287-288; Lumber

Hearinqs-I, Senator Maurine B. Neuberger
(D-OR)
Report,

State Department,

and

97,

"Imports of Softwood Lumber from

Canada", 27 February 1962,

31,

and 34

Statistics of the United States, pt
^°Albert Hall,

,

.

(Table
II,

8)

Historical

757.

"What's Happening in Forestry", Report

to Private Forestry Enterprise 13, no.

5

(1

March 1962):

5;

Wayne Morse and eight senators to Secretary of
Agriculture
Orville Freeman,
Morse,

5

March 1962, attached to Freeman to

17 April 1962,

2/16/62-5/24/62, box

Lumber Industry Correspondence9,

Petersen files. In charge of the

National Forest Service, the USDA directed timber cutting
in the 42 forests of the Pacific Northwest and Inland Empire
51

"Controversy

.

.

U.S. Lumber Market to be Major

.:

Topic at WCLA Meeting, Crow'
1962)

:

8/

Lumber Digest 40

s

(22

March

"Readers Reply to Crow Poll on Canadian Lumber

Imports", Crow's Lumber Digest 40
52^

Lumber Hearings-I

,

(3

May 1962)

:

28,

30.

Mortimer Doyle, NLMA, 40 and

G.

Cleveland Edgett, West Coast Lumbermens Association, 13.
53

Frank Welch [USDA Assistant Secretary] to Cong.

Julia B. Hansen (D-WA)

,

16 May 1962,

Lumber Industry

Correspondence-2/16/62-5/24/62, box

9,

Congressional Record-House

pt

Pelly,
12,

,

v.

108,

Petersen files;
.

5189; Congressional Record-Appendix

13 June 1962,

Appendix

,

3

27 March 1962,

4,
,

v.

108,

Reel

Pelly, A4384; Congressional Record-

July 1962, Mundt, A5115.
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^^Lumber Hearinqs-I,
Oregon Journal

,

1

"Time for Action Near on Timber",

June 1962,

133 and "Some Relief for Coast

Lumbermen Foreseen", Seattle Times

3

.

June 1962, 131-132.

Department of Commerce, Preliminary: Trade
Relations
Between Canada and the United States, 6
February
1962,

Foreign Trade Fact Book-Special Country, Area,
and Regional
Economic Problems, box 31, Petersen files;
Historical
Statistics of the United States, pt

Commodity Yearbook, 1972

.

200;

.

II,

903,

905;

Lumber Hearinqs-I

,

G.

Griffith Johnson, 105.
Lumber Hearinqs-I

,

"Seattle's Business: Timber

Industry Pledged U.S. Aid", Seattle Post-Intelligencer
June 1962,

133-134 and

G.

1

,

Griffith Johnson, 107; State

Department Briefing Memorandum for Meeting with Prime

Minister Dief enbacker
113,

,

undated, Canada- Security-1 961

,

box

POF; Raymond Vernon to the Undersecretary, undated,

attached to Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, 10 October 1963,
Canada-General-9/5-9/19/63, box 19-20, NSF-JFK.
57
(D-WA)

Petersen to Senators Morse and (Henry M.) Jackson

,

Rashish,

May 1962, attached to Leonard Weiss to Myer

9
8

May 1962, Lumber Industry Correspondence-

2/16/62-5/24/62, box

9,

Petersen files. See also Howard

Petersen to (Senator) Dennis Chavez (D-NM)

,

24 May 1962,

Lumber Industry Correspondence-2/16/62-5/24/62, box

9,

Petersen files; Howard Petersen to Senator Morse, 24 May
1962, Morse papers.
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58^
^ ^
Robert

Barrie to Joe Gunterman, 23 April
1962,
Lumber Industry Correspondence-2/16/62-5/24/62,
box 9,
Petersen files; Statement of Policy on
the Trade Expansion
Act of the American Pulp and Paper
Association, attached t o
Myer Feldman to H.E. Whitaker, 1 March
1962, FO 3-3

2/16/62-5/10/62, box 238, WHCF-JFK; TEA-House, pt
J.

.

5,

David

Winton, Winton Lumber Co., 2814/ G. Colbert
Thomas,

Wholesale Lumber, Millwork, and Plywood Co. to
the
President,

14 May 1962,

28 May 1962,

attached to Myer Feldman to Thomas,

LE/FO 3-3 5/26/62-7/15/62, box 480, WHCF-JFK;

H.D. Gresham to Robert Barrie,

6

March 19 62, Trade

Expansion Act Related Correspondence-11/13/61-4/10/62, box
23,

Petersen files; The Lumber Letter

box

9,

NLMA,

Petersen files; TEA-House, pt
2096,

,

.

23 February 1962,
4,

Mortimer Doyle,

Gordon Connor for Birch Club, Northern Hardwood

and Pine Association, and Timber Producers Association,
2379-2384, Robert E. Hollowell The Fine Hardwoods

Association, 2374, and Byron

E.

Bryan,

for Southern and

Atlantic hardwood plywood producers, 2385-2387; Lumber
Hearinq-I

,

W.

Spencer Fox, Southern Pine Industry

Committee, 55-56; State Department,

"Hardwood Plywood",

1

February 1962, Foreign Trade Fact Book-Special Industry and
Commodity Problems, box 31, Petersen files.
59

Hall,

Lumber Hearing-I

,

Congressman Miller,

3;

Albert

"What's Happening in Forestry", Report to Private

Forestry Enterprise

13,

no.

12

(16

June 1962)

:

1;

Congressional Record-Senah^
Morse,

14103 and pt

Morse form letter,

.

3

2,

v.

.

108,

pt

19 February 1962,

Morse, 2441;

May 1962, Morse papers.

Congress ional Record-Appendix
June 1962,

19 July 1962,

10,

.

,

v.

reel 12,

108,

13

"U.S. Loggers Seek an Ax for Canadian
Imports",

(journal unknown), A4385. See also Congressional
Record-

Appendix, V. 108, reel 12, 13 June 1962, Dent, A4385;

Congress ional Record-House
Hansen,

v.

,

108,

pt

28 June 1962,

9,

.

12085,

61^

Congressional Record-House

1962,

v.

,

108, pt

10,

.

18 July

Congress of the United States to President John

Kennedy,

12 June 1962,

14068;

F.

"1948-1961 Voting Records on

Reciprocal Trade", Congressional Quarterly-Weekly Report
(27

April 1962)

:

680-681;

20

"House Extends Defense

Productions, Export Control Acts; Enacts Kennedy Trade Bill

After Defeating Substitute", Congressional QuarterlyAlmanac 18 (1962)
62

1962,

:

618-619.

Congressional Record-Senate

7806-7807 and pt

Lumber Hearings-I

,

Bartlett (D-AK)

116,

,

.

,

v.

108,

18 July 1962,

10,

Magnuson,

108,

Morse,

pt

,

v.

108, pt

.

6,

4

May

13914. See also

119-120, E.L.

and Frank Church (D-ID)

Congressional Record-Senate

.

7,

1

,

16;

June 1962,

9593-9595.
63

White House Statement on a Program of Assistance to

the Lumber Industry, 26 July 1962, Public Papers, 1962

,

580-581; Myer Feldman to the President, 24 July 1962, box
215

Lumber Industry, POF; "Kennedy Airs
Views on Lumber",
Cro wds Lumber Digest 40 (9 August
102,

1962):

10.

Press release, Committee for a National
Trade
Policy, 27 July 1962, Lumber Industry
Background, box

Petersen files; "WCLA'

s

9,

Reaction to JFK"; "WPA [Western

Pine Association]: Immediate Break Needed";
"LESC
[Lumbermen's Economic Survival Committee]

Continue Work", Crow's Lumber Digest 40
TEA-Senate

pt

,

.

4,

-

Committee to

August 1962):

(9

Henry Bahr, NLMA, 1767-1768,

1835-1836.
65^
Congressional
24 September 1962,

Senate,

v.

108,

pt

Record-House

,

v.

pt

108,

15,

.

Hansen,

20557-20559; Congressional Record.

11,

31 July 1962,

July 1962, 14903-14904 and pt

.

17,

Hansen,

15182 and 27

11 October 1962,

Morse,

23168-23169.
66

"Canada-U.S. Talks Set", Crow's Lumber Digest 40

(23

August 1962): 18; "U.S. Will Request Canada to Limit Lumber
Exports", Wall Street Journal

,

27 July 1962,

Upset Over Lumber Curbs", New York Times
67

Laws",

Lumber Hearings-II Olympia
Tacoma News-Tribune

,

,

:

9;

12 January 1962,

,

v.

333;

(September
108,

reel 13,

"Crucial Time for Lumber Aid", Seattle Times

A6170.
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31

"U.S. Mills Hurt By Own

Congressional Record-Appendix

August 1962,

"Canadians

27 August 1962,

,

"Editorial", British Columbia Lumberman 46
1962)

5;

9

,

68

"CLA [Canadian Lumbermens Association]

Sounds Off on

Import Crisis", Crowds Lumber Digest
40, 23 (August 1962):
17; "Industry with Problems on All Sides",
Forest

Industries 89

(July 1962):

Columbi a Lumberman 46

48;

"Market Review", British

(August 1962)

82;

:

"Editorial",

British Columbia Lumberman (September 1962)
Bellowing", British Columbia Lumberman 46

7;

:

"More

(October 1962):

69

69„

"Editorial", British Columbia Lumberman 46

1962):
no.

See also "Lumbermen Fight Back", Business Week

8.

1722

(July

(1

September 1962): 23.

70 „
"U.S.,

York Times

,

Canada Conclude Lumber Talks in Ottawa", New

(30

August 1962)

:

Finds Each Side in Doubt", Crow^

November 1962)

:

"Second Tariff Meeting

37;

Lumber Digest 40,

s

(15

Memorandum of Conversation between the

42;

President and the Prime Minister at Hyannisport, 11 May
1963,

Lumber Interests, box
71

5,

Feldman files.

"House Extends Defense Productions, Export Control

Acts; Enacts Kennedy Trade Bill After Defeating

Substitute", Congressional Quarterly-Almanac

618-619,

,

688,

Thomas Kuchel of California was the lone Republican in the
bloc; Parmet, JFK

,

206,

writes that 44.3% of New Frontier

legislation for 1962 passed, although he argues that this
figure is deceptive.
72

Congressional Record-House

24 September 1962,

,

v.

108,

pt

.

15,

Hansen,

20557-20559; Orville Freeman to the

President, 12 October 1962, roll

4,

Records of the United

states Department of Agriculture, John F.
Kennedy Library,
Boston Massachusetts (hereafter cited as USDA
Records)
"55% Ship Subsidy Kept, Pacific Coast
Differential Needed",
;

Congressional Quarterly-Almanac 18
Waived", Crowds Lumber Digest 41
73

(1962),

(10

569;

"Jones Act

January 1963): 25.

David Jones, Lumbermens Economic Survival Committee

to Dean R. Rust, U.S. Tariff Commission, 23 August
1962,

box 945, WHCF; "The U
Industries 89
Crow^

.

S

-Canadian Situation", Forest

(October 1962): 38/

Lumber Digest 40

s

.

(1

"The Cream Puff Barrage",
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"Tariff

40;

:

Commission Rejects Move to Regulate Imports", Crowds Limber
Digest 41
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1.

(21

February 1963)

:

33.

Commodity Yearbook, 1972

,
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John H. Young,

"Study

The Traditional Export Industries" in Trade

Liberalization and

a

Regional Economy: Studies of the

Impact of Free Trade on British Columbia

,

eds

Ronald A.

.

Shearer, John H, Young, and Gordon R. Munro, in Regional

and Adjustment Aspects of Trade Liberalization

,

ed.

H.

Edward English (Toronto, 1973), 69-70; Ronald Shearer,
"Study

1.

The Economy of British Columbia" in Regional and

Adjustment Aspects of Trade Liberalization

English,
II,

.

905.
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1002,

ed.

Historical Statistics of the United States, pt

2 6-27;

903,

,

Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism

1005;

,

92;

TEA-Senate

,

"Hong Kong Growth Continues; U.S. Textile Ban

Causes Concern", International Commerce 68
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(23 July 1962)

40;

Shik Chun Young,

"The GATT's Long-Term Cotton Textile

Arrangement and Hong Kong's Cotton Textile
Trade", Ph.D.
Dissertation (Washington State University,
1969),

46-48,

62-69,

121-122,

139,

158,

1,

4,

30,

178.

163,

President Kennedy to the Secretaries of State,
Commerce, and Labor, 27 July 1961, attached to
Willard
Wirtz to Myer Feldman, 28 July 1961, Textiles-Textile

Advisory Committee-7/61, box 25, Feldman files;
"Washington
Outlook", Textile World 112

(August 1962)

19-20;

:

"Activities of the Community", Bulletin of the EEC
(November 1962)
87,

90-94,

20-21; Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism

:

112-136; U.N., World Economic Survey,

The Developing Countries in the 1960s

Appraising Progress (New York:
Social Affairs,

Trade Policy
77

1971),

66-67,

,

152; Brandis,

chp

.

-

1969-1970:

The Problem of

The Making of Textile

5.
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Trends, Needs, and Policies

-

,

Department of Economic and

U.N., World Economic Survey,

Development

5

Trade and

I:

(New York:

Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 19 64)

,

195;

Summary of 23 May 1963 meeting of Interdepartmental

Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy,
4

June 1963,

Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign

Economic Policy Reports-5/63-6/63, box

8,

Behrman papers;

Brandis, The Making of Textile Trade Policy

Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism
Toyne, Jeffrey

S.

,

92-94,

29,

,

101-102,

Arpan, Andy Barnett, et al

.

,

33;

111; Brian

The Global

Textile Industry (London:
2;

Allen and Unwin, 1984), Appendix

Lenway, The Politi cs of International Trade
Policy

.

95.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, American Business
and

Public Policy, 77, 362. See also Barrie,
Executive",
79

"Congress and the

17 6.

Carroll Kilpatrick, "The Kennedy Style and

Congress", Virginia Quarterly Review 39 (Winter 1963)
6;

Theodore Hesburgh Oral History,

Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

220

7,

John F. Kennedy

:

1,

CHAPTER

4

THE POLITICS OF PROTECTION: OIL AND
TARIFFS

Despite the assistance for textile and lumber
interests,
the President shrewdly calculated that the
Trade Expansion
Act would encounter problems on Capitol Hill
without

attention to the oil and coal industries and, to a
lesser
extent, glass and carpet manufacturers.

Again, Kennedy

deviated from a defense of free-trade ideals by forging

a

private deal with Congress to limit oil imports and by
raising tariffs to restrict glass and carpets from abroad.
But these tactical manuevers, aimed to win the TEA, did not

obscure the goal of liberal trade.
The oil and tariff cases provide another look at the

American decision-making structure.

Bureaucratic politics

shaped options for the President but again, Kennedy's
concern not only with the international implications of his

policy but the political constraints placed on him by
Congress overrode departmental aims

.

Interest

intermediation reflected the pluralism of the private
sector-congressional-Executive branch triangle.

Thus, the

corporatist, interest group, and inter-branch models more

likely apply.

Kennedy eventually met oil and glass and tariff demands
from the private sector and Congress.

His concessions

greased the TEA past legislators who were concerned about
the impact of free-trade on import -competitors back home
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(and the consequent effects on
their election chances

i,n

November 1962) and who felt pressure
from or sympathized
with influential protectionist blocs
on Capitol Hill.
The
fair-trade doctrine determined the President's
handling of
the TEA on the two issues; concede
protectionism now for a
few vulnerable but politically potent
interests,
and win

the trade bill and mutually expansive and
beneficial

commerce for all trading nations later.

Concerning oil imports, the problem stemmed from
conditions in the immediate postwar era.

Requiring more

oil for its industrial plant, America became a
net importe
of petroleum in 1948 for the first time since World
War

I.

The cold war provided a further impetus for purchases
abroad.

The U.S. hoped to keep this vital commodity

available to industrial countries and buoy the economies

o

oil-dependent Middle Eastern and South American nations,

tying them to the Western camp.

Yet rising imports had a

downside; the inflow began to displace independent oil and

domestic coal producers in the American market.
These well-organized forces pressured Congress to limit
imports.

Oil-state legislators attached the national

security amendment to the trade bill of 1955, providing fo

restrictions when imports impaired domestic production of
commodities deemed necessary in an emergency.
later,
U.S.

Two years

rising imports compelled "voluntary" controls by

importers of foreign oil, limiting sales to 12% of
222

estimated domestic demand east of the
Rockies.
The
Eisenhower administration soon replaced
these faltering
restraints with the Mandatory Quota Program
in March 1959.
The program restricted imports to 9% of
estimated domestic
demand but exempted Canada and Mexico from
quotas since

their overland supplies would be critical in
crisis.

a

defense

Imports of residual fuel oil, a heavy petroleum

product used for heating factories, schools, and hospitals
along the Atlantic seaboard, were given

a

ceiling at their

1957 level and kept under review.

The aim of controls was to bolster stagnating production
in U.S. oil and coal regions, but restrictions hurt fuel

oil users who chafed at the prospects of energy shortages

during the winter months and paying higher prices.

On the

foreign front, Venezuela was particularly vulnerable to the
program.

This nation relied on revenues from oil to prop

up its depressed economy and fledgling democracy.

Yet

Caracas received no exemption from quotas like Canada and
Mexico, because it transported oil by sea.

The controls

also damaged Venezuela's residual fuel exports, of which it

provided most of America's supply.

Inimical to liberal

trade, the quota program was well ensconced by the time

Kennedy arrived in Washington.^
Kennedy's prior stand on oil issues burdened the new
President, however.

Of all the presidential aspirants in

1960, he had been rightfully singled out by the oil press
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as the most "openly hostile" to the
industry.

a prominent

foe of the depletion allowance, which
gave tax breaks to
producers, and the quota program, he was one
of twelve

members of the New England Senate Delegation
who argued
against limiting residual fuel oil.
The oil and
coal

industries suffered not from imports of residual,
he
claimed, but from the switch by consumers to other
forms of

energy and the concentration by independents on crude
production.

Failing to persuade Eisenhower to exempt fuel

oil from limits, Kennedy censored the quota program as
a

"completely unjustified, uneconomic and shortsighted
action" which not only raised prices but "cuts athwart our

trade position, unnecessarily damages our relations in this
hemisphere,

.

.

.

and does not contribute to our national

defense and security". 2
Such a view did not sit well with domestic oil and coal
interests.

As a result, during the presidential campaign

in 1960, Kennedy toned down his remarks.

He stressed

instead regional redevelopment and modernization to aid the
coal industry.

Wary of inviting "howls" of complaints from

oilmen, where his support was weak, his campaign staff

requested that he not depart from the quota program.
complied.
oil,

He

Nevertheless, partly because of his position on

he won only Texas among the oil states, and this state

thanks to his Vice-Presidential running mate Lyndon
Johnson, and lost nine of the ten major coal states.
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B.

Energy interests were uneasy, and
hoped that the pro-oil
Johnson would temper Kennedy's stand
on import controls
The new President played it safe.
Secretary
.

of the

Interior Stewart

L.

Udall revised the rules of the
quota

program and increased imports of fuel oil.
Since this
product affected the coal industry, such
measures worried
Appalachia more than the Southwest. Oil interests
warned
that easing residual controls signaled
the imminent
collapse of the quota program, but most paid
little

attention to the coal bloc at this time.

Asked about the

future of fuel oil limits, Kennedy responded
guardedly that
"we have to consider the needs of the coal industry
and

domestic producers, the needs of New England, and we are

trying to reach a balance which will protect the public
interest".

4

Despite a rise in crude quotas in the last

half of 1961, producers expressed satisfaction with this

fair-trade statement regarding
Nevertheless, oilmen asked

the import program.

oil.'^
a

fundamental question about

Would Kennedy swing the concept of

controls away from national security, and protection of

domestic production, and toward reducing quotas for the
sake of Western cooperation and foreign aid?

Secretary of the Interior and oilman John

M.

Assistant
Kelly argued

that domestic health should be the top priority on the

grounds of national defense.

Total petroleum imports had

risen over 63% since 1954, and while foreign crude
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production was up an average of 29%, the
output of the U.S.
independents had not kept pace. For the sake
of the

nation's security, Kelly and Udall suggested
cutting import
quotas by 50,0 00 barrels a day
.

However compelling, the potential injury to the
LDCs and
Kennedy's opposition to trade restrictions and high
fuel

prices offset the Interior argument.

Kelly and Udall were

the sole supporters of oil protectionism within the

administration and found their proposed quota reduction
tabled.

Presidential policy supplanted bureaucratic

politics; as oilmen had feared, Kennedy shifted the focus
of import policy from the national to the international

level in order to ensure close trade relations with other
nations.

He did not seek an end to the quota program, and

critics pointed out the inconsistency of pursuing free-

trade in tandem with oil import controls.

Yet in general,

Kennedy was a staunch believer in freer trade in order to
correct the payments deficit and prevent inroads by the
Soviet bloc into the LDCs.

7

In fact, the Soviet Union was a catalyst to Kennedy's

trade program as well as his resistance to oil import
restrictions.

Moscow had chosen petroleum as a weapon in

its economic offensive against the West, becoming the

second-ranking producer behind the United States

.

Italy

had already responded to Soviet overtures by selling or
bartering construction materials for East-bloc oil.
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The

state Department now worried over Soviet
penetration in the
politically unstable LDCs, many of whom
turned to Russian
financing for exploration and drilling when
international
oil companies refused such help.^

Regarding communist penetration, Venezuela,
the largest
source of American petroleum imports, was a major
worry for
Kennedy.
Enjoying the highest per capita income in
the

region, Venezuela was a gauge of the effectiveness
of his

Alliance for Progress and of democratic government in
Latin
America.

The world's top oil exporter, the nation also had

become the sixth best customer for the U.S. goods, buying
over $1 billion worth thanks to its petroleum revenues and

the help of bilateral trade agreements with the United
States.

Venezuela was also considered the bellwether of

the Latin American oil industry.^

Washington recognized that all was not golden in
Venezuela, however.

The country had endured a severe

recession in 1959-1960, with unemployment at 12%, a decline
in drilling by 42% since 1959,

million.

and a deficit of over $800

Oil investment was down and petroleum exports,

comprising one-fourth of Venezuela's GNP and over 90% of
its overseas sales, were sluggish.

The world oil surplus

consequently weakened prices and thus reduced earnings for
the country.

And, the new, moderate leftist President

Romulo Betancourt frightened some investors, both domestic
10
ur
^ foreign.
and
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Politically, Venezuelans remembered
Eisenhower's
tolerance of the brutal dictatorship of
Perez Jimenez, and
had shown their disfavor to Vice-President
Richard Nixon in
1958 during his visit to Caracas.
Now, Kennedy courted
President Betancourt, in order to cushion
Venezuela's new
democracy from economic and political turmoil.
Betancourt
had recently survived a bombing attempt on his
life from

insurgents on the Left.

From the Right, he faced an

oligarchic and entrenched ruling class which resisted
land,
government, and other reforms.

Schlesinger warned, Betancourt'

guarantee a Castro or

As White House aide Arthur
s

Peron."^-^

ousting or death would

A prosperous economy,

undergirded by a healthy oil industry, would benefit
Betancourt and U.S. aims in the region invaluably.
But since its inception, the quota program had been a

problem for Venezuela, and its first Minister of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo, sought
compensation.

Perez Alfonzo adhered to the ideas of

Brazilian economist Raul Prebisch, who claimed that the
terms of trade gave the manufactured goods of the North a

price advantage over the raw materials of the South, and
thus permanently impoverished the LDCs

.

The Minister, a

believer in government intervention in the petroleum
industry, addressed this problem by trying to raise world

prices of oil, reduce output, and control exports.

To

these ends, Perez Alfonzo helped form Organization of
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Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in I960,
which proved
effective a decade later.
in the early
1960s, though,

Caracas seemed merely to alienate Venezuelan
oilmen, which
further depressed the economy and enhanced
leftist inroads

m

its democracy. 12

The oil quota program was a focus of Venezuelan

grievances, although Caracas was sympathetic to its

political necessity.

allowed

a

The program had stabilized prices and

sustained growth of exports, yet Venezuela feared

losing its historically favorable position in the U.S.
market to cheaper Mideast and burgeoning Canadian oil.

Opposed to a reduction in quotas, Perez Alfonzo complained
that Venezuela did not receive a preferential overland

exemption from the program like Canada and Mexico.

Betancourt was more strident.

In 1961,

he sent a letter to

the Departments of State and Interior, noting the harmful

effects of quotas, and asked UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
to end the "abuses and injustices" of oil restrictions

"^"^
.

These complaints were the principal theme during

Kennedy's visit to Venezuela in December 1961, the first
ever by a U.S. President.

Drawing on arguments by

Interior's Kelly, the President responded that the program

actually helped Venezuela.

Because of the overland

exemption, for instance, Canada's Western provinces were
not subject to U.S. controls and sold oil profitably in the

American upper Midwest.

Thus,

Canada saw no need to build

a oil pipeline to its eastern
provinces,

dependent on petroleum from Venezuela.

a large

market

Furthermore,

decontrolling fuel oil would lower prices,
impairing
Caracas' exchange rate.

Also, Venezuelan oil was not in

bad shape in the U.S. market.

Residual fuel was not overly

limited and Kennedy had abandoned plans to
reduce crude
quotas 14
Nevertheless, always sensitive to the developing
nations, Kennedy recognized Venezuela's democracy
was

teetering on the edge of political ruin.

In response,

the

U.S. had doubled its loans to the nation to $100 million
in

1961 and urged Venezuela to boost all LDC exports through

regional economic integration under the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA)

,

a common market similar to the

European Economic Community.

As a fair-trader, Kennedy

accepted LAFTA discrimination against U.S. goods because he

believed that the body was essential to economic viability.
He also affirmed that the importing countries of the north

must recognize the region's dependence on exports.

Kennedy

promised to hold consultations with Betancourt before
changing the quota program, even installing

a

"hot-line"

between the Oval Office and Betancourt 's chambers to effect
15
^
such communications
V.

•

•

Back home, Kennedy prepared for the task of placating
domestic interests in order to net votes for the TEA.

Returning from the Army-Navy football game in early
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December 1961, he had announced a review
of the Mandatory
Quota Program by the Office of Emergency
Planning (OEP)
This study, due out in mid-1962, did not
comfort oilmen
about the future of controls.
It did win praise from the
coal industry, which thought the quota program
was
inadequate.

Overall, the energy sector believed that the

administration lacked a clear-cut oil policy, but that
1962
would be a "showdown year" over trade and other
issues.

Well before the TEA campaign, though, the coal and
oil

factions began the battle against imports.
coal industry was in a sad state.

Indeed, the

While world coal

production had risen by 35% from 1950-1962, U.S. output had
dropped 13%.

Even economically distressed Britain

registered an increase.

Of the ten principal coal-

producing states, only three small producers, Virginia,
Tennessee, and Missouri, mined more coal in 1962 than 1950.

Meanwhile, nearly one-fifth of American mines closed and

employment dropped by 65%, or 272,000 workers.

But these

conditions existed because exports to Canada and Europe had

been halved while railroads had shifted to diesel and
consumers to natural gas.

To be sure,

residual oil imports

had captured the Eastern seaboard, but that market provided
a

minor part of coal's traditional purchasers.

1

The industry wanted Kennedy to increase exports,

particularly to West Germany and Canada which restricted
U.S. coal.

Producers attacked Canadian restrictions on

U.S. coal on the grounds of receiprocity

;

Ottawa received

free entry of its oil through the U.S.
overland exemption.
The U.S. also reproved Germany, which
discriminated against

American bituminous while discreetly importing
cheaper East
Bloc coal,
Bonn criticized U.S. restrictions on residual
oil, but Senate free-trader Paul Douglas retorted
that West

German duties on U.S. coal were just as bad."^^
But most observers, however erroneously, perceived

imports as a bigger problem.

The major coal associations,

companies, and the United Mine Workers

cited residual

(UMW)

oil imports as injurious to Appalachia,

a

testing ground

for the New Frontier economic recovery program.

The UMW,

demanding a "permanent rigid quota" on residual oil
imports,

opposed the TEA, while management, having not yet

announced its position, criticized oil import policy.

Kennedy preferred modernization plans already drawn up,
such as a coal slurry, to stake out a certain portion of
the eastern market for coal producers and help them compete

with residual oil.

Such efforts, though, only led

a

West

Virginia legislator to point out that "the President is
killing us with kindness" but "we're not going to get what
we really want" 19
.

The oil industry,

interests

,

They wanted limits on fuel imports
in an unusual concert with coal

drummed up similar arguments

.

Independents

cared more about crude than residual imports

,

since oilmen

supplied only 10% of the fuel oil consumed in America.
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Yet

they allied with the coal industry
because this percentage
still added up to 900,000 barrels a day
(bbl./day)

in sales

and because they feared that further
decontrols on any
petroleum product might signify an easing of
crude quotas.

Spokesman for oilmen, the Independent Petroleum
Association
of America (IPAA) and state groups, were
disappointed
that

Kennedy refused to cut quotas by 250,000 bbl./day,
or even
by 50,000 following Udall's recommendation
The independents cited imports, which they claimed
had

absorbed market growth, and loopholes or overly liberal
quotas, as the causes of stagnations in production and

exploration.

They complained that the overland exemption

enabled Canada's western provinces to dominate the U.S.
upper Midwest.

A major loophole which irked them was the

"Brownsville Shuffle",

a

deceptive transhipment manuever

around American customs houses which Mexico exploited to
avoid U.S. oil restrictions.

In the interest of "national

security", the IPAA offered a plan to limit total imports
to 14% of domestic production, instead of estimated demand,
in order to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

Oilmen

girded for a "tough fight" with Kennedy, willing to trade
support on the TEA for a tightening of the quota program. 21
Oil imports were partially to blame for the industry's

problems

.

Indeed, production of crude in the country still

more than doubled the output of the closest competitors,

Russia and Venezuela.

Since 1950, production had risen by
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25% and output in 1961 had topped the
previous boom year of
1957.
Residual fuel production had fallen
but this drop
was by choice, since the independents
wished to concentrate
on refining the more profitable crude.
Nonetheless,

surplus world production and eroding prices
had increased
imports, which took an increasing share of
U.S. demand.

Excess capacity, coupled with rising imports,
idled

drilling and prompted worker lay-offs.

In Texas,

exploration fell 44% from 1958 to 1961, as the glutted
market limited production from an average of 21 days

month in 1952 to just over

8

a

days a month in 1961.

Louisiana, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico suffered

similar fates. 22
Calls for import limits found sympathetic ears in
Congress, since lawmakers viewed the TEA vote as an

opportunity to take a stand for their constituents.

Many

faced re-election and many in the Southwest relied on
oilmen to bankroll their campaigns.

Though gratified by

Kennedy's attention to Appalachia in his domestic agenda,
coal-state members had soured on oil imports.
Virginia,

led by Arch A. Moore, Jr.

Cleveland M. Bailey

(D)

,

(R)

West

and the venerable

and Pennsylvanians under

protectionist John Dent, whose special hearings on trade
focused first on coal and residual oil problems, mobilized
the House coal bloc.

One indication of its influence was

the position of Thomas Morgan (D-PA)
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,

Chairman of the House

Foreign Relations Committee, who opposed
the TEA as an ally
of the UMW.^"^
The House oil bloc marched with their
coal cohorts, with

Representative Tom Steed (D-OK) leading
protectionists.
Steed's hearing on oil imports under a
subcommittee of the
House Small Business Committee in late 1961 had
been

a

platform for independent producers to criticize what
they
viewed as an over-liberal quota program. with Arch

Moore,

Steed proposed an amendment to the TEA which endorsed
the
IPAA plan of limiting imports to 14% of domestic
production.

He described the Steed-Moore amendment as a

weapon with which the oil-coal alliance would make a
"final" stand against oil imports.

Protectionists united by an impressive margin in April
1962.

For instance, 33 congressmen introduced bills

identical to the Steed-Moore amendment.

A bipartisan group

of 110 House and Senate members endorsed a pamphlet

published by the National Coal Policy Conference calling
for import restrictions.

A few signed the pamphlet to

voice discontent about foreign
exports.
imports,

discrimination of U.S. coal

But in general, the 79 House members attacked

and 84 congressmen from 23 states expressed

similar disgruntlement in the New York Times

.

Kennedy

could not help but notice the outcry, especially since it

involved several members of the Ways and Means Committee,

which directed hearings on trade legislation in the
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House. 25

Signs pointed to success for interest
groups in
their fight against oil imports.
If the revolt against oil imports had
been as clear-cut
as the one by the textile industry,

Kennedy might have

responded promptly with restrictions.
interests,

But Venezuelan

and more immediate, the position of the

"consumer" bloc, prevented

a

hasty move.

The New England

Council and the Independent Fuel Oil Marketers of America

spearheaded efforts toward relaxing restrictions.
argued,

They

like Senator Kennedy, that residual imports were

not responsible for coal problems.

They claimed that these

imports were consumed on the Atlantic seaboard where coal
was no longer a significant source of energy and because
fuel oil was too heavy for economical transport inland.

Anyway,

consumers said that they were willing to buy U.S.-

made residual if produced in sufficient quantities.
Meanwhile,

import controls made consumers pay high fuel

prices and had forced three large New England fuel oil

marketers out of business.
Consumers had a plausible case.

Since 1950, stocks and

production of residual fuel in the U.S. had fallen by 17%
and 30% respectively due to slackening demand.

Fuel oil

for industrial and heating purposes had not filled the gaps
in the market created by the switchover to other energy

sources by railroads
Also,

,

utilities, and ocean-going vessels

since producers earned about $1 less per barrel for
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residual than crude, the yield of fuel oil
since 1959 had
been halved as independents concentrated
on the more

lucrative crude.

Before the war, residual accounted for

over half the output of U.S. refineries; in
1962, the

production ratio was only 9.6%.

Even the Oil and Gas

Journal, a voice of the petroleum industry, conceded
that

removal of fuel oil controls would have little effect
on
producers, would hurt coal interests only if prices dropped
appreciably, and that perhaps Venezuela should supply

America's fuel demand.

Consumers did not make Kennedy's

decision on oil any easier.
The illogicality of import controls on residual oil

prompted pressure for their removal by the House consumer
bloc during the TEA campaign.

The Massachusetts delegation

of Republicans Silvio Conte and Hastings Keith and Democrat

Thomas Lane were at the vanguard of these Atlantic seaboard
forces.

In all, the House bloc included New England,

several Atlantic states, and Florida, numbering roughly 75
members.

They urged the President to "show his genuine

belief in freer trade by removing barriers to residual oil
imports" and ending "protection gone wild".

28

This line-up of consumer and oil-coal blocs placed

Kennedy in a difficult position, yet he leaned toward freer
trade in oil

.

Udall raised the ceiling on residual imports

by 10% in April 1962, an action that enraged the coal bloc
but pleased the consumer faction.

A continued refusal to

amend the TEA with the Steed-Moore limit
brought
"rumblings" from Steed, who visited the
President in March
1962.
Kennedy and Udall opposed the Steed-Moore
amendment
on the grounds that other commodity
interests would attempt
to tack on special clauses to the trade bill
and that help
for oil could be accomplished "administratively"
through
the quota program.

Though aware of the depressed

conditions in the oil industry, the administration
believed
security interests would be better served by not cutting
off LDC producers from the American market and throwing

them into the laps of the Soviet bloc.^^

As a matter of

general policy, cold war concerns overruled the demands of

domestic producers.
For the political short-term, however, Kennedy decided

passage of the TEA took precedence, and thus handled the
coal-oil with care.

To pacify oilmen, Kennedy kept the

national security provision intact in the TEA.

Though

Steed adamantly refused to back off his 14% amendment,

rumored to be a losing proposition because of presidential
opposition, Kennedy privately assured key congressmen that
he had considered revising quotas along the lines of

Steed's proposal.

Thus,

Steed returned from the White

House encouraged by Kennedy's "understanding".

In

addition, despite rising fuel oil imports, the recovery

program for Appalachia, as well as

a

tariff increase on

glass imports, convinced many coal bloc members of
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Kennedy's concern for their region.

Such were the

initial results of interest group pressure
working through
inter-branch cooperation.

Most important, Kennedy had developed key
friends in
Congress which bettered prospects for the TEA.
One ally
was Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, who
managed to

defeat the Steed-Moore amendment in the committee by
a vote
of 15-10 on 23 May 1962, arguing that it would
unduly tie
the President's hands in trade policy.

The action

bolstered Kennedy' a hopes for winning votes, even from oilstate congressmen. 31
On 28 June 1962, the trade bill sailed through the

House, and the application of the fair-trade doctrine to
oil imports was a major reason.

Of the 108 representatives

who had the signed publications calling for more oil

restrictions, 71 voted for the TEA.

Congressmen who

tallied against included 24 anti-New Frontier Republicans
and intractable protectionists such as Steed, Moore, and
Dent.

The coal states backed the bill,

including two-

thirds of the West Virginia delegation and over half of

Pennsylvania's members.

Two-thirds of the oil-state

legislators from Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, and

New Mexico sided with Kennedy, as did 20 of the 33 cosponsors of the Steed-Moore amendment.

Not surprisingly,

four-fifths of the consumer bloc favored the bill. 32
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This win secured, Kennedy's tightrope
act on oil imports
faced a similar challenge in the Senate.
The vote could

prove sticky because the OEP report on the
quota program
was due and might draw a hostile response
from oil
interests.

Kennedy wisely delayed the report's release

until September, though oilmen criticized his
"vague

promises that never seem to materialize".

Their last "thin

thread of hope" for protection was the Senate.
The battlelines were drawn immediately in the Senate.
The New England Delegation, the 12-member bipartisan

collection of senators of which Kennedy had been

represented the consumer bloc.

The voice of the coal

forces was newcomer Robert C. Byrd (D-WVA)

,

backed by

legislators from several states, while Robert
OK)

directed the oil bloc.

a member,

S.

Kerr (D-

Earlier, 27 oil- and coal-state

senators had complained to Secretary Udall about the
adverse effect of oil imports.

Eighteen had warned the

President that imports jeopardized the nation's security,
and 30 had endorsed the same pamplet or advertisement

signed by their counterparts in the House.

All together,

the oil-coal bloc consisted of 39 senators from half the

states in the union. 34
The real strength in the bloc belonged to Robert Kerr.
The second-ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee

(which

had jurisdiction over the TEA) and part owner of Kerr-McGee
Oil Company, Kerr had reached the apex of his power as New
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Frontier legislation made its way through
Congress in 1962.
He had been instrumental in handing the
administration
one

of its worst defeats on Capitol Hill over
the Medicare

bill.

Regardless of this independence, however, he was
one
of Kennedy's few friends of influence on
Capitol Hill.
The power of Kerr, the "King of the Senate", was
not

lost on the President.

As the story goes, Kennedy, looking

ahead to his legislative agenda for 1962, announced he

would visit Kerr's ranch in late October 1961.
trip,

a

jealous Oklahoma Governor

J.

Howard Edmondson, a

possible replacement for Lyndon Johnson as

presidential running mate in 1964 and

Before the

a

a

vice-

Kennedy intimate,

hysterically telephoned and then flew to Hyannisport, found
the President on a golf course, and demanded to know

Kennedy's purpose.

The President responded,

"Why Howard,

I'm going to Oklahoma to kiss Bob Kerr's ass".

Kennedy had

become Kerr's "legislative captive", and the administration

..35
knew it
,

This relationship gave Kerr much leverage.

His allies,

senior senators called "whales" by LB J, dominated the

President's "minnow" friends.

Persuading these veterans on

votes enabled Kerr to win concrete advantages for Oklahoma.

Biographer Ann Morgan explains how Kerr suggested that
Kennedy trade a tax bill for pork, an allusion to the
senator's pet public works proposal, the Arkansas River

Navigation Project.

Kerr reported that he could not break
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the logjam in Congress on the tax
bill before the President
moved on the project. A smiling
Kennedy replied, "You
know,

Bob,

never really understood the Arkansas
River
bill before today", and accepted the
bill.
Kerr
I

also

chaired the Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Committee which
funded NASA and could reject Kennedy's
plans to send a man
to the moon.^^ He could also make or break
the
Trade

Expansion Act.
In order to win favors for Oklahoma,

in the senate,

promote his image

and undercut the power of his rival on the

Finance Committee, Chairman Harry Byrd, Kerr single-

handedly bargained with Kennedy over oil imports.

He had

opposed the last two trade bills, helped write the national
security amendment in 1955, and pushed for the Mandatory
Quota Program.

Now,

willing to abandon the protectionist

camp, Kerr advocated liberal trade as a benefit to Oklahoma

and responded tepidly to the Steed-Moore amendment.

The

national security clause would be sufficient, he argued, if
the President tightened up the quota program.

^'^

Kerr's

support of the TEA hinged on this trade-off.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1962, Kerr visited
the White House.

President was

a

His only "understanding" with the

vague avowal that Kennedy was interested in

accommodating the oil-coal bloc.

Kerr pledged to make this

goal easy for Kennedy and planned to reach an accord after

hearings on the TEA ended in mid-August.
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Yet,

he received

heat back home for not supporting the
Steed-Moore
amendment. When the oil press reported
that he would guide
the TEA through the senate, which meant
he could not back
Steed, Kerr claimed that the amendment
was a political
impossibility, promised his position had not
changed on
limiting oil imports, and proclaimed that he
would oppose
the TEA if he thought Oklahoma and oilmen might
suffer.

The eventual deal lived up to these assurances.

Kennedy

agreed to limit crude imports to 12.2% of domestic
production, instead of estimated demand, taking 1961 as a

base period.

The new plan exempted residual oil from the

formula, it was less than the 14% Steed-Moore-IPAA

proposal, and it retained the overland exemptions for

Canada and Mexico.

But it adopted the Steed method of

allocating quotas, restricted imports more effectively than
the current program, and expanded consumption of domestic

crude especially on the oil-deprived West coast.

The plan

reduced imports an estimated 70,000 bbls/day, limited
Canadian oil in the U.S., and did not increase imports
faster than domestic output.

In return, Kerr did not

introduce an oil amendment to the TEA.

promised to corral votes for the bill.
Kerr did just that.

Most important, he
39

In a remarkable turnaround for an

erstwhile protectionist, Kerr campaigned for the TEA.

His

persuasion won votes from the senior members of the oil
bloc, 34 of the 39 senators who had endorsed restrictions.
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and unanimous consent from the
Southwestern oil states.
Every senator but two from the coal
states followed suit,
including bloc leader Robert Byrd.
Meanwhile 9 of the 12
New England Delegation members sided with
Kennedy.
Dissent
came from either staunch protectionists or
the President's
Republican enemies /° The fair-trade strategy
of conceding

protectionism in oil in return for general trade
liberalization under the TEA was a success.
There remained two loose ends to tie up before the

administration could relish its victory.

The first dealt

with the OEP report, cagily released in Septeinber after
the
Senate vote.

When the OEP recommended liberalizing quotas,

the watch-dog Kerr readied a special bill to tighten them
in case Kennedy did not.

At once, the President told

reporters that the OEP proposal was "not acceptable" and on
30 November 1962,

he had Udall announce a revised Mandatory

Quota Program identical to his deal with Kerr.

Earlier,

the IPAA gave Kerr a standing ovation for his efforts and

thanked Kennedy for the special

treatment.'^''"

The other loose end was the foreign response to the

revised program.

Over the past two years, Canada had

sought to boost its exports in the American market, and

though its oil might be indirectly hurt by the new program,
the U.S.,

in fact,

did not squeeze off the burgeoning flow

of crude from Canada nor revoke the free entry status of

the overland exemption.

Thus, Canadian oil sales in the

U.S.

surpassed those of the Middle East by 1966
and top
exporter Venezuela by 1972, resulting in an
overall

rise of

21% from 1962 to 1973.

America also sustained the level of

Mexico's negligible exports at 30,000 bbl./day,
continued
the overland exemption from quotas until
1971, and
even

accepted the tricky "Brownsville Shuffle".^^

American oil

trade policy was more than fair; it was overly generous.

For Venezuela, the situation was more complicated.

During 1962, Betancourt had quelled several leftist
rebellions, thus stabilizing the transition to democracy.

Recovery from the recent depression underway, oil

production began to increase.

Also,

relations between

Washington and Caracas grew more cordial after the Kennedy
visit.

Even oil minister Perez Alfonzo, though still

demanding preferential treatment for Venezuelan oil in the

American market, had toned down his recriminations against
the import quota program during a trip to the U.S. in April
1962.

Indeed, he realized Venezuela would be the chief

beneficiary from the raised residual oil ceiling that
occurred that month. 43
Yet the revised program threatened to derail these good

feelings

.

The American embassy in Caracas reported private

and government indignation over the new restrictions.

Betancourt "had worked up quite

a

head of steam" after

briefing by Perez Alfonzo, and was reconsidering his

proposed visit to Washington in early 1963 unless
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concessions were forthcoming/^

Kennedy took this

complaint seriously and dispatched White
House aide Myer
Feldman to Venezuela for consultations.

Betancourt and Perez Alfonzo issued their
grievances to
Feldman.
The revised program contradicted Kennedy's
pledge
never to change the system unilaterally,
asserted Perez
Alfonzo.

Also, Venezuela was America's oldest and most

important supplier of petroleum in the hemisphere,
yet did
not enjoy an exemption from the quota program like
Canada
and Mexico.

This lack of preferences "entirely

disregarded" that Venezuela was an "integrated SisterRepublic" with the United States.

Despite the continued

dominance of its oil in the eastern Canadian and American
residual market, moreover, Venezuela was left with "the
bones" of fuel oil sales as opposed to the more profitable
crude

Another gripe was

a

new method of "quota trading"

.

The

revised system reduced the percentage of imports allocated
to "historical" importers, those U.S. companies who bought
foreign, and mostly Venezuelan, oil before 1957.

The rules

now allowed "inland" refiners, which did not directly use
imported oil, to swap their quota allotments for domestic
petroleum.

Quota trading cut imports; Venezuela estimated

a loss of revenue of $35 million.

Betancourt wished to

eliminate quota trading, charging that the allocation of
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permits for imports encouraged speculation
by greedy
refiners.
He desired that they use Venezuelan
oil.^^
Feldman responded with
the Kennedy program.

a

sympathetic yet firm defense of

On preferences for others and not

Venezuela, he repeated that without the overland
exemption,
Canada would have cut off Venezuelan exports to
the

Montreal area by building
provinces.

a

pipeline from its oil-producing

Besides, Canada's position in the U.S. market

was fixed under the quota exemption while Venezuela
had an

increased sales potential once American consumption
expanded.

Anyway, Venezuela's rising exports during 1962

confirmed the nation's competitiveness in the United
States

Admittedly, the revised quota program would slow

Venezuelan crude sales, said Feldman, but Caracas could
look forward to increased demand in Europe and in the many

markets it dominated, such as Puerto Rico, other Caribbean
countries, and Canada.

Though residual oil did not reap as

high profits as crude, it still offered "attractive
opportunities".

Venezuela virtually owned the American

fuel oil market, supplying about 86% of the residual

consumed in the U.S. either directly or through the
Netherlands Antilles.

These exports had climbed 30% over

the past three years and could rise further, depending on

Kennedy's response to a pending OEP report on residual oil
quotas
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Like Betancourt, Kennedy did not
like the speculation
involved in quota trading, and promised
a solution.
But
Feldman explained that quota trading
aided domestic
producers, who were required to expand
their sales to
inland refiners penalized by the allocation
advantage of

historical importers under the previous system.

Phasing

out this competitive edge for importers
was only fair.

Besides, an elimination of quota trading would
actually

hurt Caracas by forcing inland refiners to
transport oil

from the coast at an uneconomical cost, thereby
depressing

prices and bringing in less revenue for Venezuela
In the end,

U.S. position.

Betancourt and Perez Alfonzo accepted the

Purely for home consumption, Betancourt

pledged in January 19 63 to end the "Sword of Damocles" by
which the U.S. could unilaterally make decisions taken"

affecting Venezuelan oil in the American market.

But the

following month, he privately expressed to the President
his satisfisf action with the revised program.

Meeting

Betancourt in Washington, Kennedy promised to inform him of
any changes in the import program. 47
.

As time would tell, the administration's claim that

Venezuela would encounter steady growth in exports was
borne out.

From 1962 to the first oil crisis in 1973, its

exports to America increased by 83 million barrels,
feeble

8

million barrels a year.

Yet since Venezuela also

produced nearly all of the oil exported from the
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Netherlands Antilles, it gained an
additional 100 million
barrels over the period, or 18 million
barrels per year.
While the nation remained the top oil
supplier

to America,

dropping to third behind Canada and the
Middle East by
1975, Venezuela remained in first place in
the U.S. market
until 197 6 when Caribbean sources are added
to its export
total.

Furthermore, Kennedy rejected the recommendation
of the
OEP in February 1963 to eliminate controls
on residual oil,

but

began

a

trend toward liberalization that ended in

abolishing limits in 1966.

While American imports of crude

rose by 15%, to 483,293 thousand barrels a day, residual

imports more than doubled to 557,845 thousand barrels a
day, thus topping crude imports, by the end of the decade.

Significantly, the ratio of residual imports to U.S.

domestic consumption leapt from 48.2% in 1962 to 69.4% in
1970.

Since it sent nearly nine-tenths of this fuel oil,

Venezuela profited considerably.'^^
Increased exports to America showed that the controls
imposed by the Kennedy fair-trade approach to oil imports
were limited in their effect on trade.

They were not

limited in their effect on congressional treatment of the
TEA,

however.

The revision of the Mandatory Quota Program

was a sop to oilmen; the refusal to junk restrictions on

residual fuel a bone to coal interests.

In the end,

Kennedy's oil import policy, based on the delicate balance

of the fair-trade doctrine,

satisfied all parties.

Oil and

coal producers were protected, while
consumers enjoyed the
general trend toward trade liberalization.
Canada and
Venezuela initially criticized but
accepted the revised
program. And Kennedy won a strategic
victory which helped
win him the trade bill and the essential
power to transform
his liberal trade goals into reality.

Kennedy granted the most explicitly protectionist
of all
of his concessions well before he signed the
TEA, by
raising tariffs on glass and carpet items.

Based on a

unanimous recommendation by the Tariff Commission to invoke
the escape clause, which released an industry from a
prior

trade agreement and enabled an increase in barriers to
imports, the action was the first and only tariff hike he

ever made.

The duties were too drastic to explain away as

mere economic assistance, especially since the

administration was in the midst of trying to inject
liberalism into the international trade regime.

Instead,

they indicated the lengths to which Kennedy would go to
pass the TEA.
The President raised tariffs on wilton and velvet carpet

imports as another part of his aid for the textile
industry.

The inflow of carpets from abroad reached a

record high $8.2 million square yards in 1961, almost
double the level of 1958, which compelled congressional
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representatives of major producing
areas, particularly
Congressman Samuel S. Stratton (D-NY)
from upstate New
York, to lobby the President for
limits.
The textile
industry joined this appeal. Kennedy,
of course, had
already exerted much effort on behalf
of textile
manufacturers, thus his help for wilton
and velvet carpet
manufacturers added to his good standing
within the

industry and on Capitol Hill.^'^
More revealing of the motives behind and
the impact of
the tariff hike was the issue of sheet glass
imports.

Sheet glass, used for windows, had been
rejected twice for
a duty increase by Eisenhower despite Tariff
Commission

suggestions to the contrary.

Kennedy kept the glass

industry in mind during the 19 60 campaign as a possible
focal point for a "trade adjustment bill" in the event
he
won the election.

He had lost, however, a majority of the

top nine glass-producing states, including West Virginia
and Oklahoma, two of the three largest.

In the

presidential politics of glass trade, he did not succeed.

Now in office, he had his chance to act on the findings
of a Tariff Commission hearing in May 1961.

Commission,

major companies

-

Before the

Libbey-Owens-Ford,

Pittsbutgh Plate Glass, and American-St. Gobain

-

as well

as the United Glass and Ceramic Workers of North America,

the Window Glass Cutters League, and the Ohio,

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Indiana Glass Workers
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Protective League, complained about
imports.
They
testified that the steadily declining
tariff since the war,
labor and material cost advantages
of
foreigners, and

parity in technological expertise
and productivity among
domestic and overseas firms gave
imports a competitive
edge 52
,

The Tariff Commission agreed with
them,

finding imports

to blame for the decline in sheet
glass production.

Sales

of domestic manufactures had decreased
by one-quarter

between 1955 and 1960, employment had
dropped 16%, and the
four major manufacturing firms suffered
net operating
losses of over $1.1 million. A discriminatory
factory
distribution arrangement, which drove unfavored
buyers to
turn to cheaper imports in order to compete with
"recognized" factory and consumer distributors, caused
some
of these problems.

Yet the industry had also lost nearly

one-quarter of the domestic market to imports during the
past decade.

In order,

Belgium,

Japan,

and other European

countries had accounted for 32% of these sales in 1959,
when just nine years before they had less than 3% of the
market.

Overall, the percentage share of U.S. sheet glass

consumption for domestic manufacturers had fallen from
97.8% to 75.4% from 1950 to 1960. Based on its findings,

the Commission recommended in June 19 61 invoking the escape

clause
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Yet,

the President,

suspicious particularly of the
discriminatory distributor practice,
postponed his decision
to act on the recommendation.
Aware of the seriousness of
a tariff increase on foreign
relations, Kennedy wanted more
information in order to consider fully
the "national

interest" without "unduly restricting
fair competition"
from abroad. He figured that the
predicted imminent

economic recovery in the country, fueled
by expanding
production in the construction, automobile
and aircraft
sectors, would benefit window-makers and
reverse
the

depressed conditions in the sheet glass industry.

Also, by

delaying, Kennedy shrewdly avoided inciting
Congress to
override him in the event he rejected the Commission's

recommendation
This approach angered Congress, however.

The

postponement induced Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH) to
introduce a bill which made Tariff Commission

recommendations binding on the President.

That three

presidents had accepted only 13 of 36 recommendations for
tariff raises since 1950 frustrated protectionists.

The

six House members at the Commission hearing had also backed

calls for restrictions on foreign sheet glass.

They

concurred with the demand of the four-state Glass Workers
Protective League to know "plainly and promptly" where

Kennedy stood on the import issue, for they had received to
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date "no encouragement-only the
opposite"
House.

-

from the White

Surely sparking Kennedy's attention
was Congressman
Dent's self-proclaimed "crusade" for
restrictions on sheet
glass imports.
Dent was an irreconcilable
protectionists-

Kennedy could not hope to woo him to
the TEA.
But he was
also an articulate opponent of liberal
trade and might
rally fellow legislators who accused the
administration of
giving "second-class consideration" to
American workers and
industries. The sheet glass problem was an
example
of

Kennedy's "perverted" trade policies, he said,
which

permitted imports of goods in which there already
existed
surplus, particularly in his home district in
Pennsylvania

where the world's largest glass factory had recently
closed.

Not very subtly. Dent pointed to the President,

saying that "it does not take a Harvard graduate to make
two and two equal four" in relating imports to economic

stagnation
Dent gathered a collection of House and Senate

supporters of the tariff increase on sheet glass imports.
These legislators hailed from the nine major glass-

producing states and even included administration allies
such as Senators Estes Kefauver (D-Tenn.) and J.W.

Fulbright

(D-Ark.)

.

Added to them was Robert Kerr and the

entire Oklahoma congressional delegation, minus House

majority whip Carl Albert.

This informal "glass bloc"
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paralleled to a large extent the
regional make-up of the
coal-oil forces and numbered around
90 House and 15 Senate
members
The interim between the decision
to postpone action in
late June 1961 and the time tariff
hikes were instituted

eight months later allowed Kennedy
to weigh the various
elements of the case.
The Department of State reminded
hir
of the international implications of
tariffs.
Japan would
be sorely hurt at a time Tokyo was sorting
out its trade
relationship with the West. Restrictions
could enrage
Premier Ikeda, disgruntled over the limits
on cotton
textiles, and might heighten pressure within
Japan to shut
out some important American exports.
The potential difficulty with Belgium and the
rest of

EEC demanded the most attention, however.

endured

a

Belgium had

series of foreign and domestic setbacks.

Its

grant of independence to the Congo had led to political
chaos and war which had not served Belgian interests.

Brussels was also the sole member of the Six whose economy
lagged,

and the GATT textile accords, which pried Belgium

open to cheap imports made the nation ever-more sensitive
to further economic burdens and foreign harrassment.

But

the U.S. also counted on the moderate and long-time Belgian
statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak, to sustain an outward-looking,

liberal-trading Common Market.
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The EEC had stepped in this
direction during the Dillon
Round of GATT, which was drawing to
a conclusion by early
March 1962, around the same time
Kennedy would decide on
the tariff issue. An American tariff
raise, warned the
State Department, would be "counterproductive,
both

psychologically and practically" to the
participants at the
Round.
Restricting carpets and glass might set off
a

"chain reaction" of retaliation by the Common
Market and
doom the emerging trade relationship of the
U.S. and the
Six that was the raison d'etre of the TEA.^^
Once again, Kennedy found himself in a familiar
no-win

situation.

He would gladly close out the Dillon Round,

move on to the TEA, and open the next GATT round without

raising tariffs.

But timing was on the side of

congressional protectionists; the desire of the President
to gather votes on the TEA brightened the prospects of

escape clause action.

Besides, glass interests were

adamantly opposed to free-trade.

The President of Libbey-

Owens-Ford, for instance, stated that "we're in favor of

protection", and his company joined three other major

producers in staunchly rejecting the TEA.
congressional bloc followed suit.
but disaster" for producers

Kennedy protected jobs.

The

Dent foresaw "nothing

(and presumably the TEA)

unless

59

Facing the TEA vote in Congress, and with the Tariff
Commission in support, the President opted to raise tariffs
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on 19 March 1962.

He did refuse to boost
duties on

baseball gloves and ceramic mosaic
tiles on the grounds
that domestic production had
not been directly affected
by
imports.
But sheet glass and carpets,
with organized
protectionist blocs behind them,
received favorable
treatment. Aide Theodore Sorensen
explained that Kennedy
acted on behalf of these industries
to show that under

U.S.

trade laws, there still existed the
principle of
selectivity in choosing some industries
for protection ^°
Since neither carpets nor sheet glass
contributed much to
the gross national product or to imports
or exports
.

relative to other products, this principle
took on a
distinct political meaning. Kennedy traded
protectionism
for support on the TEA.
That politics overrode other considerations is
shown by

the subsequent reaction of the parties concerned.

The

sheet glass industry continued, despite the tariff
hike, to

resist the trade bill.

in fact,

the day the hikes were

announced, nine industry witnesses testified against the

TEA before the House Ways and Means Committee.

When

Kennedy delayed the tariffs for 90 days to give importers

a

chance to find new sources of supply, the industry

criticized him.

But manufacturers then turned around and,

against the wishes of the President, raised prices and

received the full benefits of owning a greater share of the
market.

6

Interest groups won their demands, but the
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industry and the White House
were still at odds on general
trade policy.
If the industry and the
President were out of step,

Kennedy and Congress certainly
were not. Members of both
houses noted the linkage of the
tariff action with the
upcoming votes on the trade bill.
Time Magazine responded
that the duties cast in doubt upon
Kennedy's sincerity for
promoting free-trade, but they won him
votes.
Many
legislators expressed their "delight" with
the move.
Escape clause originator Cleveland Bailey
pointed out that
since Kennedy had shown a genuine concern
for injured
industries by raising tariffs, the congressman
would vote
for the TEA.
Congressman Ed Edmondson (D-OK)
like Bailey
one of the six House members who attended the
Tariff
,

Commission hearing, said after the hike that

"I feel that

I

can not only go along with the [trade] bill,
but work for
its passage".

Winning over protectionists was the outcome envisioned
by the administration.

The duty hike on carpets earned the

votes of the two concerned New York congressmen, Samuel

Stratton and Steven

B.

Derounian

(R)

.

Senator Harry Byrd

later attributed the passage of the TEA to the seven-point

textile program coupled with the carpet duty action.
Legislators from glass producing areas in West Virginia,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois who, as Business Week
claimed, had been "100% against" the legislation earlier.
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were now divided.

m

the House,

four of the six

n.enU3ers

who demanded an escape clause
ruling by the Tariff
Coitunission now voted with
Kennedy.
The

90-meinber glass

bloc split down the middle on the
TEA, with the intractable
Dent and congressmen from the nine
glass states in
opposition.

Yet 34 of those against were the
Republicans

from whom Kennedy could not expect
any help.

m

the

Senate, all but two of the 15-member
bloc, one of whom was

free-trader Fulbright who did not record

a vote,

the other

Republican Homer Capehart (R-Ind.), tallied
in favor.
The Common Market did not publicly
acknowledge the

politics of glass trade in criticizing the tariff
hike,
which occurred just twelve days after the end
of the Dillon
Round.
With Belgium in the lead, the Six denounced
the

increases which raised tariffs on wilton and velvet
carpets

from 21 to 40% and on sheet, crown, and cylinder
glass from
1.3 to 3.5 cents per pound.

Belgium had already recalled

its delegate to GATT and its Ambassador to the United

States for consultation.

Foreign Minister Maurice Brasseur

now called the hikes a "brutal" and "immoral" step.

France

joined Belguim in claiming that the new tariffs further

indicated that any European industry which competed
successfully in the American market would be penalized.

In

its entirety, the EEC was more diplomatic, dismayed that

the measures were "not in the spirit of the recent [Dillon
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Round] talks or of the coming
talks" to be held after the
passage of the TEA.
The Conunon Market might have
recognxzed the constraints
on Kennedy, however.
Quite justifiably, the Six
retaliated
in June 1962 by raising
tariffs from 19 to 40% on certain
U.S. chemical, man-made fiber,
and paint exports.
Yet the
reprisals were not politically
injurious to the President.
That is, the American chemical
industry,

primarily an

exporter,

incurred the brunt of the European
duty raises.
The few chemical manufacturers who
were import-competitors
cared more about retaining the restrictive
American Selling
Price than protection from tariffs.
They also viewed

Europe as a temporary outlet until the
U.S. market could
absorb their products.
Thus, the Six very likely picked
the healthy chemical industry, and not
more vulnerable
producers, so as not to arouse protectionists
in Congress
any further against the TEA.^^ The EEC
understood that

inter-branch politics underlay Kennedy's decision to
raise
tariffs
The EEC, though,

still questioned the utility of future

negotiations with America if the President could enact such
blatant protectionism just after
U.S.

a

round of tariff cuts.

imports of wilton and velvet carpets plummeted from

the high of of 8.2 million square yards worth $28 million
in 1961 to a low in 1966 of 560,000 square yards valued at

only $3.1 million, and never rose above the 1961 levels
260

during the next decade.

The new tariffs provided
similar

severe cuts in sheet glass imports.

Belgium's share of

these carpet and glass imports actually
rose during the
decade, but did not register real
gains since this market
was obviously much smaller.
In addition, Brussels ran
alternative trade surpluses and deficits
with the U.S., but
when in the red, Belgium's deficit grew
from $146 million
in 1962 to $232 million by 1970.

Trade tended to favor

America
The effect of the tariffs, though, ranked
second to the
trade bill in Kennedy's mind. He justified the
tariffs by

citing Belgium's favorable payments balance and
healthier
glass and carpet industries relative to American
producers,
and before the EEC retaliation, meekly argued that the
TEA

would stimulate employment on both sides of the Atlantic.
After the EEC reacted, he said that protectionism was
regrettable.

But reminding Americans of link between the

duty raises and the trade legislation, Kennedy preferred to

emphasize that if the TEA had been in effect, "we could
have then offered an alternate package which
have prevented retaliation".

I

think would
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Clearly protectionist, the carpets and glass tariff
hikes served their purpose of winning adherents to the

trade bill.

Indeed,

it is difficult to determine exactly

how heavily economic motives weighed in the President's
actions, but politics took precedence.
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Aide Myer Feldman

in August 19 62 echoed his boss in writing a chemical

industry leader that it was precisely to avoid the type of

mini-trade wars which had occurred during the carpets and
glass episode that the TEA must be passed,^®

It is

unlikely that Kennedy would have risked upsetting his
carefully cultivated relationship with Europe and future
trade negotiations for the sake of selfishly protecting two
rather minor industries.

Instead, he decided to lose a

battle to protectionists and enrage the allies now, and win
the war later by passing the TEA and reducing overall trade

barriers in negotiations with Europe,
The action on carpets and glass, like the measures for
oil and coal,

lumber, and textiles, indicated that Kennedy

was not an ideologue on trade, despite his penchant for

lofty rhetoric.

He pragmatically balanced the domestic and

international elements inherent in the fair-trade doctrine.
The President seemed already to have mastered the domestic

political element.

He learned that legislative leadership

depended on compromise which broke down resistance to his
bills.

The TEA, his top priority for 1962, required extra

effort toward this end.
One example of his conciliatory tactics related to an

incident involving Senator Russell Long (D-LA)

.

After

giving a pitch for the TEA to a group of senators, Kennedy

fielded their questions.

Long, upset about the

administration's previously announced intention of shutting
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down some military bases around the country,
demanded an
explanation about the closure of Louisiana's Fort
Polk.

An

irritated Kennedy informed Long that the meeting
concerned
trade, not bases.
to",

"I

understand trade and

I

hope you do

replied the senator, "I'll trade you that fort for

a

vote on the Trade Expansion Act"
In short, Kennedy perceived he had little choice but
to

forge these agreements.

TEA would surely lose.

By resisting protectionists, the
By meekly submitting to them, as

Eisenhower had done, the trade bill could be altered and
its effectiveness as an instrument of trade liberalization

undermined.

His fair-trade tactic was a middle course that

preserved the basic outline of the TEA and appeased
Congress at the same time.

As Theodore Lowi wrote, inter-

branch bargaining on the TEA signified

a

most "vulgar

pluralist view of American politics". 7 0

Decision-making reflected this pluralism.

Private

elites, including potent independent oil producers who

pressed for import restrictions during the TEA battle, did
not enjoy an informal, consensual relationship with the

Kennedy administration.

Even adherent David Painter

singles out the domestic oil industry as incompatible with
the supposed corporatist international petroleum

structure.

7

Leaders in the glass industry certainly did

not see eye-to-eye with Kennedy trade policy.

In essence,

government and private sector leaders were not in alliance
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and corporatism does not explain
decision-making in these
cases

Bureaucrats indeed took distinct positions on
both
issues, but in the end their views merely
provided the

President with

a list of opinions.

Interior Department

official Kelly and George Ball were surely at odds on
oil
import policy, for instance, but Kennedy knew the options

available to him and the ones that were feasible in light
of the TEA.

Very likely nobody in the administration

wanted tariffs raised, but the timing of the TEA and the
Tariff Commission report virtually made the hike a fait
accompli.

In actuality, Kennedy had decided his course,

guided by his political instincts.

Buying votes did not

require policy prescriptions from advisors.
The dependent variable for Kennedy was Congress.
oil and tariff issues,

goals.

In the

interest groups achieved their

Oilmen came very close to getting the full slate of

their demands, including levels and the method of limiting
imports

.

Coal interests received sympathy for overseas

export barriers and much government attention to
development.

Consumers were assured of freer trade and

lower prices in fuel oil.

Glass and carpet manufacturers

won higher, nearly prohibitive tariffs.

Yet the very

tangle of rival parties, especially regarding oil imports,
also casts doubts on relying entirely on the interest group

model as an explanatory tool for the decision-making
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process.

Kennedy juggled all concerns and satisfied
industries, yet not because of direct pressure
from the
private sector.
Interest groups got the President's ear,
but only through their congressmen.
Instead, both cases represent interest group
politics

succeeding through inter-branch, regulatory bargaining.
The deal with Kerr over oil imports epitomizes this

process.

Kerr discreetly but firmly informed the President

that the demands of the oil industry would have to be met

before Kerr wielded his considerable clout in the Senate
and pushed the oil bloc to vote for the TEA.

Kennedy

acquiesced, granting the independents their demands.

At

the same time, he preserved his goal of fair-trade by

winning votes from all three congressional blocs on the
TEA,

giving foreign producers

U.S. oil market,

a

slowly growing share of the

and offering the potential for more access

on other goods once he used the TEA to bargain down trade

barriers through GATT

.

The President's concentration

on domestic politics certainly had an impact on

international affairs, the other half of the fair-trade
doctrine.

Trade in textiles, oil, and carpets and glass

became more restrictive because

a

recalcitrant Congress

forced Kennedy to limit imports of these products.

Some

scholars cite this parochial congressional power over the

more global strategies of the President as the reason for

eroding liberalism in economic regimes during the last
265

twenty-five years
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.
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Congress had considerable control over American
policy in
the international trade regime.
The notion that Congress got the upper
hand through

inter-branch politics at the expense of U.S. and
foreign
trade interests can only be taken so far, however.
The

special treatment accorded to the several industries
by
Kennedy, which ended up restricting trade, strayed from

commerce based on the principle of comparative advantage.
But the halving of the American merchandise trade surplus

by the end of the 1960s bears witness to the fact that
other countries did not unduly suffer from U.S. trade
policies, and that America did.

Canada, Japan, Venezuela,

and the EEC, all affected by Kennedy's protectionist

arrangements, soon developed surpluses with America.

For instance, critics of U.S. trade policy blame

American oil import limits for reducing Venezuelan gains in
crude oil exports and thus hindering that nation's lack of

diversification of its oil-based economy.
just as easily placed on Venezuela.

But blame can be

The country's high

cost structure, due to its lofty tariffs and overvalued

exchange rate relative to LDCs and other nations,

restrained growth in export sectors other than petroleum.

Venezuela was not successful in using its considerable
earnings from oil exports to build a solid industrial base
73
necessary for economic diversity and growth.
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The hegemony scholars also overlook
the fact that U.S.
imports rose at America's own expense.
Fuel oil imports

climbed while coal exports to Europe and Canada
continued
to plunge until 1970.
Oil imports grew by 65% from

1962 to

1973, the U.S.

share of world production dropped, and

purchases from overseas filled a growing percentage
of

demand and consumption, taking more of the market away
from
domestic producers and giving it to other nations.

'^^

American oil and coal producers were hurt in trade.
At the same time, the effects of the Trade Expansion Act
sent American trade into the red, and not only with

Venezuela.

Critics contend that this deficit was warranted

by America's overall world trade surplus and its domination
of the Venezuelan economy.

Yet as Secretary of State Rusk

informed Betancourt in late 1962, the oil import program

would in no way effect the growing tide of other Venezuelan
exports to the United States.

He was right.

The U.S.

trade deficit with Venezuela more than doubled between 1960
and 1976, when it totaled $896 million.

By 1976, moreover,

the U.S. suffered a global trade deficit of almost $6

billion, when fifteen years before it had enjoyed a $5

billion surplus. 75

The benefits brought to others in

commerce, added to the injury domestic producers suffered,

proved that America was a magnanimous fair-trader.
Indeed,

at last glance,

the oil quotas did not grant

American producers immunity from import injury.

The door

remained ajar to U.S. markets at the
expense of the
independents.
The pay-off was that under the
authority of
the TEA, America would reciprocally boost
exports in which
it enjoyed a comparative advantage and
maintain leadership
over the global trade order. Regardless,
increases in oil
imports, decreases in coal exports, and the
halving of the

American trade surplus by the end of the 1960s
bears
witness that other nations did not unduly suffer from
U.S.

trade policies, and that America, to an extent, did.
Again, considering the political constraints on Kennedy,

trade was as fair as possible.
In other cases,

trade policy.
lumber

other nations fared well under U.S.

Hong Kong in textiles and Canada in oil and

registered gains in trade, and the latter earned an

overall trade surplus with the United States.

Belgium in

carpets and glass and Japan in textiles were hurt, yet the

former used the muscle of the EEC to bargain down tariffs
later in the decade and the Japanese enjoyed a steadily

burgeoning trade surplus with America by 1968 and
thereafter.

76

It should be noted also that all of these

nations were not innocent from protectionism, and

restricted U.S. exports of certain significant goods.

In

sum, America was not very successful in maintaining its

postwar trade power in the global economy of the 1960s and

beyond
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To a considerable degree, the U.S.

sacrificed its home

markets to foreign competition in order
to retain its shaky
leadership over the world trade order.
Kennedy believed
such a trade-off worthwhile because he sought
a reciprocal
opening of doors abroad for American exports.
This goal

undergirded his hope, soon to be somewhat dampened,
that
most Americans would understand the importance
of the

Trade

Expansion Act in promoting exports and helping the
country
achieve the domestic and foreign aims envisioned by the
New
Frontier
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CPIAPTER 5

KENNEDY DRIVES fOR EXPORTS

After mollifying the major protectionist
blocs, Kennedy
assumed he could round up votes for the
TEA from exportminded legislators. His belief was
well-grounded:
exporters were usually efficient producers
who would
benefit, under the law of comparative advantage,
from
tariff reductions.
Indeed, by the early 1960s, a wider

acceptance of liberal trade existed in agricultural,
labor,
business, and industrial circles, and increasingly
on

Capitol Hill, than ever before.

The newly-recovered

nations presented capital-intensive enterprises with

attractive trade and investment opportunities, leading many
in Congress to stress export expansion, especially with an

eye on Europe.

America seemed primed to export.

Yet two tendencies within the American economy boded ill

for the trade expansion effort.

First, producers

oftentimes lacked a will to search for overseas outlets.
In many cases, the actual orientation of the private sector

toward exploiting the domestic market overshadowed the
opportunities available in foreign trade.

When producers

sought markets abroad, moreover, they encountered stiff

resistance from other countries and failed to sell enough
to make exporting worth their while.

A passivity,

indifference, or hostility toward exchanging tariff
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reduction for expansion into foreign
markets was prevalent
among U.S. producers.
Second, the essential pluralism at
the societal level-

of-analysis endangered Kennedy's trade
program.
general, the private sector, exporters

In

included, eyed each

other and the adminstration with suspicion
and diverged on
trade policy.
In other words, agricultural,
labor,

business and industrial interests competed
against each
other for the benefits of trade, and many ran
into conflict
with Kennedy.
The divergent views within the private
sector and between these interests and the White House

exemplified behavior among exporters.
These themes are clearer after a look at the perspective
and policies of the three trade sectors in the U.S.
economy:

agriculture, labour, and manufacturing.

Contrary

to hegemony school theory, prctectionism was more powerful

than the search for overseas markets, even in segments of
the export-oriented farm community, because selling in the

home market still took precedence.

Furthermore, even when

exporters went abroad, they were often stymied by foreign
restrictions.

Kennedy encouraged exports as the main

benefit of his fair-trade doctrine.

The inherent tendency

of Americans to turn inward, especially in matters

affecting the economy, however, compelled him to promote
the TEA as more than just an aid to trade expansion.
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Not counting solely on economic
argument to win the TEA,

the administratxon and its allies in
Congress promoted the
bill as a critical part of American security.
Along with
military programs, trade was a part of Kennedy's
"Grand
Design", his U S -European policy aimed
to unify and
.

.

strengthen the Western allies under an "Atlantic
partnership".

Reversing the balance-of -payment s deficit by

expanding exports served these objectives.

Exports helped

finance the country's considerable outlays for overseas

military and aid programs, which provided the bases of
alliance security.

The hypothesis that the push for

exports came from cold warriors in the administration and

Congress and not from the American private sector thus

illuminates the arguments of the comparative-advantage and

hegemony schools.
This debate also sets up a test for the models of

interest intermediation.

The bureaucracy agreed on the

need to win the cold war by every means, including trade.
Thus,

it can be assumed there was no fundamental

differences among officials with Kennedy policy.

Corporatism provides
expanding exports was

more relevant paradigm, for

a

a

goal in which private and public

elites promoted in unison.

Thus,

the decision-making arena

may have included links, either institutionalized or
informal, between the rising capital-intensive export

sector and the administration.

Or,

as in the protectionist

cases, the most applicable models
might be those in which
Congress is the central focus of interest
group or inter-

branch politics.
Since export expansion was Kennedy's
reason for

introducing the Trade Expansion Act, corporatism
is a
compelling explanation of the decision-making

process.

it is flawed.

But

A public-private partnership on trade, such

as the corporate-led Randall Commission under
the

Eisenhower's "industrial administration", did not exist in
Kennedy policy-making. The only bodies for formulating
trade policy were bureaucratic entities, such as the inter-

departmental Trade Policy Committee or the Petersen task
force.

The latter, though drawn from the private sector

and instrumental in the formulation of the TEA, was limited
to the campaign in Congress.

A candidate for testing the

corporatist analysis, though, was the Committee for a

National Trade Policy (CNTP)

,

an effective lobby for

liberal trade.

While it included on its rolls the major U.S. corporate
executives, the CNTP was not a forum for policy-making, nor
was it asked to be.

Some of the 2000 members of the CNTP,

founded in 1953, included Ford Motor, Standard Oil, Chase
National Bank, Gillette Safety Razor, Burroughs
Manufacturing, IBM, General Mills, ITT, Pillsbury, H.J.
Heinz,
TEA.

and Crown Zellerbach.

All of these firms backed the

In additions, many of the architects of postwar trade
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policy had been members of the CNTP;
founders George Ball,
William Clayton, and Paul Hoffman had served
in key
government or related positions.

But the CNTP engaged in

educating the public, giving its opinion on
trade measures,
and acting as one of Petersen's liaisons with
Congress and
private interests. However influential, the
organization
was devoid of a corporatist decision-making
role in
the

Kennedy administration.^
Nevertheless, the administration appreciated the CNTP's

efforts in persuading Americans to accept exporting as

necessity for the 1960s.

a

The President fought to convince

Congress and producers to ignore their natural proclivities
to turn inward and exploit the U.S. economy.

Yet Seymour

Harris pointed out that the stress on exports over imports

had a limited appeal since many producers believed that
GATT negotiations tended to increase imports, not exports.

Kennedy could also not ignore the most telling fact about
U.S. trade; only an estimated 5% of all American

manufacturers sold abroad.

3

Kennedy hoped to convert these unwilling or apathetic
interests into exporters by an impressive propaganda

campaign for the TEA.

He discussed the salutary effects of

overseas sales to the domestic economy, and tried to

present exports as a crucial part of American foreign

policy by linking commerce to political goals.

"Be export-

minded", he told the National Association of Manufacturers,

in order to offset the payments
deficit and permit the

country "to meet our commitments" in aid
and defense/
The entire administration helped in
the campaign.
TEA was

a

The

foreign rather than an economic policy,
echoed

Petersen, in attempting to give the bill a
broader meaning.
Policy planner Walt Rostow added that without
American

business expansion (including exports), the U.S.
would
complicate the adjustments occurring in the Atlantic
community, damage the interests of the LDCs, and hearten

Soviet leaders who feared a resurgent West.

Ultimately,

the President himself had to convince the public.

America

could either "trade or fade", he warned, with the obvious
consequences of losing more power in global economic and

political terms if the latter happened.^
Indeed, upon entering office, Kennedy seized the

initiative, instructing Secretary of Commerce Hodges to

boost Eisenhower's export expansion program.

Hodges set

out to reverse the previous complacency of his department

and businessmen in trade.

He began trade fairs,

conferences, and centers abroad, and revitalized the

overseas commercial services organization to aid exporters.
Under State Department jurisdiction, foreign country
surveys, product lists, directories,

and personnel

available to U.S. businessmen had suffered neglect.

The

State Department pledged to expand the services and elevate
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employees to ministerial rank in exchange
for continued
control over the services.^
To reward exporters, the President
introduced the "E"
(export) flags in recognition of
businessmen who built a

large export trade.

The flags had flown over the most

productive factories during World War II.

He also approved

the expansion of credit for exporters through
the ExportImport Bank, and credit guarantees.

Under Eisenhower and

Kennedy, the expansion program played an important
role in

increasing merchandise exports by almost $6 billion from
1959 to 1963."^

But such efforts did not have an effect on changing the

attitudes of the private sector toward foreign trade.

Ambassador to Belgium Douglas MacArthur II attributed the
poor showing of American goods in foreign markets to the
U.S. business sector's loss of "vigor", while an Export-

Import Bank official called the export performance
"pathetic".

Hodges complained that even U.S. ambassadors

downgraded the commercial services to the point where they
were inadequate

.

At a White House conference on export

expansion, 40 trade associations rejected free-trade and

demanded more protection, prompting Petersen to conclude
that Americans were "not strong seekers of export

opportunities"

g

The public shared this view.

Parochialism, the impact

of imports, and the inability of producers to see the
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benefits of exports undercut the
President's appeal. The
public response to the TEA revealed
either an unawareness
of market opportunities abroad or no
convincing evidence of
support for liberal trade. Asked if they
had heard of the
Common Market, over three-quarters of the
people polled by
George Gallup responded "no". Nearly half
had no knowledge
of Kennedy's bill in January 1962; by April,
after
the

informational campaign by Petersen was underway,
this
figure had worsened to 54%.
the TEA,

Of those that did know about

60% saw no reason to change or lower duties or had

no opinion at all.

Failure to win the TEA, acknowledged

Petersen's staff, would not be due to

a lack of

persuasiveness by the administration, but because of public
ignorance

9

The export figures which Petersen brought to the Oval

Office showed Kennedy the reason behind this unconcern.

Exports accounted for 35% of the Netherlands' gross

national product and 10 to 19% of the GNP of the Common
Market, Britain, Sweden, and Canada.

The world leader in

export volume, the U.S. earned nearly $20 billion from
sales in 1961, or one-sixth of the global total.

Yet only

3.8% of the American GNP in 1962 was attributable to

exports, and this figure had not moved above 6.8% since
1920.

'^
It rose to only 4.4% by 1970.

A novel "export origin" study by the Commerce
Department in 1962 showed that all 50 states benefited from
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overseas markets, but agriculture was
the only sector
reliant on these sales.
Only eight states accounted for
60% of manufacturing exports and fewer than
one of every 25

manufacturers exported.

With justification, protectionists

complained that the study, which claimed that

6

million

workers were employed in plants that produced
for
exporting, was misleading since only a small
percentage of
the total output of these plants went abroad.
In
effect,

America did not need to export its industrial goods
out of
necessity as other nations did, a reality which backs
up

the comparative-advantage school's argument but hurt
the

campaign for the

TEA."'""'"

Kennedy was happier with the response of farmers to his
bill and about the trade figures for agriculture, where

exports were much more important.

Fourteen states sent

abroad farm produce worth more than $100 million.

The farm

export total of $5.1 billion out of $35 billion produced,

which accounted for 14% of farm income, was impressive, but
it must be noted that $3.2 billion were earned dollars

while almost $2 billion went abroad as aid or gifts.

An

overall farm commodity surplus of $1.4 billion in 1962 grew

larger as the decade progress, though America ran
in dollar exports until 1970.

America's export champions.

a

deficit

Farmers were nonetheless
One of every six acres

harvested and 15% of farm goods, as opposed to 8% for nonagricultural production went abroad.
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Broken down into

commodities, production as a
percentage of exports ranged
from 57% for rice to 20-49% for
barley, tobacco, cotton,
soybeans, wheat, and 14% for sorghum.
"Make no mistake
about it", said Secretary of
Agriculture Orville Freeman to
Congress. "The prosperity and stability
of the American
farmer is directly dependent upon our
exports".

As a result. Big Agriculture was the
most consistent
supporter of liberal trade, and the most
demanding of

access into the lucrative Common Market.

The EEC took

close to 30% of U.S. farm goods but its common
agricultural
policy, already instituted for a few commodities,
was a

troublesome protective device.

Though farm-state

legislators urged lower barriers to trade, Kennedy
feared
that agricultural interests would sour on the TEA
when they

perceived little chance for reciprocity from Europe.

To

secure votes for the bill, he fought for access into the
EEC,

though the Six dodged his efforts on the grounds that

the CAP was still in its formative phase.

Poultry exports

emerged as the weapon in Kennedy's crusade.
The celebrated "chicken war" grew from a squabble over

EEC trade restrictions into a dramatic stand by America

against the CAP.

The problem stemmed from a six-fold

upturn in U.S. poultry (broilers and eggs) exports

beginning in 1959, and a rise by 36% in 1962.
Technological advances in breeding and management had

caused an oversupply of chickens at home and prompted
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a

search for new markets.

Unfortunately, the explosion was

ill-timed; exports ran headlong
into the integration
process and a similar poultry
production revolution in the
Common Market. After rancorous
inter-EEC negotiations, the
Six approved the CAP in mid-January
1962 and readied
variable levies on poultry imports
for 30 July of that
year.
CAP Regulation 22 sought to harmonize
internal EEC
poultry prices, restrict U.S. and Danish
exports, and
reserve the lucrative West German chicken
market for Dutch,
French, Belgian and, to a lesser extent,
Italian

producers

1

But American raisers already controlled
one-quarter of

the German market, with exports valued at $49.5
million and
growing. The levy, and a special "sluice gate"
provision

which set a minimum import price, raised the cost of
U.S.
chickens in West Germany by nearly 10 cents per pound.

The

EEC had declined to negotiate the fee, though it was one of
the two CAP levies set at the time of the Dillon Round.
a result,

As

the "standstill agreement" of 1961 on poultry did

not assure the U.S. of its historic share of the EEC

market.

As Ross Talbot explains, this stalemate allowed

the chicken export issue "to fester and irritate"

"'"'^
.

By the time the levy was in place at the end of July
19 62,

just before the Senate hearings opened on the TEA,

pressure had built for

a

major conflict.

The American Farm

Bureau Federation and the National Farmer's Union demanded
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that the EEC agree to maintain
America's share of the
German market.
The influential Institute of
American
Poultry industries, an amalgam of
chicken and egg producers
with offices in Washington, D.C. and
Frankfurt, West
Germany, mobilized producers and
congressmen to lobby
Kennedy for "fair-play" from Europe.
The subsequent visits
and mail to the White House from
poultrymen, delegations of
governors from 17 states, and chicken bloc
legislators were
considerable
The President surely felt the need to
take action

because, like textiles, the poultry industry
was centered
in the South.

The fact that chicken producers were free-

traders while textile manufacturers were protectionist
did
not matter.
Southern congressmen controlled key
committees, and thus much Kennedy legislation, and demanded

solutions to the chicken problem.

Cooley (D-NC)

,

for instance,

Congressman Harold

chairman of the House

Agriculture Committee, could tie up the beleaguered Kennedy
farm program indefinitely.

And no less than Ways and Means

Chairman Wilbur Mills, from one of the top chicken-

producing states, was

a

member of the poultry bloc.

He

warned Kennedy that the TEA would not pass if the President
failed to persuade the EEC to lower the CAP or give
adequate compensation.

Mills said that it was ridiculous

to grant Kennedy tariff reduction authority which later
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would be dissipated by bargaining
down the very barri ers
that the Common Market had raised
arbitrarily
In the Senate,

Democratic Senator

another administration ally and
Arkansan,
J.

William Fulbright, the powerful

chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, made known his
discontent. He scorned the EEC's farm
trade policy,
calling it "trade strangulation".
Joining Fulbright, who
was also a member of the Senate Finance
Committee, were
other key Southern Senate veterans who held
important
posts, such as Richard B. Russell (D-GA)
John L. McClellan
,

(D-Ark), Allen J. Ellender
AL)

.

(D-LA)

,

and John

J.

Sparkman (D-

Kennedy also expected pressure from Atlantic state

legislators, especially Maryland.

Interest groups worked

through inter-branch politics to achieve their aims.
Such concerted pressure sent White House aides

scampering to help the poultry industry.

Not that the

administration did not favor action; indeed Freeman,
Petersen, and Kennedy had been disappointed with EEC

agricultural policy at the Dillon Round and the restrictive
CAP.

Now they plotted an approach to Europe.

Not

surprisingly, Myer Feldman insisted on avoiding

congressional recriminations, and so opposed waiting until
the TEA passed before working out a bargain with the EEC.
He also ruled out appeals to the EEC, realizing the Six

would merely ignore them, and also turned down an option
calling for a meeting of Common Market agricultural
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ministers.

To bring
iy the
tne entT-rp.
enrire vvr
EEC to a conference table

to discuss unfair and untimely
European trade barriers,
furthermore, put Kennedy in an
uncomfortable spot.
Talks
would come on the heels of EEC
retaliation to the

inopportune American tariff hikes on
carpets and glass.
Instead, the President opted for a
bilateral approach by
sending a letter to German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer in
June 1962, before the poultry levy was
activated.

Kennedy's goal was not increased access but
to maintain
America's share of the EEC market. Basing his
request on
the fair-trade doctrine, Kennedy called the
levy "unfair
and inconsistent" with the principles of GATT
.

The fee

harmed Atlantic community relations and might doom
the TEA.
Kennedy warned that American disfavor of the EEC could
be

"an important adverse factor in the consideration of
the

Trade Bill now before Congress".

Noting the pressure from

Capitol Hill, he asked Adenauer to defer the imposition of
the levy from 30 July until, preferably, after passage of
the

TEA.^
Adenuaer's response was encouraging, but negative, due

to constraints on his options.

He promised to look into

the fee but that the EEC Commission determined the levy.
Indeed, on 20 July 1962, the Chancellor requested the

Common Market to lower poultry duties and maintain this
level until the end of the year.

The administration was

delighted; the State Department remarked that the German
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effort would at least "earn us
some credit in this matter"
with Congress.
The EEC Commission, resisting
pressure from
large farm organizations in Europe
to institute the fee at
the same level, authorized the
reduction in the German levy
subject to approval by the Bundestag.
Since German farmers
had considerable political influence
and sought to protect
their market, however, the parliament
never
acted.

The

poultry levy went into effect on schedule
on 30 July
1962.^°
Thus,

over the next year, the poultry issue erupted
into

the Chicken War.

The congressional poultry bloc

appreciated Kennedy's understandably limited actions
against the Common Market, and voted overwhelmingly for
the
TEA,

EEC.

choosing to take their hostility out instead on the

USDA Secretary Freeman met with EEC leaders and

futilely berated them for the levy.

in June 1963, the

chickens had made such an impact on diplomacy that Kennedy

raised it during his trip to West Germany, though the

President regretted the fact that the issue had become so
protracted.

But the conflict was not resolved until

December 19 63 when the United States retaliated, raising
tariffs amounting to $26 million on items that particularly

injured West Germany, France, and the Netherlands, the main

poultry protectionists.

2

At the very least, the Chicken War showed that the

future of expanding agricultural exports under the CAP was
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quite limited. By 1971, U.S. poultry
exports to the EEC
fell to less than one-fifth of
their high levels of 1962
and almost half of sales in 1959.
Though overall U.S. farm
exports to the Common Market rose in
value, they declined
as a percentage of EEC imports.
Thus, the U.S. did not
retain its historical share of access
commensurate to the
rise in total global farm imports into
the EEC.22 America
possessed a comparative advantage in chickens
but the Six
refused to trade fairly. Contrary to the
claims of the
hegemony school, the U.S. could not force Europe
to keep
the door open to exports despite persuasive
efforts and

ultimately, the threat and reality of retaliation.

The

issue indicated how far American strength had waned.
In general, most agricultural interests took the
same

expansionist position on trade as the poultry industry, but
their views did not mean they supported the TEA right down
the line.

For instance, the American Farm Bureau

wholeheartedly backed freer trade and greater access for
farm goods into the EEC.

But the Bureau, as an opponent of

government intervention in the economy, disliked the

Kennedy domestic farm program of subsidies and price
supports and the adjustment assistance provision and the
export subsidies in the trade bill.

The National Grange

and National Farmers Union backed trade expansion, too, as

did major export commodities, but there were enough
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discrepancies between them to confirm
the pluralism within
the farm sector.
For instance, the Farmers Union, a
family-farmer
oriented organization with import
-competing members,
advocated adjustment assistance in
opposition to the Farm
Bureau.
Other farmers hurt by imports flocked
to

Washington to complain, too.

Among those demanding

protection were livestock and dairy producers,
whose
legislators accounted for two-thirds of the

votes against

the TEA.

Also,

a

plethora of California specialty crop

farmers, Pacific fishermen, and vegetable and
fruit growers

from all over the nation opposed Kennedy.

Most

significant, cotton producers, who enjoyed a comparative

advantage and exported half their production abroad, backed
protection.

Cotton farmers feared losing the two-price

cotton subsidy which textilemen opposed, and denounced the

Farm Bureau's liberal trade stance.

Corporatism was not a trait among farmers in trade.
Some analysts questioned the utility of exporting to solve

the domestic farm surplus problem, asserting that overseas

markets only partly helped.

A Farm Bureau official

admitted he had a "damn tough job" of even interesting
farmers in the trade expansion goals of the TEA.

As Lauren

Soth writes, those who generalize about farm opinion stand
on "dangerous ground" 25
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Legislators were not immune from import
-competing farm
interest groups. Both senators from New
York claimed

that

their state sold only 1% of its produce
abroad, while
agricultural imports displaced workers.
The inflow of
strawberries could provoke noise from
congressmen from
several states, noted the TEA task force,
while

Representatives Al Ulman (D-OR) and Clair Engle
(D-CA)
pressed for restrictions on a host of non-basic
specialty
commodities.
The lumber bloc already pushed for
restraints, and Senator E.L. Bartlett sought to
limit fish
imports.

These legislators listened to the Western Growers

Association when it argued that "foreign trade should be
fair trade"

Kennedy expected, and received, however, solid support
from the farm bloc because of the TEA'

s

promise of export

benefits. The Farm Bureau delivered, for example, all but
one member of the Kansas delegation.

Kennedy did not buy

votes in the farm sector with special concessions, as he

had with textiles and lumber.

His inaction, wrote an

administration analyst, implied that he was willing to risk
losses in upcoming elections in agricultural districts in

order to gain them in industrial areas.

Yet farmers had

leverage over him through inter-branch pressure.

Indeed,

their demand for access abroad forced the President to
answer to Congress and plead, often in vain, with the EEC
for retaining or increasing U.S. farm exports.
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By doing

he most likely hoped to alleviate
his political
weakness xn the Midwestern farm
states, which he lost in
the 1960, before the next election. ^"^
so,

In the labor sector,

where,

contrary to farm states,

Kennedy's political stock was high,
he expected and
received solid support for the TEA.
But its backing came
with a price tag, qualifications, and
deep disagreement
with the business community.
It was also unclear if
workers recognized the importance of exports,
but they
certainly realized the effects of imports on
their jobs.

Administration and labor leaders exaggerated the
employment benefits of foreign trade, especially

in

lowering the jobless rate.

About 3.1 million workers,

nearly one-third of these farm labor, relied on
exports.
Thus,

13.2% of agricultural workers benefited from sales

abroad.

Yet,

only 5% of all non-government, non-

agricultural jobs and 7.7% of manufacturing workers

depended on exports.

As Vice-President George Harrison of

the AFL-CIO explained, since the percentage of employment

attributable to exports and imports (7.5%), as well as the
ratio of the GNP to foreign sales was so small, the U.S.
was not reliant on trade for domestic economic security.

Exports of merchandise created jobs, said Senator Albert
Gore

(D-Tenn.)

in assessing Kennedy's contention that

foreign sales were critical to domestic well-being.

But

exports were certainly not of such great magnitude that

a

reasonable increase could absorb
enough workers and lower
unemployment to an acceptable level,
^8
he concluded.

That the administration counted
on labor support for the
TEA stemmed not just from the
perception that more exports
would create jobs but from the cold
war views of AFL-CIO
President George Meany. A fervent ant
i- communist, Meany
linked liberal trade to a unified Atlantic
community joined
with the LDCs. The Soviet bloc was anathema;
he opposed,
for instance, inviting Moscow to agreem
to a code of fair
practices. For Meany, the foreign affairs
involved

capitalism versus communism.
Congress,

"in this struggle", he told

"the economic well-being of the free nations,
our

own included, is of paramount importance "^^
.

Security concerns aside, the AFL-CIO nevertheless made

adjustment assistance a condition of its support for
Kennedy. Because unions were one of his key political
bases, the President had to satisfy worker demands on trade

policy.

Big Labor had sided with all the Reciprocal Trade

Acts since 1934 as part of New Deal legislation.

But

unions signaled that without some form of unemployment

compensation to cushion workers after the TEA eliminated
the "no-injury" criteria, that is, little reliance on the

escape clause and peril points, they would oppose the bill.
The AFL-CIO even requested the retention of the no-injury

measures at the Democratic convention in 1960.
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Now, AFL-

CIO endorsement was "wholly
contingent upon inclusion of
these trade adjustment assistance
provisions"
Of course, this requirement was
not a burden on Kennedy.

He welcomed the AFL-CIO demand since
he had sought
adjustment assistance for the RTA of 1953
and made it a

centerpiece of his fair-trade doctrine under
the Trade
Expansion Act. AFL-CIO adamancy, however,
restricted his
flexiblity in changing parts of the provision
to suit

conservative, anti-labor industry leaders and
congressional
foes of adjustment assistance.

Labor intransigeance on adjustment assistance
indeed

posed a problem for Kennedy, since it sparked criticism
by
the business community as yet another dole for the welfare
state.

A reporter goggled at the rare sight of labor and

business leaders walking into the Capitol together when the
TEA hearings began, but the sight belied the tensions below
the surface in this expedient union against

protectionism. 31

Adjustment assistance laid bare the

fundamental schism between both sectors on societal values,
the role of government in the economy, and the continuation
of the New Deal.

These differences put in doubt the

corporatist view that a firm alliance existed between

business and labor.
The AFL-CIO issued, for instance, numerous statements

which took indirect jabs at the corporate "enemies of
progress", who claimed that the payments deficit resulted
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from high labor costs which priced
American goods out of
domestic and foreign markets. The
deficit, competiti on
abroad, and cheap imports were favorite
"fronts"
f or

"those" who advocated wage restraints
on U.S. labor, argued
labor leaders.
In reality, high wages permitted
workers to
buy more goods, so boosting corporate
profits and mutually

benefiting everyone.

"Honest businessmen and bankers" knew

that feeble salesmanship by industry explained
the lack of
exports and the persistent def icit
Economic and
.

ideological differences caused a pluralistic divergence

among these societal interests.

Pluralism existed within the labor movement as well.
Some unions opposed freer trade, and though small in
number, they were influential.
joiners,

Unions of carpenters and

shoemakers, potters, and glass and textile workers

rejected the AFL-CIO stand on liberal trade.

Higher

tariffs and the textile program showed the protectionist

influence of the latter two on the Congress and Kennedy.
The 1.7 million member Teamsters brotherhood also expressed

"serious reservations" about the trade bill, viewing it as
a

major departure from other RTAs

.

The TEA made "no

provision for fair trade" by equalizing international wages
or eliminating non-tariff barriers.

Like many others, the

union accused Kennedy of inconsistency with his more

protectionist Senate record. 33
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In sum,

workers were not "free traders in
the usual
sense", as Solomon Barkin of the
Textile Workers Union
explained.
Labor support was highly qualified,
both by an
insistence on adjustment assistance and
a demand by some
unions for protection for industries which
suffered market
disruption.
Kennedy recognized and acted on these

propositions, and won the majority to liberal
trade.

As

Meany contended, "I would support any legislation
that
would be helpful to our country's position in the

world,

and at the same time find some way to help protect
our own
workers". 34 Such was the fair-trade balance necessary
to

win labor's support.
The fair-trade compromise ran into more opposition from

the business community, where protectionism held its
ground.

Manufacturers were at odds with labor and the

administration on trade and other issues to the point where
a

partnership of private interests with the government was

unworkable.

But the factor that stands out in the business

community perspective is the pervasive influence of
protectionism.

Unlike agriculture and labor, Kennedy

struggled to convince industrialists of export
opportunities abroad.

In the end,

he marshalled the

strength of congressional liberal traders to dampen down
protectionism.
As scholar Robert A. Dahl discovered, pluralism on trade
was prevalent in the two major business organizations, the

united States Chamber of Commerce and
National Associati on
of Manufacturers (NAM)
A spokesman for local merchants
and trade, business, and professional
.

associations, the

Chamber consisted of export industries
as well as importcompetitors.
This variation explained why the
Chamber had
always supported the RTA but only with the
inclusion
of

protectionist safeguards.

In 1962,

the organization's vote

on its resolution for the TEA provoked a
stormy session.

Protectionists blocked endorsement of the bill and
united
against adjustment assistance as an answer to import
injury.

The Chamber's board of directors managed to

reverse some votes and win support for Kennedy, but many

members agreed with Monsanto'

s

Thomas

J.

Dewey that such a

"wide diversity" existed within the Chamber that no policy

statement should be made at all.

in the end,

the one

Chamber reservation, in conflict with Kennedy, concerned
federal funding for adjustment assistance
NAM, the voice of Big Business,

"^^
.

remained neutral.

Split

between export- and import -competitors and firms with no
interest whatsoever in foreign trade, this 22,000 member

organization had maintained a consistent neutrality since
the 1940s.

Rejecting both extremes of free trade and

protectionism in fair-trade fashion, NAM hoped for expanded
trade but not at the expense of domestic producers.

Officials doubted that liberal trade was advantageous to

America since it opened up domestic markets to competitive
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forces.

But its neutrality was so
deep-rooted that NAM'

Economic Advisory Committee routinely
discussed all facets
of foreign economic policy except
tariffs, to which it left
the "widest discretion" to its membership.
Though not
promulgating an official resolution on
the TEA, NAM firmly
opposed adjustment assistance, sought a
one year extension
of the RTA, and desired to reduce
presidential authority
over tariff s."^^
The cold to lukewarm reception to the
trade program from

NAM and the Chamber showed not only variation
within the
private sector between industry, labor, and
agriculture,
but discord between business and the administration.

Recent scholarship on the 1960s draws the picture of

a

president who was the consummate "corporate liberal",

vigorously pursuing tax and trade policies which assured
corporate hegemony in the domestic and foreign economy.

in

reality, the President encountered much resistance from

private interests, a condition borne out by the steel price
crisis, tax and investment policy, and resistance to his

trade bill.

And,

as Jim Heath notes,

even when agreement

occurred, Kennedy acted not for businessmen but in the

national interest of updating and invigorating the
economy 37
No doubt a substantial portion of the business community
fell in behind Kennedy's call for freer trade.

Transportation, consumer goods, and heavy machinery

manufacturers joined banks and insurance
companies in
stressing the "amazing opportunities"
which were opening up
in Europe for exports.
The liberal CNTP and the Committee
for Economic Development, a political
think-tank, added to
these forces. Producers and service industries
sought an

end to the "vicious circle" of trade
restrictionism for
diplomatic reasons, but the profit motive served
as a major
catalyst.
Take away the national income derived from
exports and imports, commented an industrialist, and
the

cushion between profit and loss would be eliminated.
Even among such capital intensive enterprises, however,
the support was mixed in its intensity and diverse in its
reasoning.

One trend was clear:

the TEA represented

a

"sweeping change" in business attitudes away from

protectionism and toward liberal trade, said business
analyst Gene Bradley.

The urge to export and invest abroad

converged in the early 1960s to build this enthusiasm.

For

many, though, tariffs were not important. Automakers like

Chrysler Corporation, for instance, admitted that road and
other taxes doubled the price of their cars in Europe, so a
duty cut of even several hundred dollars would make little

difference in sales.

tariff cuts were not

Aircraft giant Boeing remarked that
a

concern since most of its foreign

and domestic buyers were government -owned and would pay any
price. 39

These firms backed the TEA, but not actively.

I
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other rising industries were not
so forthcoming.
Political scientist James Lindeen found
in his survey of
testimony in the RTAs since 1934 that
the more competitive
the producer, the more inclined toward
liberal
trade.

Yet

some firms seemed apathetic to the
free-trade cause.
The
CNTP reported several members were
delinquent in donating
to the organization, including Texaco,
Coca-Cola, American

Radiator and Standard, and F.W. Woolworth.

Still other

multinationals, such as Caterpillar Tractor, were
concerned
with exports but more with maintaining subsidiaries
overseas.

And competitive, high technology industries in

the chemicals, coal, steel, and aluminum sectors
straddled
the fence between the TEA and protectionism.
The products of the fast-growing electronics industry,

for instance, with export sales accounting for 6% and $613

million of its output, would fall under the dominant
supplier provision of the TEA and therefore enjoy free
access into the Common Market.

But the industry predicted

that European advances in technology and production would
soon squeeze out American competitors like Westinghouse
Anyway, the main market for radios, televisions and semi-

conductors was at home, claimed manufacturers.

Thus, the

Electronics Industries Association issued a resolution
calling for trade restrictions which disappointed the

administration and enraged the CNTP.

Because Japanese

imports threatened domestic production, electronics
321

manufacturers requested a cotton
textile-type quota
agreement to limit these products, the
retention
of

existing protectionist devices in the
TEA, and additional
enforcement measures.
Here was a capital-intensive
industry that turned inward as well as
outward.
This tnedency also showed up in the
chemical industry.
On the surface, this industry was a prime
candidate for the
export club. With 6% of sales going overseas,
chemical
manufacturers ranked fifth in total sales and
fourth in
assets among all American producers and boasted
a growth
rate that was three times the national average.
They

accounted for 8.7% of U.S. exports in 1961, grossing
$1.7
billion, while imports amounted to less than $400 million.
Not only did exports more than quadruple imports, but total

trade had climbed over the $2 billion mark beginning in
1960 and continued to rise.

Market surveys predicted rapid

growth in investment and trade, especially in competitive
but capital-starved Western Europe.

chemical industry played so heavy
trade", proclaimed Chemical Week

Chemicalmen were

a

a

"Never before has the

role in the U.S. export

.

paradox, however.

Their knee-jerk

reaction against imports dominated the industry's trade
stance.

Strident protectionism stemmed from the struggle

against German dye manufacturers who had dumped their

products on the American market just after World War
nearly destroyed the fledgling chemical industry.
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and

In order

to protect its infant industry
against powerful German
concerns, the U.S. raised tariffs and
introduced the

American Selling Price (ASP) method of
customs valuation in
1922.
Reinforcing the prohibitive 60% chemical
rates of

the Fordney-McCumber tariff, the ASP
standard undercut the
price advantage of foreign manufacturers
in organics (dyes)
by basing duties on the current American
price of chemicals
instead of the value of the goods. While high
tariffs fell

over the next

40

years, the ASP remained intact and limited

organics imports to 20% of their potential in the
American
market
The revival of British and EEC chemical cartels, soon
to

be united under the Common Market, exacerbated American

fears of destructive competition.
Italy,

West Germany, France,

and Great Britain had experienced tremendous growth

in chemical production since the late 1950s and as a

result,

cut into America's global share of markets.

Despite the boom in U.S. production. Western European
output rose one-third higher.

Free-traders pointed to the

huge surplus of exports over imports, but chemicalmen

predicted

leveling off of overseas sales and a six-fold

a

jump in imports.

Manufacturers hoped Kennedy would

increase access for chemicals in Europe, while protecting
less competitive sectors 44 The industry was ready for some
-,

.

.

.

.

fair-trade persuasion.
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Influencing chemical producers in
this direction proved
to be a difficult task, though,
and one compounded by
differences between the industry and
the administration on
trade and other matters. Manufacturers
were content but
not enthusiastic about the new export
credit guarantee
program, for instance.
The program, administered by U.S.
insurance companies in agreement with the
Export -Import
Bank,

issued coverage for financial institutions
which
granted credit to exporters. Since their main
European
markets were low-risk trade areas, chemicalmen
were not in
dire need of the program. Kennedy's approach to
business
also revealed the rifts.

His confrontational rollback of

steel prices in May 1962 upset chemical leaders, as did
the
lack of more liberal depreciation allowances to help plant

modernization. 45
Kennedy'

s

plans to change the overseas investment tax

deferral privilege was another point of discord.

Corporations did not pay federal tax until earnings of

their subsidiaries were remitted to the parent company.
But Kennedy sought to tax subsidiaries in order to

discourage investment and slow the outflow of capital which

worsened the payments deficit.

Between 1957-1960, capital

investment in Europe and Canada exceeded the dividends

remitted to the parent company by $655 million.

Kennedy

withdrew the plan under industry and congressional
pressure, but his action angered chemicalmen, who claimed
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that producing at home was
expensive compared to the
advantages of cheaper labor,
transportation, and
manufacturing costs in Europe. They
could compete in the
EEC only by skirting around the
common external tariff to
set up plants in Europe.
Putting this view into practice,
the industry set up 55 new plants in
Europe from
1957 to

1962 and increasing the output of American
subsidiaries by

Export expansion was not the industry's
top

84%.

concern

Kennedy and producers were also at odds on
trade.
the Dillon Round, the Synthetic Organic
Chemical

Manufacturers Association (SOCMA)

,

At

backed by the industry's

trade organization, the Manufacturing Chemists
Association
(MCA)

,

revolted when many chemical products appeared on the

list of goods eligible for tariff cuts.

Demanding higher

tariffs instead, the MCA remarked that the list looked like
it had been prepared by foreigners eager to enter the U.S.

market.

Chemical Week cautioned against such sarcasm, but

implored negotiators to remember that "there is no stigma

attached to considering U.S. interests ".

'^'^

The Dillon Round provoked animosity over chemical trade
on both sides of the Atlantic.

Charges of chemical dumping

flew both ways in late November 1961; the EEC protested the

flood of U.S. polyethylene while Americans denounced cheap
imports of antibiotics from Europe.

A British producer

called Americans "two-faced" because they wished to sell
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without reciprocally lowering
chemical protection.
The ASP
standard was particularly nettlesome
because it more than
doubled the price of European chemical
products.
Anyway,

argued the Europeans, the reasons
for American
protectionism in chemicals had disappeared
long ago since
other products had assumed a much
greater export
significance in trade than those covered
by the ASP
system. 48

Americans were accurate, however, in claiming
that the
EEC had higher chemical tariffs than the
United
States.

Senator Paul Douglas, for instance, called
European tariffs
"astronomical" and "unrealistic", and urged their
reduction.

In the end,

the EEC included chemicals in its

initial tariff cut offer at the Round, but withdrew

concessions on products that it considered too heavily

restricted in America and on which the U.S. had refused to
negotiate.

The U.S. still got the better deal, receiving

244 cuts valued at $203 million on chemicals while granting
80 concessions worth $25 million and retaining the ASP."^^

U.S. producers won their protectionist cause.

Despite the gains, the Round left chemicalmen with a bad
taste for the Kennedy trade program.

Even before the TEA,

they girded themselves for one of their "stiffest battles

with the government in years" over tariff policies.
Linear, or sectoral, tariff cuts, would leave them in

"complete uncertainty" in future negotiations and
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discourage development of new, but
vulnerable, products.
Other spokesmen accepted tariff
reductions as long
as

Kennedy did not water down the escape
clause and peril
point provisions, which he in fact did.
in stiff
opposition were synthetic organic producers,
who predicted
an evisceration of the ASP valuation
if the TEA passed
Congress.^^
Diverse enough opinion on the TEA ran through
the ranks
of the chemical industry to make a
statement of policy
impossible.

But there was no doubt that regardless of
the

"split personality" of exporters and militant

protectionists, the industry leaned toward more
restrictions.

Welcoming the bill were executives of

American Cyanamid, Cabot Corporation, Pfizer International,
and Baird Chemical, who confidently predicted that U.S.

chemical products could penetrate the EEC.

Others,

such as

Reichhold Co. and National Distillers and Chemicals were
resigned to the inevitablity of tariff cuts as long as they
were gradual. 51

Opposition to the bill was overwhelming, however, and

much resistance came from chemical giants who were major
exporters.

Dow Chemical and Monsanto, both with

volume of foreign sales, opposed the TEA.

a

high

Dow wanted

"reasonable" controls on imports and saw a "definite peril"
to employment and research from liberal trade.

Monsanto

actually proposed a five-point program designed around
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item-by-item reductions.

Criticizing the TEA for its lack

of insurance for true reciprocity,
Monsanto spokesmen took
their cue from founder Edgar Queeny's
40-year old stress on

protectionism, which still prevailed in
the company. ^2
Dupont's exports comprised 6% of total

sales, yet the

dye and chemical division dominated policy.

Vowing to

"fight for our very existence", dyemakers
pushed President

Crawford Greenewalt to offer four amendments
to the TEA
which would safeguard their interests. These
measures
strengthened the escape clause and retained the
peril
point, eliminated adjustment assistance, and
assured

reciprocity in negotiations in which industry advisors

would be present.

Dupont supported Senator Prescott Bush's

protectionist amendments, but much of the industry

predicated support for the TEA on the Dupont amendments
Protectionists translated their views to the major trade
associations.

As expected, synthetic organic producers

denounced the bill as a "reckless" piece of legislation
that squandered U.S. economic strength.

As of March 1962,

moreover, the MCA, representing 182 producers who accounted
for 90% of chemical sales, edged toward a revised TEA

instead of defeat or acceptance of the bill in its present
form.

Indeed, Chairman Robert Semple sided with export

promotion as

a

goal in commerce and, like Kennedy, sought

to establish "fair trade rules so that the U.S.

manufacturer operating abroad has an equal break with the
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foreign competition delivering his
products to our
shores".
Semple backed the Dupont amendments
to the TEA
and opposed giving the President more
authority, and
Congress less, over tariff s.'^^
The MCA position concerned the Kennedy
forces which,
like the CNTP, had predicted that all
chemicalmen except
for organics would be at the "vanguard of
liberal trade".

Petersen told the MCA that the industry was a
model of the
laws of comparative advantage: it possessed
substantial
investment capital, cheap raw materials, and enviable

production and marketing efficiency to exploit overseas
markets.

Imports were negligible, moreover, accounting for

only 5% of U.S. consumption.^^
The President reiterated this message during a visit of

MCA officials to the White House on

9

April 1962.

Semple

accompanied General John Hull, President of the MCA and
former aide to General George

C.

Marshall, to discuss

chemical issues, including the four Dupont amendments and

retention of the ASP system.

Kennedy promised to take the

four amendments under "earnest consideration" and make a

careful determination of which chemical items to reserve

from the "zero" list at the negotiations under the dominant

supplier clause, the provision of the TEA which eliminated
duties on products in which the U.S. and the EEC accounted
for

8

0% or more of world trade.

Upon the advice of

Petersen, the President also pledged to retain the crucial
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ASP.

Though he was disappointed at the
industry's
intransigeance, Kennedy agreed not
"to disturb" the
chemical sector. Hull later thanked
Kennedy and Semple
gave qualified approval to the TEA,
but surely, as Petersen
aide Myer Rashish concluded, the
industry was "one of those
squeaky wheels that get the grease".

Kennedy relied on Congress to deal with
the chemical
industry.
When organics producers complained, Wilbur
Mills
called Carl Gerstacker, SOCMA chairman and
Dow
President,

selfiish.

Exports way above imports for the industry as

whole. Mills noted,

a

so inefficient sectors must adjust or

bow under to competition for the good of all chemicalmen.
Congressman Sidney Yates (D-Ill.) asked producers to look
at the export origin study by the Commerce Department
to

discover how beneficial chemical exports were for every
state.

To Kennedy's relief. House and Senate conferees

refused to attach the Dupont amendments to the TEA.^^
Interest groups failed to move Congress.
In the end,

administration allies in Congress secured

the chemical industry for the TEA.

Though Chemical Week

was resigned to "make the best" of the TEA, for instance,
the journal conceded that the legislation had a "silver

lining" since it would lower EEC restrictions on U.S.
exports. 59

The interaction reflected more interest group

politics than inter-branch relations, as Congress fended
off pressure from organic producers and convinced the rest
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of the industry of the advantages
of reduced tariffs.

Free-trade legislators also took up
the TEA banner for the
President and fought chemical
protectionists.
The promise of lower tariffs and
increased exports came
true in the Kennedy Round.
Subject to congressional

approval of a complex agreement eliminating
the ASP
standard, the EEC, United Kingdom, and
other chemical
importers would drop duties by 4 9%.
The accord hinged on
an American pledge to reduce by half its
tariff on chemical
products.
The industry and Congress later balked
at the
arrangement, but exports and total foreign sales
to the EEC
continued to rise throughout the decade. Such were
the
results of Kennedy's onerous push for fair-trade for
an

industry that to most observers seemed

a

confirmed liberal

trader. ^°

Other manufacturers showed a similar resistance, some an
indifference, to the Kennedy trade program.

Many

businessmen demonstrated a reluctance to accept tariff
reductions which might hurt fellow producers.

Some refused

to speak out publicly for the TEA out of a fear of risking

boycotts from Americans injured by imports.
apathetic.

Others were

Elmo Roper pollsters found that though most

sided with Kennedy, only 27% of the 500 largest

corporations answered their survey.

A Research Institute

of America survey of 30,000 businessmen found 57% in favor
of the TEA but one-quarter against and 17.3% undecided.

At

the local level, of 262 industrialists
polled in Cleveland,
Ohio, 164 opposed or had no
opinion on the bill.
Finally,
a Business Week sampling of
150 executives found fully onehalf undecided but concerned about
the effects of the TEA
on local industry, and the other
half split between
supporters and opponents of the bill. a
"solid minority"
of opposition, in Heath's words, when
added to fencesitters, revealed the diversity in the
business sector.
In many cases, the administration
failed to convince

U.S. businessmen to become export -minded.

Lumbermen, for

instance, sent a trade mission to Europe in
1963 and

considered gearing production according to foreign
specifications.

Yet giants Georgia-Pacific and Weyerheuser

remained skeptical of exporting.
in general,

U.S.

labor and management

admitted Kennedy, remained "largely

unconcerned" about opportunities abroad.

Only a handful of

companies, he told some bankers in February 1963, gave the

export market "the attention it deserved" because they

thought the risks were greater than the potential benefits,
the profit margin for exports was much less than that of
the domestic market, and foreign restrictions limited
sales. 62

Conflict between the administration and the private
sector, moreover, outnumbered the agreements.

Kennedy

playfully but accurately told NAM that the organization was
not one of his staunchest supporters.
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Though comfortable

with a labor audience, he also
had disputes with uni ons
over wage-price guidelines.
addition, many agricultural
interests opposed his farm program.
Businessmen abroad,
such as a member of the International
Chamber of Commerce,
noted the close relationship of
governments to the private
sector in other countries but adinitted
that a similar

m

relationship in America was "more difficult
to achieve".
Erecting bridges between business and
government was an aim
that the President found taxing and often
unfruitful.

To overcome hostility or apathy to his
trade policy,

Kennedy banked on muffling protectionist
legislators with
concessions but also looked to a "liberal trade"
bloc in
Congress for help.
This bloc is hard to identify
since

many of its members remained silent in order to avoid
arousing import-competitors in their districts.

One

unidentified midwestern congressman perceived little
political gain in voting for the TEA but recognized the
need for new trade legislation to meet the Common Market.
Yet he preferred to cast his vote with Kennedy and then

"keep quiet about it and hope nobody notices".

Other liberal traders in Congress were bolder, such as
the 22 congressman who wrote Kennedy urging an aggressive

bill because trade liberalization helped more than it hurt.
This group was indicative of support he could expect from

legislators representing major exporting states, such as
California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New
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York,

and Texas, many of which he had
won in the elect on
and expected to win in 1964. He
counted on
farm-stat^.e

votes, too,

for the TEA, and hoped for their
support in

Guarding against defections within
these states, and
to offset the sizable protectionist
forces, the President
also welcomed recent converts won over
by concessions on
textiles, lumber, oil, and carpets and glass
1964.

The heart of the pro-Kennedy forces was

bipartisan

a

segment on Capitol Hill which looked beyond local

conditions to the national and international interests.
Like the President, they recognized that a trade war
with

Europe or failure to reverse the payments deficit would
impair America's strength in the cold war.

Kennedy's

diplomatic scheme for American-European relations,

a

Grand

Design which promoted an Atlantic partnership between the
Common Market and the United States, appealed to them.
Indeed, the idea of an Atlantic partnership had been

enunciated many years before and most recently by
Eisenhower in response to the rise of the EEC.

The

partnership meant that the U.S. accepted Europe as

a

decision-maker on matters pertaining to the Atlantic
alliance.

Since trade legislation was the only expression

of the partnership available, trade policy became the

testing ground for the Grand Design.

Equality was based on

two commercial partners of the same strength.
"pillars", one American, the other European,
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Two

joined by the

common purpose of trade liberalization
under the TEA,
seemed a real possibility.^^
The Grand Design implied that America
was no longer the
sole great power in the West and that
the country must

orient itself toward cooperative, and
not unilateral,

endeavors in foreign economic policy.

toward this end.

The OECD was a start

As the President wrote one journalist,

"We have sought among our European allies
not a band of

followers, but a strong partnership capable of
sharing with
us the leadership" of the West.^"^

The concrete forms of the partnership remained
vague,

and many of its proponents erroneously tended to think
that
the EEC would logically and easily accept the idea.

The

concept was glamorous as a call to unite the West, and

Europe responded generally in favor.

The full integration

of the EEC was a requisite for the partnership to succeed.
To the administration, this aim hinged on whether Britain

entered the Common Market.

For Charles de Gaulle and other

suspect Europeans, this reliance on Britain raised again
the specter of U.S. infiltration into European affairs

using London as a disguise.

Did the partnership cloak

Kennedy's intention of preserving U.S. dominance at the
expense of a truly European Common Market, they asked?

Yet

EEC officials, such as Commission President Walter
Hallstein, Vice-President Robert Marjolin, and others said
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that a partnership would avert
protectionism on both sides
of the Atlantic.

Kennedy emphasized that the EEC had
instigated
more equitable relationship among the
Atlantic

a new,

powers.

his "Declaration of Interdependence"
on July

4,

1962,

In
a

statement directed at foreign as much as
domestic
listeners, he explained the Grand Design.

The speech

summed up his view of Europe's place in his
fair-trade
ideology by stressing American-European trade
"on a basis
of full equality".

Kennedy recognized that the "cement" of

healthy U.S. -EEC relations did not depend on
complete
agreement on all political and economic matters.

The

United States did not aim "to please all of our European
allies", but only wanted "the benefits of this kind of

union to be shared".

7n

Basically, Kennedy knew that the era of U.S.

predominance was over and his Grand Design sought to
redress the economic balance-of -power in ways acceptable to
all.

The EEC was a trade rival, and the idea of an

Atlantic community to keep Europe open to American goods
and preempt Gaullist nationalism took on a greater urgency

than ever before.

Indeed, as Ball explained, any U.S.

trade disadvantages incurred because of Europe would be

more than offset by the increased volume of trade under a
free-trade regime.

Under the TEA, America would enter

trade negotiations with Europe which would create, as
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Kennedy exclaimed,
known

...

"the greatest market the world has
ever

trillion dollar economy, where goods
can move
freely back and forth. "'^'^
a

Defense imperatives underlay this goal.

administration hoped that

a

The

trade partnership would spread

to aid and military spheres, as Europe
assumed more of the
financial burden while the U.S. shared decision-making

power in nuclear policy.

Without the TEA, however, the

economies of Europe and America would drift apart,
fissure which the Soviets would gladly exploit.

Moscow feared

a U.S.

a

Above all,

-EEC front which would enhance European

integration, build up the Atlantic economy, strengthen
NATO,

and turn its full attention to the LDCs, reported

Roger Hilsman of the State Department.
of U.S. foreign policy,

Thus, the success

added Kennedy, relied on trade to

solidify Western political unity.

A partnership would

frustrate communist hopes for a capitalist trade war and
fund the military deterrent of the alliance, thereby

dooming Soviet "efforts to split the West" to "failure".
Thus,

said Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell

to Congress,

L.

Gilpatric

"while defense provides the essential security

of the alliance, trade provides the substance." 72

Understanding the relationship of the TEA to national
security, liberal traders in Congress pushed for the TEA.

Senator Fulbright reiterated that

more than a dream, it was

a

a

trade partnership was

necessity in the cold war.
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trade war with Europe, warned Senator
Vance Hartke (Dind.), would "only delight the
communists".
Congressman
John R. Lindsay (R-NY) claimed that
Soviet encroachment in
the LDCs and America's need for raw
materials were reasons
enough for a free-trade program. Rep.
William S. Moorehead
(D-PA) argued that winning the cold war
outweighed the
consideration of economic injury to America.
"Much more
[was]

at stake" than U.S. employment and expansion,

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-NY).

added

The TEA addressed "the

economic strength and military power of the nations

confronted today by
challenge

a

massive and multi-faceted Soviet

""^^
.

If the cold war lay at the ideological base of the TEA,

the fair-trade doctrine emerged as the practical foundation
of support for the bill.

Critical to passage were

amendments, worked out by House and Senate conferees, which

ensured

a

liberal trade bias but satisfied congressmen

worried about injury.
effort.

Wilbur Mills spearheaded this

He tacked on a change in congressional veto power

over presidential escape clause decisions from two-thirds
to merely a majority vote.

Also, the President could not

reduce tariffs for five years on items which the Tariff

Commission deemed injured by imports.

In addition,

the TEA

provided for a bipartisan delegation of two House and two
Senate members to accompany the new Special Representative
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for Trade Negotiations

talks

(STR)

to the upcoming tariff

'^^
.

The creation of the Special Trade
Representative was the
most novel of the fair-trade amendments.
This official,

working out of the White House, would
preside over a
revamped committee within the administration
charged with
formulating trade policy, thereby replacing
the State

Department as chief negotiator at GATT

While Rusk and

.

Ball grudgingly accepted the position, the
Commerce

Department and Kennedy supported it as

a

concession to

Congress and the business community, both of which had

previously accused the State Department of being too
generous with tariff reductions.

Upon the advice of Ball

and others, the President selected ailing former Secretary
of State Christian A. Herter as STR.

Some disagreed with

the choice; Congressman Henry Reuss (D-Wis

.

)

wanted someone

capable of confronting the EEC "who smokes a cigar without

lighting it and doesn't smile very often", rather than the
genteel Herter. 75

Washington as
deputy.

a

Yet Herter hoped to spend more time in

coordinator, leaving the bargaining to his

Congress was happy when

Thus,

J.

Michael

Blumenthal, a seasoned, tough negotiator who Ball had

tapped to forge difficult international commodity
agreements (including the GATT cotton textile accords)

became Herter'

s

man in Geneva.

76
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Ironically, the most significant
defeat for ardent
liberal traders came from the administration
itself.

Predicting British failure to join the
Common Market,
Congressman Reuss and Senator Douglas
proposed an amendment
to extend the dominant supplier provision,
to eliminate
tariffs on items in which the U.S. and EEC
provided 80% of
world trade, to the British-led, seven-member
European Free
Trade Association. Noting that Britain had a
hand in most
of the products covered by the provision, the
Douglas-

Reuss amendment allowed for the cuts regardless of
EEC
action
The amendment sparked a dispute between the two

legislators and the administration.

Ball opposed the

measure, fearing that the EEC would interpret it as an

interference in the delicate UK-Common Market talks.

Other

officials believed that by supporting the provision, the
U.S. would signal that it had lost confidence in Britain's

chance to join the EEC.

Reuss and Douglas retorted that

America had already injected itself into the talks by
siding with British entry.

Howard Petersen disagreed,

arguing that the U.S. had not urged Britain's application
and that anyway, the dominant supplier was the best means
to achieve a true Atlantic partnership.

In any event,

Gaulle crushed the hope for zero duties by rejecting

British membership in 1963. 77
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The ardent liberal traders in
Congress were thus victims
of international policy beyond their
control, but on

Capitol Hill, they succeeded in winning
the TEA without
vitiating its ability to bargain down
tariffs with the
Common Market.
Crucial to this outcome was the defeat
of
37 crippling protectionist amendments authored
by Senator
Bush that would have eliminated adjustment
assistance,

boosted import restrictions on farm products, and
restored
the "no-injury" criteria by reinstating the peril
point and
escape clause procedures.

The amendments, believed the

administration, would have "nullified" the TEA.
Regardless, when the votes were tallied, Kennedy racked up
the fifth highest total in the House and accumulated the

most votes ever in the Senate on the 12 votes on reciprocal

trade legislation since 1934."^^
Congressional liberal traders helped Kennedy coax other
legislators and amenable elements of the private sector

toward acceptance of tariff reductions.
President worked out
of exporters,

a

Congress and the

bill suitable to the disparate band

import-competitors, and a vast segment of the

population who cared or knew little about foreign markets.
Senator Eugene

T.

McCarthy (D-Minn.) summed up the bill

accurately the day it passed the Senate.
reality, a 'fair trade' bill.

The TEA was,

"in

Its aim is to insure those

conditions around the world which will foster and guarantee
the age-old right to exchange goods and services in a free

and open market place.

It is designed to protect the

American businessman in his right to compete
fairly around
the world [while] it protects American
workers
and firms

from unfair competition".'^^

Kennedy had completed

a

grueling campaign for his top

priority legislation of 1962.

Placating key protectionists

had been especially hard, but luring exporters by
a pledge
to increase their access access abroad was another
burden

necessary to win the bill.

Along the way, convincing

Americans of the importance of foreign trade, stirring
their enthusiasm for exports, and steering them away from
the domestic marketplace and toward an interest in economic

opportunities abroad had been particularly wearisome.

He

was not always successful in these tasks, as the general

apathy or sizable opposition to the TEA, recalcitrance from

exporting industries, or disagreements with big trade
associations showed.

A sure win for the TEA had not been assured back in
January because of the divisions and opposition within the

private sector.

Not only were protectionists resistant to

the bill, but the President could not count on a tight-knit

coalition of exporters in agriculture, labor, and business
to support him.

Many of these interests, in general,

leaned toward freer trade.

But intra- and inter-industry

divisions, a concern among multinationals more for their

subsidiaries abroad than for exporting, and the relative
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unimportance of exports to the U.S. economy,
even in parts
of the farm sector, rendered support
for the trade program
tepid or even neutral in many sectors.
Thus, Kennedy did not enjoy homogeneous
support for his

TEA within the private sector.

According to corporatism,

the linear or sectoral method of cutting
tariffs under the
TEA gave large sectoral "syndicates" control
over
decisions.

These associations supposedly united to decide

trade policy administratively, that is, "outside

parliamentary channels".

Yet the existence of such a

coalition, and even such unity within each syndicate, is

questionable.

Export interests were Kennedy's best allies.

But they did not monopolize policy positions because of the

diversity between and within sectors.

They also did not

have a decision-making role in the trade process.
Instead,

in the politics of liberal trade. Congress

played a predominant part, though not mediatory as in the
textile, lumber, oil, and tariff cases.

The common purpose

of free-trade precluded any infighting within the Executive

branch; thus, the bureaucratic politics model is not

pertinent.

The interest group model also does not apply.

Exporters did not pressure Congress, like importcompetitors did, since they agreed with the substance of
the TEA.

When they did press Congress, such as during the

poultry episode, Kennedy was not forced to deviate from his
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free-trade position.

Chemicalmen did not deter him,

either, even as import -competitors
prescribed policy.
Instead, congressional liberal traders
joined Kennedy in
an inter-branch agreement.
The Reuss-Douglas dominant
supplier amendment signified that squabbling
existed

between Capitol Hill and the White House.

But a

significant portion of Congress backed liberal
trade,
uniting behind Kennedy's reasoning that the
nation's

security depended on an international free-trade
regime and
close cooperation with trade partners.
Once Kennedy lived
up to the protectionist side of his fair-trade
doctrine
by

aiding import -competitors
TEA.

,

liberal traders assured him his

An inter-branch accord, styled by the President's

foreign policy aims, determined the politics of free-trade.
Though compelling on economic grounds and as a political
tactic, the fair-trade doctrine alone did not induce

Congress to vote for the trade bill.

The national security

concerns of the administration and Congress did.

That is,

economic growth was an important reason for freeing global
trade, but had limited appeal in Congress where import

competitors were influential.

Instead, Kennedy placed the

TEA within the context of the cold war, urging approval in

order to reverse the balance-of -payments deficit and

preserve America's ability to finance its overseas
commitments
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His Grand Design in trade and defense
sought to unite
the allies under a free-trade regime
in order, ultimately,
to provide a solid front against Soviet
power.
Kennedy and
cold warriors in Congress, not domestic
economic interests,

pushed

a

liberal trade regime based on an Atlantic

partnership.

Thus,

the comparative-advantage school is

more accurate in explaining the motives and aims
of U.S.
trade policy than their hegemony counterparts.
Shrewd maneuvering and graceful rhetoric gave Kennedy

well-earned triumph.

a

For the President, the victory was

the go-ahead signal for much of his foreign policy agenda.

Upon signing the bill on 11 October 1962, he proclaimed
that the TEA was "the most important international piece of
legislation,

I

think, affecting economics since the passage

of the Marshall Plan."^"'-

This statement implicitly placed Europe as the key

target of the American trade program.

But as the President

later explained, the TEA was an opportunity not only for

advances in trade but for closer political relations with
Europe,

for boosting the economies of the less-developed

nations, and ultimately, for unifying the West in the cold
war.

With these broad goals in mind, Kennedy approached

the trade negotiations named in his honor.
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ROUND ONE TO EUROPE, 1963-1964

With the Trade Expansion Act secured,
Kennedy expected
world trade barriers to be lowered at the
sixth round of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)
dubbed
the Kennedy Round in recognition of his initiative.
,

Duty

rates were already low, but the TEA would ensure
the

European Economic Community's common external tariff
would
stay at a reasonable level.
Even better, pending British
entry into the Common Market, the dominant supplier

provision would eliminate tariffs on the many goods traded
between the EEC and the United States.

The provision would

bring expanded trade dividends for both sides and further
enhance the unity and strength of the Atlantic partnership.
The Kennedy Round became entangled in the divergent aims
of the U.S. and the EEC, however.

Trade problems between

the two had simmered since the disappointing end to the

Dillon Round, the Six's retaliation to the U.S. carpets and
glass tariff hikes, and the chicken war.

In diplomacy, the

stalled UK-EEC negotiations and French President Charles de
Gaulle's criticism of American foreign policy were only
some of the major irritants.

Underlying these problems, moreover, was an inherent
contradiction in American and EEC trade relations.
Washington had always encouraged European integration, but

unification wrought by the imposition of Common

Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the common
external tariff
meant trade discrimination against
outsiders.

EEC

integration served U.S. security objectives
yet conflicted
with free-trade. American negotiators
addressed
the

problem during the rule-making stage of the
Kennedy Round
in 1963 and 1964, the period following
passage of the TEA,

through the fair-trade doctrine.
In effect,

as the United States tried to wield the
new

powers of the TEA, the fair-trade doctrine came
directly
under attack by Europe. Prodded by de Gaulle,
the EEC

dominated the rule-setting stage of the negotiations.

In

order to protect its fledgling agricultural system from
U.S. penetration and adjust tariff structures which it

believed favored America, the Common Market frustrated
Washington's hopes for harmonious and fruitful preparation
for the Kennedy Round.

The conflict was a reflection of

heightened European trade leverage, and lessened U.S.
economic power, in the GATT regime.

Surely self-

interested, America nonetheless found Europe to be more so
The period before the actual bargaining occurred

pertains to the historiographical debate over trade policy

Hegemony scholars assert that the U.S., under domestic
pressure, sought rules which forced Europe to open up to

American exports by reducing EEC trade restrictions and
selfishly refused to lower its own barriers.

Comparative

advantage historians claim, however, that Washington
372

avoided the protectionism desired
by producers at home
while pursuing export expansion of
efficiently produced
goods (regardless of which side made
them) for the mutual
benefit of all traders.
in light of Europe's obstinate

policy in the early stages, the latter
school appears more
accurate
For the first time in GATT's history,
the 'contracting
parties had problems agreeing on rules. But
well before
this conflict, the EEC had showed signs of
dissent against
Kennedy's trade designs. Its Commission, the
Common

Market's institutional force, applauded the aims
of the Act
and accepted the Atlantic partnership in economic
affairs.
The less enthusiastic nationally-oriented Council
of

Ministers, which held the ultimate power in the EEC by

granting the Commission its negotiating mandate, supported
the linear method of cutting tariffs in broad sectors.

Its

members were apprehensive that large-scale cuts in duties
and non-tariff barrier (NTBs) might weaken the unity among
the Six, since an effective common external tariff and the

protectionist CAP were their basic link.

The conflict

between European integration and Atlantic free-trade was at
issue throughout the Kennedy Round.

More than any other EEC member, France singled out this
conflict as a prime consideration in trade policy.
Germany,

Italy,

West

and the Benelux countries generally shared

America's free-trade ideology and goals for the Round,

though German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
feared
"monstrous" influx of American goods. Above

a

all,

controlled the EEC Commission's trade policy.

de Gaulle

France hoped

to limit European concessions, noting that
America's trade
surplus with the Common Market might grow larger
if the Six

lowered their external tariff.

French Minister of Finance

Valery Giscard d'Estaing stressed cautious consideration
of
the dominant supplier provision, agriculture, NTBs,
and
the

"doctrine of integration" implied by the Atlantic

partnership

2

French attitudes became even clearer when de Gaulle
vetoed Britain's application for membership into the EEC on
14

January 1963.

The rejection undercut the TEA.

It also

had grave implication for the Grand Design of allied

military and economic unity, which de Gaulle (and hegemony
scholars) viewed as a scheme to extend American

predominance over Europe
De Gaulle scoffed at the Atlantic partnership, presuming

that as the Soviet threat abated, Europe would disengage

from America.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy

showed that the allies would not be consulted in an
emergency, and de Gaulle further doubted America's will to

defend Europe.

Paris sought both a European nuclear "third

force" to offset the two Superpowers and closer relations

with West Germany by planning a treaty of friendship.

London's acceptance of American control over NATO's nuclear
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force in December 1962 in exchange
for U.S. Polaris
missiles convinced him that Britain
was more loyal to
Washington than an independent Europe.
The EEC now might
be weakened by the Americophile Britain.
De Gaulle decided
to stop Britain from "dragging the West
into an Atlantic
system" under U.S. domination."*

Franco-American economic relations affected this
opposition to the Atlantic partnership. Concerned

about

U.S.

investments in European subsidiaries and firms,
French
industrialists complained that their small enterprises

could not compete with large-scale American manufacturers.
The TEA portended an invasion of cheap U.S. exports
and an

attack on EEC institutions such as the CAP.
the EEC's arable land, France was
CAP.

a

With 47% of

main beneficiary of the

Not surprisingly, therefore, Paris denounced USDA

Secretary Orville Freeman's criticism of farm protectionism
in Europe during his visit in November 1962.

De Gaulle

also feared Britain's support of less protectionist Holland

and West Germany, the latter at odds with French farm
policy, and thus encourage U.S. trade penetration.^

But if blame can be assessed on the U.S. for the veto,
it lay not in Kennedy's imperialistic ambition but in

misjudgement.

He mistakenly believed that Europe would

readily accept closer economic interdependence.
did not.
era,

De Gaulle

Arthur Schlesinger and historians studying the

asserted that de Gaulle voiced a growing European
375

sense of potency and desire for
independence.

indeed, he

tapped the pride of Europeans whose
enterprises had
contributed to the EEC's growth and
competitive vitality.
The Grand Design was also too
impressionistic, a vision
with few practical guidelines. As a
program, a
"common

pursuit of economic expansion" was vague
and provoked
suspicions about the self-interested goals of
the U.S. in
g
Europe
To a large extent, however, De Gaulle's
view of Europe

mainly determined his veto.

Initially opposed to the EEC,

he now aimed to control it.

Plotting Franco-German

domination of the Community, de Gaulle believed that
the
addition of another great power would alter this plan.
Once Britain

-

and presumably the rest of the EFTA

-

joined

the Common Market, and majority voting emerged by 1966,

there would be more votes against de Gaulle's policies than
for them.

7

The general did not look forward to these

prospects

Washington tried to remain aloof from the entire entry
issue, though the British,

several other EFTA nations, and

de Gaulle became aggravated by George Ball's overzealous

interest in the affair.

Kennedy supported Britain but

pledged cooperation with the Six in the event of
rejection.

8

a

De Gaulle gave him the chance to live up to

his word.
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On the whole, most nations reacted
against the veto.
Mostly the far Right and Left, who
fought for greater

independence from America, supported de
Gaulle.
Yet the
other members of the Common Market, joined
by European
integrationists such as Jean Monnet, Belgian
Foreign
Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, and EEC Commission
head Walter
Hallstein, agreed with the West German parliament
members
who called 14 January 1963 "a black day for
Europe".

A

majority of European politicians and businessmen
also

reaffirmed their support of the Atlantic partnership.
Still,

out of a desire to preserve the EEC and because

France was an important trade partner for weaker nations
such as Belgium and Italy, the Common Market members and
the EEC Commission were somewhat reluctant to confront de
Gaulle.

Across the Atlantic, the veto was seen as an affront to
U.S. policies and as an indication that the Grand Design

was rapidly "going down the drain".

Only arch-

protectionists applauded de Gaulle, since the veto vitiated
the TEA'S effectiveness in lowering American tariff

barriers

.

The White House and State Department wished to

avoid a shouting match with de Gaulle, but stressed that
the the General's policies were more damaging to France and

Europe than the United States.

Before a visit by

Hallstein, Ball insisted that the President make clear

America's aim of defending its trade interests and the

expectation that the EEC would remain
open and devoted to
free-trade.
Kennedy continued to emphasize that
he did not
want to influence or dominate Europe,
but merely opposed
European independence through protectionism.

Privately, he

wrote MacMillan that he held France
accountable for any
increase in restrictiveness in EEC trade
policy, which
"would be a disaster" for the alliance.
The effect of the veto was immediate on
the Kennedy

Round in nullifying the dominant supplier
provision.

Its

elimination prompted Congressman Henry Reuss and
Senators
Paul Douglas and Jacob Javits to propose anew
that
the

provision apply regardless of British membership.

They

criticized the administration for its obsession with the
Common Market, and especially with Britain's joining the
EEC,

instead of using the dominant supplier as

pursue the most-favored-nation principle.

a

tool to

Because of

Kennedy's "toadying" to Europe, said Reuss, tariffs could
be erased only on jet aircraft and margarine and America

had simply punished itself by making it impossible to

bargain effectively with the EEC.

The dominant supplier

amounted to "all sound and fury, signifying nothing".
Kennedy said he would accept the Douglas-Reuss amendment if
Congress did, but believed it was not essential to the

negotiations
Thus,

.

It never passed.

from the start, a gloom pervaded the preparation

for the Kennedy Round.

GATT Director Eric Wyndham White
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called for an early meeting of GATT
Ministers in order to
restore confidence in trade cooperation
after the veto.
Yet some U.S. officials took de
Gaulle's action as another
sign that America would encounter
much resistance in Europe
to its free-trade policy.
John K. Galbraith,
for instance,

argued that the trade talks would worsen
America's balanceof-payments deficit because agriculture would
fail to

penetrate the EEC and trade in manufactures
would favor
lower-cost European producers.
The administration
must

cease its "self-delusion" that tough bargaining
would open
up Europe to U.S. goods; instead, America should
raise its

trade barriers to reverse its balance-of -payments
deficit.

-"-^

Discussions in the White House showed that Kennedy had
also decided to get tougher.

At a cabinet meeting on

1

March 1963, he cautioned against a shouting match with de
Gaulle.

Yet,

the administration must now concern itself

with protecting America's own economic interests and
position.

Kennedy felt mounting pressure to take forceful

action from many sectors, notably poultry and wool, and

complained that he could not "keep running around" aiding
them because he would lose his effectiveness as a leader.
In response to de Gaulle, Kennedy announced that "the day

of free traders around this administration was over" and

that the STR, State Department, and White House must "sort
out our priorities" at the Kennedy Round.

1

The major priority, however, was
to avoid the

protectionism that Gailbraith suggested
because Kennedy had
plugged free-trade not only as a solution
to the deficit

but as a critical part of Western cooperation
and strength.
The deficit had worsened in 1962 by $5 million,
prompting
the President to bring in former Secretary of
State Dean

Acheson to iron out a coherent monetary policy,
propose an
interest equalization tax to cut down on foreign loans

and

an investment tax credit to help industries modernize.

He

also urged Americans to expand exports, arguing that
the

deficit could be brought into balance if exporters could

increase their sales just 10%.

White House aide Carl

Kaysen reminded the President that without an increase in
its trade surplus, the U.S. would have to reduce its

disproportionate share of military and economic
expenditures

''^
.

Thus, the fair-trade doctrine must be put

into practice to pry open overseas and American markets on
a

reciprocal basis in such

a

way as not to injure domestic

producers or incite nationalists like de Gaulle to raise

barriers unilaterally in Europe.
Thus,

diplomacy was central to U.S. policy at the

Kennedy Round.

The talks,

for Trade Negotiations

said the Special Representative

(STR)

Christian Herter's negotiating

chief W. Michael Blumenthal, were a test of "cooperation"
and the "sum and substance of a strong and vital Atlantic

alliance." 15

Failure at this largest and most ambitious
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Round in GATT's history, invited
divisive trade practices,
encouraged nationalism and regionalism,
and threatened the
alliance with destructive, 1930s-style
protectionism.
The
safeguard against such an outcome, explained
Herter'

deputy William Roth, was "trade liberalization
and
expansion which has contributed so greatly
to the buoyant
economies of the postwar industrialized world
and which
holds the greatest potential for rapid development
of the
emerging nations". Building a vibrant and unified
Western
bloc of nations was "what the Kennedy Round was
all
about"

.

While the level of the common external tariff was still
"malleable" and Europe enjoyed high growth and employment
rates, the U.S. attacked protectionism in Europe.

The

EEC's tariff reduced American exports, enabling inefficient
but politically powerful European producers to seize U.S.

markets in the region.
low,

If encouraged to keep their tariff

the Six would remain more open, permitting

sharing

a

of trade benefits by all nations on the basis of

comparative advantage and the fair-trade doctrine

"'"'^
.

Thus, the administration's initial policy was simple:

insist on halving tariffs in broad sectors

exceptions to this rule to a minimum)

,

(keeping

include "fair

access" for agriculture as an integral part of the

discussions, and recognize that the elimination of NTBs

involved politically-sensitive decisions.
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The U.S.

leverage to achieve these goals was its
large market,
knowledge that the EEC nations depended
on trade for their
economic health, and willingness to exchange
needed
industrial tariff concessions for cuts in
European

agricultural barriers.
But the EEC also had leverage.

one-third of U.S. exports.

The Common Market bought

American agriculture relied on

European markets, enjoying a five-to-one edge in
trade in
food products.
Since trade of manufactured goods among

the

Six and and to the EFTA and America yielded more
benefits

for the Common Market than farm exports across the

Atlantic, the EEC saw no benefit in reducing the CAP.

In

addition, export expansion of industrial items promised

more gains than agriculture for Washington, as sales to the
EEC of manufactures had risen almost four times that of
farm goods.

Yet the common external tariff was the

determining factor in the future level of industrial
exports.

Also, Europe knew the importance of exports to

Kennedy, who had revealed his hand in selling the TEA as a

corrective for the payments deficit.

1

Europe held many

cards, too.

Recognizing this fact, the State Department wanted
America to aim its sights lower for the Kennedy Round.

The

U.S. was asking for more concessions than it could give the
Six,

but the American trade surplus made the EEC less

unwilling to reciprocate equally.
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Thus, the request for

50% cuts was a wish, not an expectation.

Washington should

try for a maximum reduction of the EEC's
tariff on items in
the 10-20% range, on which 60% of Europe's
duties applied.
Herter and the State Deaprtment argued
that the U.S. should
also be careful not to attack Common
Market protectionism,

especially on agriculture, which de Gaulle
might construe
as inimical to European integration -"-^
.

Behind this more realistic position were trade
patterns
which forewarned much resistance in Europe to
American
free-trade goals.

In 1962, the EEC's growth rate and

exports to non-members slowed.

The Common Market suffered

an overall trade deficit of $1.9 billion in 1962,
down from

the previous year but worsening by 1964.

Much of the

deficit was attributable to its unfavorable balance with
America, as Europe's share of the U.S. market decreased 71%

while American exports shot up by 93% between 1958 and
1964.

Though Washington insisted that the EEC was too

concerned with its deficit, the Common Market frequently

emphasized this disadvantage throughout the Kennedy
Round.
The way the Six coped with its deficit was to increase

their share of the EEC market, to the detriment of U.S.
exports.

Of 177 items made on both sides of the Atlantic,

for instance,

97

American products suffered a decline in

market share and 12 showed no change from 1960 to 1962.
Some of reductions, as in cotton, were due to shifts in
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European purchases from other countries.

But many,

such as

transportation goods and electrical machinery,
occurred
because of production increases in the
EEC.
America

faced

increasingly adverse competitive conditions
also in
cereals,

fruits, coal, chemicals, and aluminum.

in order

to compete, America could expand sales in
all of the afore-

mentioned sectors, in which it still had a
comparative
advantage, only if the Common Market cut its
external

tariff by

half.^-'-

But de Gaulle set out to hinder this aim.

The State

Department reported that de Gaulle would not torpedo the

Round for fear of inciting a negative reaction from free-

trading West Germany and upsetting his carefully cultivated
scheme for a Paris-Bonn alliance.

But most of the French

government sought only a limited success for the

negotiations in order to preserve the protectionist

building blocks of the EEC, prevent an incursion of U.S.
goods, adjust French industry to the eventual removal of

Common Market internal trade barriers, and enable France's
farmers to become the main supplier of food in exchange for

buying manufactures from the other five members.

Paris

continued to stress the "political madness" of opening
Europe to a flood of U.S. products by slashing tariffs
further.

French policy placed the other five members in a
dilemma.

Despite rallying against Gaullist obstructionism.
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they agreed that unless America negotiated
"even where it
hurts", the Round would generate little
enthusiasm on their
part for free-trade.
The EEC Commission, influenced by
France, suggested separate talks on farm
goods, in direct
opposition to U.S. policy. The smaller members
of the

Community also felt vulnerable to the U.S. trading
monolith.

Yet led by pro-American West Germany, and
by

October 1963, its new free-trade Chancellor Ludwig
Erhard,
these nations basically supported the Kennedy Round and
U.S.

objectives.

Though all hastened for protection for

certain industries, the smaller four looked to Bonn to
confront the French black sheep and promote trade

liberalization
In effect,

23

running underneath the Kennedy Round was a

current of Franco-German differences on EEC integration and
trade.

Erhard, enraged at de Gaulle's veto of British

membership, believed the Common Market should accept the

EFTA nations as members.

Above all, he was an Atlanticist,

who knew German industry relied on markets in America as

well as in Europe.

Thus,

as de Gaulle tried to distance

the Common Market from Washington, Erhard pressed for

closer Atlantic relations.

America welcomed this policy

and hoped to enlist Erhard in the fight against Gaullist

protectionism in the Kennedy Round. 24
The growing rift between Bonn and Paris centered on EEC

agricultural policy.

France, in its quest to dominate
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Common Market food supplies, hoped to
discourage the
production of cereals in the other five
nations by
negotiating a common price of grain at
a low level.

Bonn

balked at low cereals prices, which would
permit French
grain to undersell politically powerful
German farmers, and
hoped to delay a decision on a unified grains
price until
after the Federal elections in 1965.
The price issue, however, was entangled in
the Kennedy

Round negotiations.

De Gaulle, pressed by farmers at home,

could not accept high prices.

Ironically, his American

trade nemesis backed this approach in order to increase
access for its grain in Europe.

Meanwhile, West Germany

supported Washington's call for lower industrial tariffs,
which Paris did not.

Once in office, Erhard pledged to

ensure personally that France would not sabotage the

Kennedy Round by confronting Gaullism at EEC policyformulation meetings.

He did so through his

"synchronization" plan, in which West Germany would permit
the imposition of the CAP for beef, rice, and dairy

products in exchange for French cooperation at the Kennedy

Round on industrial tariffs.

The proposal fell short of

the common grains price agreement, but because Bonn would
go no further, the issue soon stalled the GATT talks on

farm trade. 25

Meanwhile, the other major industrial participants at
the Kennedy Round in general awaited U.S. -EEC discussions.
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The low-tariff,

liberal EFTA, depended on the
Common Market
as its primary market.
The volume of trade between

Scandinavia and the Six alone exceeded
the U.S. -EEC total.
Thus, the Outer Seven were interested
in the concessions
granted to American products which, in
turn, would apply to
the EFTA on MFN basis.
Canada, the rest of the Commonwealth, and
the LDCs

opposed the linear cut method because it would
expose their
smaller secondary industries to unacceptable
competition.
Canada,

for instance, was predominantly agricultural
and

doubted that

tariff cut on industrial items would be

a 50%

of much benefit.

Ottawa preferred instead to grant

selective, product -by-product tariff concessions of equal

value to the linear approach.

The LDCs sought trade

preferences through separate negotiations under the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development for help.^^
Japan would profit from reduced duties, but eliminating

voluntary export restraints, such as textile quotas, were
of primary concern.

Until VER'

s

were cut in America and

especially Europe, Tokyo refused to accept linear tariff
reductions for its highly protective duties.

America was

receptive to this complaint since Japan was the country's
second largest export market.

Yet Herter reminded the

Japanese mission in Geneva of their nation's own quotas and
severe restrictions on U.S. farm goods which, if not
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lowered, might hurt Tokyo's sizable
exports to the United
States, which rose 70% from 1960 to 1964.^'^
Overall, the contracting parties watched
the developing

American-Common Market problems.

As early as December

at a GATT working party session in
preparation for

1962,

the rule-setting Ministerial meeting, the EEC
backed away

from the simple linear tariff cut method on the
grounds
that significant "disparities" existed between American
and

European duties.

On French insistence, the Six claimed

that a 50% reduction in the many U.S. tariffs with high
rates and the more medium-range EEC duties would not lead
to concessions of equal value.

By March 1963, de Gaulle

had compelled the Commission to insist on

a

formula for

dealing with the disparity problem, making compensation by

America a top priority before bargaining could occur.
The disparity issue plagued the negotiations for over a
year,

erupting into a battle between Herter and the Six.

The STR rebuffed French efforts to establish an automatic

rule for cutting the "peaks" off the high U.S. tariffs to

harmonize them with other nations.

Such a rule would

result in unequal and inadequate reductions, which would
cause America to lower its duties more than the EEC, fall
short of the 50% tariff cut goal, and invite outcries at

home from import-competitors about giving away too much and

receiving too little in return. 29
.

.

.

.
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In fact, America's 895
-F-Fq at
a-iv.
0:70 tar-i
T^arirrs
the -uhigh
range of 30%

or more did were more numerous than
the EEC's mere 45 at
this level.
High tariffs encompassed 18% of the
U.S. total

dutiable imports, while only 2% of the
Six's imports.

But

or 20% of U.S. imports were duty-free,
while only 10%,
or 270 enjoyed free-list status in the EEC.
And, more than
half of the latter' s tariffs provided middle-range
990,

protection of 10-20% ad valorem, which the Commerce
Department believed most effectively restricted U.S.
industrial exports, while 30% of America's were grouped
at
this level. A halving of tariffs, on the other hand,
would
result in a reduction of $8.7 billion in American tariffs
and $12 billion in EEC duties, though both would net $3.8

billion in receipts.

In short,

though the U.S. indeed had

many higher tariffs, the differences between these and EEC
rates were minimal and not nearly enough to warrant a

gutting of the 50% linear cut method.

All of the GATT

members, except the Common Market, agreed with Herter that
the disparities were merely a subsidiary issue.

"^"^

At the Ministerial meeting in May 1963, the U.S. and EEC

compromised on disparities after Herter warned of a
breakdown at the talks over the matter,

France backed down

on the formula for "de-peaking" U.S. tariffs while America

allowed for a departure from the equilinear cut when
justified by a "significant" disparity.

Identifying these

cases occupied the GATT members during the ensuing year.
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the Ministers decided to proceed with
tariff cuts
applied across-the-board with a bare minimum
of exceptions,
though the rules were less precise than
those sought by the
United States. Kennedy welcomed the "Geneva
Compromise"
But,

but recognized that there was still much work
ahead before

bargaining brought down trade barriers in Europe.
The Ministers also discussed NTBs, of which all
parties

were guilty.

Herter naturally hoped to reduce or remove

the most onerous foreign barriers, such as Italian and

French taxes on U.S. cars.

But he also offered to modify

his country's own escape clause, the Buy American

provision, and other NTBs

.

The EEC,

led by West German

chemical producers, insisted that the Six not negotiate

with America unless the prohibitive American Selling Price
(ASP)

system was placed on the bargaining table.

Japan,

West Germany, Benelux, and Austria also complained about
the Anti-Dumping Act imposed on American steel imports,

which the U.S. claimed were priced below the cost these

products sold abroad.

GATT committees were asked to study

these NTBs and submit lists of the measures in need of

discussion 32
For America, the most bothersome form of protection was
the EEC's common agricultural policy.
all nations had farm barriers.

Just as in industry,

Yet only 26% of U.S.

commodities benefited from quantitative restrictions, while
80% of Common Market,

and even more of the EFTA'
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s

crops,

had such protection.
U.S.

Thus,

it was no surprise that the

stress on placing agricultural barriers
alongside

manufactures for the first time in postwar
trade
negotiations, prompted rancorous discussions within
the
Atlantic community. Agriculture tested the extent
of trade
liberalism in Europe in the face of large, U.S. farm
exports, America's growing food trade surplus, and

Washington's reversal from protectionist farm policies of
the 1950s.
The prospects for increased access for U.S. agricultural

exports in Europe was dim, as they had been at the Dillon
Round.

Farm employment was higher in the EEC than across

the Atlantic, which made farmers in Europe more influential

and markets more precious.

American farm commodity exports

had soared in recent years, climbing 26% in 1960-1964 over
the previous five years.

Feed grains, wheat, and oilseeds

were the top performers, comprising $650 million of the
$1.5 billion in agriculture the Common Market bought from

the United States.

But while the variable levy curtailed

poultry and other products, the strongest U.S. export crops
suffered from the CAP's inflation of prices in the EEC,
which encouraged inefficient production and forced American
farmers into a role as residual suppliers.
wheat,

corn,

U.S. prices for

and barley, for instance, were one-third lower

than in France. 34

An adjustment of the CAP would help U.S.

farmers
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The Department of Agriculture led the
attack on the CAP.

Delighted that farmers were now full partners
in GATT,
Secretary Freeman declared that without an
access

agreement satisfactory to U.S. farmers and Congress,
the
Kennedy Round would not be concluded. He reminded
the

President that "all agriculture is watching carefully"
for

Kennedy actions against restrictions in Europe.

For home

consumption, Kennedy and Herter backed up the USDA by

stressing that farm trade exports sold according to the

principle of comparative advantage helped the payments
balance. The President pledged "to take every step to

protect the full rights due American agricultural
exporters", and that "a fair agreement [was] an essential
first part" of the trade talks.

Freeman used this support to criticize the CAP, which
had gone into effect on 30 July 1962 for feed grains, rice,
poultry, and wheat.

The EEC, he said,

could now modify the

Dillon Round "Standstill Agreements" by breaking tariff

bindings and raising import barriers.

Touring Europe,

Freeman found a "very disturbing" trend emerging in the
EEC,

in which each country had staked out its market in

particular commodities

-

Holland in dairy products

France in wheat, Italy in rice,
.

French Agricultural Minister

Edgar Pisani informed him that French farmers needed years
to develop and expand their production,

outside competition.

sheltered from

EEC Vice-President for Agriculture
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Sicco Mansholt warned that without
U.S. pressure, the
Common Market's grains prices would
climb to the high
German level, boost EEC production, and
hurt American
exports "^^
.

Freeman responded that America was willing
to modify its
protectionist policies in agriculture, but upon
returning
to Washington, he devoted his efforts at the
White House
for action against the CAP.
He, and the President,

realized the United States had
on farm goods,

a

weak bargaining position

since it sold one-third of its crops to the

EEC while purchasing only 10% of Europe's produce.

But

pressure was mounting from the farm bloc to end foreign
restrictions, and Kennedy had based his campaign for the
TEA with this aim in mind.

Though acceptance by the Six

for the principle of comparative advantage was an "ideal".

Freeman declared that Herter must insist on minimum
guarantees to insure a "fair sharing of markets" abroad,
said Freeman.

If not granted, the U.S.

should "let the

people in Western Europe and their governments know what we
really meant about agriculture" as America clearly showed

m

retaliating in the chicken war in August 1963.
The STR, State Department, and the White House agreed

with the USDA on gaining access assurances, though less
vehemently.

Chief negotiator Blumenthal reminded Americans

that productivity rises and static wheat consumption in

Europe were not new but antedated the CAP.
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Therefore, the

U.S.

should keep prices low through world
commodity
agreements and sell feed grains, meat, tobacco,
and fruit
in which it was most efficient and in
which EEC consumption
and imports were growing. Above all, he said,
farmers
should not expect to "sweep away the elaborate
structure of

agricultural protectionism" but seek a progressive

enlargement of access in the EEC."^^
In fair-trade fashion, the STR recognized that
Europe

had compelling reasons to confront Freeman.

The CAP was a

structural support of European integration, and EEC farm
organization, financing, and pricing policy was still under
debate.

Farmers in the region pointed out that the

technological revolution made possible by American
financial generosity after the war had taken hold in
Europe, reducing farm employment but raising output and

creating surpluses.

Anyway, America was guilty of its own

protectionism, restricting certain dairy products, wheat,
cotton,

and peanut products.

Thus,

instead of knocking

down barriers, implied the EEC, all nations should agree on
a level of price supports for their farmers. 3 9

Pushed by France, EEC minister Mansholt suggested this
hotly contested "margin of support" plan in February 1964.

Assuming that protectionism and price controls in all
countries precluded the possibility that world agricultural
prices would ever reflect free-market prices, the EEC aimed
to raise world prices to a level in which nations
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maintained production without subsidies.

The plan,

in

short,

set minimum import prices and
left each nation free
to set its own level of protection.
in practice, once the
EEC agreed on a unified grain price,
the Six would bind the
high levels of domestic support for
three years.
The

Common Market viewed the "Mansholt Plan"
as a valid
concession at the Kennedy Round, agreeing to

limit domestic

farm support through international trade
agreements if
others did likewise '^'^
.

The proposal drew criticism from West
Germany.

Bonn

resisted lowering grains prices, especially because
its
farmers received sizable subsidies which would be
cut under
the Mansholt Plan.
Conceding to unify cereals prices
within a year. West Germany refused to change its domestic
support levels, provoking France to consider a rigid

position on the tariff disparity issue in return.

Bonn

eventually gave in to the Mansholt Plan.
The United States issued the major opposition to the

margin of support, formulated purely in the interests of
the EEC without regard to outside producers.

The proposal

universalized the hated CAP variable levy system, set
prices at levels which were too high for exporters, and

would not reduce import barriers and expand access for U.S.
agriculture.

The Mansholt Plan disregarded existing GATT

rules and concessions by fixing new, three-year bindings,
and in no way addressed the problem of limiting production
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of commodities in chronic surplus.

The plan was the

fundamental source of disagreement
between the U.S. and EEC
in farm trade.
Yet the Chicken War, which by the
summer of
1963 had erupted into a major clash between
the U.S. and
the EEC, and disagreement on agricultural
rules, also

revealed the widening gap between the allies.
The rift irked farmers at home and, as
during the TEA
battle, brought pressure on the administration.
Farm-state
legislators were irate about the drive in the
EEC for selfsufficiency in food production. They now believed
Kennedy

had been too naive in advocating export expansion
or had
craftily inflated domestic farm hopes in order to sell

the

TEA,

and warned him either to persuade Europe to open up or

expect Congress to retaliate.

Farmers already had rejected

his supply management farm program in a wheat referendum in

the Spring 1963.

The vote added to U.S. trade problems,

permitting overproduction and thus creating larger
surpluses which required outlets abroad.

'^"^

There was also dis grunt lement in industry.

As required

by the TEA, the President submitted to the Tariff

Commission the items America wished to table for tariff
cuts at the GATT talks. Kennedy hoped to minimize the

number of products withheld from this list in order to show
his intention of promoting free-trade, though certain

"exceptions" were mandatory under law, such as oil under
the national security clause, and carpets, glass, and seven
396

other manufactures under the escape
clause.

in October

Kennedy submitted 6000 products for
tariff cuts, the
largest negotiating list in history.
Approximately 87% of
1963,

U.S. dutiable imports were included; by
comparison,

only

25% had been sent to the Dillon Round by Eisenhower

The domestic input began at this point.

The Tariff

Commission held hearings starting in late 1963,
in which
manufacturers presented cases against the inclusion
of

their products on the negotiating list, and Herter
chaired
a forum for exporters that identified foreign
protectionist

barriers.

Also, pursuant to the TEA, the President

appointed 35 advisors from industry, agriculture, and labor
to aid the STR in formulating a negotiating plan in each

sector.

He also selected Congressmen Cecil King (D-LA) and

Thomas Curtis (R-MO) and Senators Herman Talmadge (D-GA)
and John Williams

(R-DE)

to accompany the U.S. delegation

to Geneva as overseers for Congress.

'^^

Herter would be

closely watched by legislators and producers.
The private sector grumbled about post-TEA trade policy.

When the Tariff Commission rejected three petitions for
adjustment assistance, the AFL-CIO denounced the

Commission's technical interpretation of the law and

threatened to withdraw its backing of the Kennedy Round.
The lumber bloc, now 108 strong, urged limits on Canadian

softwood imports

.

New England and Southern legislators

increased pressure for an cotton textile Arrangement -type

agreement on woolen textiles from Britain,
Italy, and
Japan, but England refused.
Kennedy closed some loopholes
in the wool import laws and considered
reserving woolens
from the Kennedy Round offer list.
Yet other industries
pointed to the LTA as an example of what could
be done with
"sufficient will" by the administration.
The President

continued to step delicately, reiterating that
fair-trade
required letting in imports to expand exports.
Yet the difficulties with the EEC were a
call-to-arms
for enemies and allies of free-trade.

The ambiguous

conclusion of the May Ministerial meeting, which had

resulted in rules favoring the Common Market on disparities
but no progress on agriculture, angered domestic observers.

Protectionist John Dent joined free-trader Javits in
calling the meeting a failure for U.S. trade objectives.
Other legislators vowed to block a removal of critical
NTBs, particularly the highly-prized ASP,

as long as Europe

strangled American exports such as poultry.

Congressional

advisor Curtis, struggling against Herter to sit in on

policy planning meetings in Geneva, reminded Kennedy that
the TEA granted no power to deal with

NTBs.'^'^

Even close friend Wilbur Mills joined the dissenters.
He made unusually strong statements about the Kennedy

Round, warning that Congress "would legislate toughness" if

Herter was not firm with Europe.

Mills had blocked several

protectionist bills on Capitol Hill, but a "soft position"
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would warrant consideration of them.

m

no uncertain

terms, he declared in May 1963 that
"there would be hell to
pay" if the Kennedy Round "resulted in
an unequal

agreement" 48

Kennedy listened, both as

a

fair-trader who was

discouraged by EEC protectionism but also as

a

for whom the 1964 election loomed.

staff played

Herter'

s

politician

down the election because it made Kennedy
appear more

vulnerable to domestic pressure, perhaps instilling

a

cautious, less liberal approach in other GATT members.

The

timing of the Tariff Commission hearings in late 1963
and
the scheduled official opening of the Kennedy Round for
May
1964, placed U.S. protectionists in a politically favorable

position.

If forced to give in to them, Kennedy risked

upsetting the negotiations named in his honor, in which he
had made the target of his biggest legislative achievement
in 1962."^^

When Kennedy counted votes, he noted that
1964 was not a certainty.

victory in

The race issue had hurt him in

the South, where he had carried
If he lost some of these

a

7

7

states

losing Alabama and North Carolina)

out of 11 states in 1960.
(and polls showed him
,

he would not be re-

elected assuming the other results remained the same.
Furthermore, he had won

4

Midwestern farm states in 1960

Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Missouri.

But if he

lost the former and any two of the others, his opponent
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would assume the presidency.

He had won Illinois only with

help from Chicago Mayor Daley and Minnesota
riding on
Senator Hubert Humphrey's (D-Minn.) coattails
in 11

.

states, his margin of victory was less
than 51%, and even
worse, the Kennedy states would have 10
fewer electoral

votes in 1964.^'^

How much trade policy affected votes is hard
to assess.
But the election was surely a consideration as he
examined
the status of the GATT talks.

Kennedy hoped to win the

industrial regions again, where his strength lay, and he

needed farm state support, where he was weak.

Thus,

Kennedy publicly backed agricultural export expansion in
part for political reasons.

In private,

he told Freeman

that he understood the need for access but that the

prospects were not good because of EEC protectionism.

The

President also complained that he bent over backwards to
help farmers with special programs and export incentives,
but "then they vote Republican" anyway.

Perhaps,

lamented

the President just before leaving for Dallas in mid-

November 1963, he had oversold the Kennedy Round.

His

failing attempt to retain U.S. farm markets in Europe,
writes William Borden, was perhaps the most disappointing
(and perhaps politically dangerous)

aspect of his foreign

economic policy. 51
Yet Kennedy's successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, launched
into a further public relations campaign for the
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negotiations.

In his first address to Congress,

for

instance, the Texan "rededicated" the
U.S. to trade
expansion.
Like Kennedy, the new President was
a vigorous
adherent to liberal trade as a safeguard
against economic
depression, a key to friendly allied relations,
and a

unifying force against communism.

But Johnson, also a

fair-trader, arrived at his trade principles by
a different
route than Kennedy.
In addition, his record of defending
local economic interests against instead of by

protectionism permitted him to step easily into the role of
promoting the Kennedy Round.
While Kennedy observed the Depression from the comfort
of Hyannisport,

Johnson had grown up in an area marked by

rural poverty, though he did later live in a small town as
a

member of the lower middle class.

In any event, this

upbringing, and a close attachment to his mentor. House

Speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX)
bent.

,

instilled in him

a

populist

Ignored by Washington in the 1920s and early 1930s,

farmers plunged into ruin as crop prices fell and farm

foreclosures were rampant.

Meanwhile, rich Eastern

manufacturing and banking interests prospered behind high
tariff walls.

This situation, which greeted Johnson when

he came to the Capitol in 1931, angered Rayburn.

The

Speaker hated the Eastern Establishment and especially the

protective tariff, which he called the "robber tariff, the
most indefensible system the world has ever known" 52
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Rayburn greatly influenced Johnson.

m

1948,

Johnson

denounced the tariff, labeling it a
subsidy for Northerners
while declining world commodity
prices undercut farm
income.
Texas was reliant on exports, he
said, but for

nearly

century the restrictive Republican
tariff had
caused foreigners to choke off the
state's overseas sales,
to the detriment of farmers.
The congressman, therefore,
vigorously supported the Reciprocal Trade
Act as a means to
help his rural constituents.
The RTA was "not pleasing to
rich northern and eastern industrialists.
They want to
bring back the high tariffs which keep the
South in a state
of economic dependency.
Lyndon Johnson is on record
a

for

extending" the RTA.

He did throughout his political

career 53

A confirmed free-trader for populist reasons, therefore,
Johnson soon promoted liberalism for national and foreign

policy interests.

Protectionism alienated America'

allies, he argued in the early 1950s, and resulted in

"international depression".

Though oil imports might hurt

Texas independents, in general the American economy would

improve by keeping trade barriers at a minimum.

As the

Senate Democratic leader, he urged Eisenhower to resist

protectionism during the RTA renewals, and opposed Senator
Robert Kerr's amendment in 19 60 aimed at preventing further

tariff cuts at the Dillon Round.
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Of course, Johnson realized that
some import-competitors
needed protection, and advocated prudence
in granting

tariff concessions at negotiations.

He once reportedly

joked that a free-trader should never
reveal his true
identity because there were no votes in
it.
Thus, while
applauding passage of the RTA in 1951, he
warned against
rushing headlong into cutting tariffs while
other nations
raised their barriers.

Above all, oil imports demanded his attention,
since he
garnered financial support from Texas independent
producers.

He believed that the petroleum industry was
a

"keystone" to national security and must not be jeopardized

by "reckless neglect".

But he was not a tough

protectionist like Kerr.

Johnson backed the Voluntary and

Mandatory Oil Quota programs, but rejected the Neely
amendment for oil quotas in favor of the national security
provision.

In effect,

strict controls on imports might

provoke easterners to try to eliminate the depletion
allowance tax break, impose price controls, and permit

Federal rationing of crude oil.

He much preferred a middle

course that prevented the national security clause from

becoming a "toothless tiger" but preserved free-trade on a
"fair and equitable basis".

Johnson's stress on oil protection and farm export

expansion were basically parochial concerns and earned him
a

reputation as less of

a

free-trader than the other
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presidential contenders in I960.

Business Week even

claimed that Johnson's conservatism
was a major reason why
protectionism had mounted on Capitol Hill.

m

reality,

though, he was merely more forthright
than the others on
trade, an ardent free-trader but clearly
worried about
"unfair competition" from abroad. Myer
Feldman

distinguished between Kennedy and Johnson in
stating that
the former initially promoted liberal trade
and
then

approached each industry to accomplish this aim
while the
latter started with each producer and tried to
arrive

at a

general free-trade posture.

Regardless of tactics, what

is important is that the two ended up as
fair-traders,

seeking to aid vulnerable producers in order to achieve
the
overall goal of export expansion.

Johnson also linked exports to the payments deficit.
His efforts at boosting exports, discouraging the outflow
of dollars,

and tying aid to purchases of American goods

helped reduce the deficit slightly and completely halt the
gold drain in 1964.

In December 1963,

he established an

Interagency Committee on Export Expansion to boost overseas
sales.

Partly as a result, the trade surplus hit its peak

of the decade,
1948.

58

at $6.7 billion,

and the highest level since

But the deficit warranted a concern for selling

more abroad.
In order to increase exports,

Johnson opposed import

restrictions to avoid provoking retaliation overseas.
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Thus,

one of his earliest actions as
president was to veto

the protectionist lumber origin labeling
act.

He also

refused to limit woolen imports, despite
pressure from
large delegations of legislators, agreeing
with GATT's Eric
Wyndham White that quotas would contradict
U.S. policy at
the Kennedy Round.
He demonstrated his commitment to free-trade
during the
first trade crisis of his administration. Beef
imports,

primarily from Australia and New Zealand,

jumped 106% from

1961 to 1963 and undercut domestic meat prices.

The Common

Market levies on beef had reduced these nations' exports
in
Europe.

Though overproduction affected prices, cattlemen

and dairy farmers sought quotas on imports as a means to

boost prices.

The Senate narrowly defeated a quota bill

sponsored by Senator Roman

L.

Hruska (R-Neb

.

)

in March

1964, but the Finance Committee began hearings on the

problem and one-quarter of the Senate proposed various
restrictive amendments.

Senator Mike Mansfield introduced

the Meat Import Law, setting targets above which imports

could not climb without triggering quotas.

6n

Johnson was receptive but would not go as far as

establishing permanent quotas by law.

The beef problem was

familiar to him; his constituents had begun writing him in
195 9 about rising imports.

He also hoped to woo cattlemen,

who were traditionally Republican, to his side in the 1964

election.

Thus, the President initiated promotional
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schemes, ordered government agencies
to buy more beef, and
told Freeman to investigate expanding
exports to the LDCs
through PL 480 shipments in order to
boost consumption at
home and abroad.
He also instructed Herter to negotiate
voluntary export
agreements, under which Australia and New
Zealand promised
to lower their exports by 29% and 22% respectively.
These
cuts were more than those projected under
the Mansfield

Meat Act, which passed Congress.

By Fall 1964, the

administration had rolled back imports to pre-1962
levels
with little complaint from Australia and New Zealand.

They

turned back to European markets for their beef sales.
The administration also considered the views of import-

competitors at the Trade Commission hearings prior to the

Kennedy Round.

The Commission heard testimony from

hundreds of industries concerned with the extensive public
list of items available for duty reductions and which

sought protection from the effects of the 50% linear tariff
cuts.

Herter cautioned that the hearings would usher in

mounting pressure from producers to place products on the
exceptions list, which prompted Johnson to issue a

memorandum that forbade government officials from promising
certain industries this sort of protection.
But protectionist pressure increased from Congress.

A

total of 75 congressmen from 38 states spent two hours in
late April 19 64,

just days before the Kennedy Round
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officially opened, discussing the need
for import
restraints.
The STR office feared an uprising
against the
GATT conference and The Economist stated
that 1964 would be
known as the "year of retraction" in trade
because
of the

plethora of restrictive amendments pending on
Capitol Hill.
These included the Meat Act, Buy American
clauses attached
to the Urban Mass Transportation law and to the
Food

Stamps

Act,

and lobbying for quotas on shoes, wool, lead and
zinc,

steel containers, and electron microscopes, the effort
for

the latter two successful.

The Tariff Commission also

imposed anti-dumping duties on Canadian steel.

In

response, Johnson repeated his pledge for fair-trade,

believing barriers abroad to be a greater problem than
domestic pressure. 54
.

Johnson expected gains for exporters at the Kennedy
Round.

Optimistic about the talks, he nevertheless

realized the need for patience, persistence, and firmness
with Europe.
a

Johnson supported the Atlantic partnership as

basis for trade relations and as

a

means to avoid a wave

of anti-Americanism in Europe and protectionism at home.

But he reiterated America''

s

determination to achieve

reciprocity in the industrial sector and fair access for
agriculture.

And,

adhering to fair-trade principles,

Johnson explained that the negotiations were "not the kind
in which some nations need lose because others gain" 65
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By early 1964, however, the
Kennedy Round seemed no
longer a grand attempt at Western
economic cooperation but
a hard-fought business deal.
Galbraith criticized Herter
for not recognizing how tough the
bargaining would be with
the EEC once the negotiations began
on 4 May 1964.
But the
STR realized that American objectives
might be

unattainable, and thus expected a more modest
achievements.
Even German Chancellor Erhard, who sided
with the U.S.
trade liberalization effort, believed Washington

exaggerated the chances of the Common Market willingly
cutting its tariffs in light of its trade deficit
with
America. 66
The Six, for instance, persisted on the tariff disparity
issue.

The other nations played down disparities and

emphasized the linear cut method.

But the EEC presented a

formula that actually expanded the cases in which America

would cut its duties more substantially than the EEC and
which drastically scaled down the 50% reduction rule.

The

Common Market finally backed down at the opening meeting of
the Kennedy Round, though the U.S. leaned toward

conditionally accepting the proposal out of recognition
that the prestige of the EEC Commission was a stake.

Both

sides agreed to wait until exceptions lists were "tabled",
or presented,

in September before discussing disparities,

and accepted the 50% linear rule as a "working hypothesis".
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Yet the disparity problem was
partly responsible for the
pessimistic spirit of the Round. ^"^

Franco-German tension also hurt the
negotiations.
The
two countries' friendship treaty
had fallen flat in the
Bundestag, with West Germany reaffirming
an attachment to
the U.S. and criticizing Gaullist
ambitions
in Europe.

American Ambassador to France Charles
Bohlen reported
less obstructionist de Gaulle had still
sought
a

a

cautious

approach from Bonn on tariff cuts and pointed
to America's
trade surplus with Europe as a reason for
harmonizing

tariff disparities.

Above all, the general insisted on a

common grains price as

a

prerequisite to French

participation on agricultural talks at the Kennedy
Round.
Erhard countered de Gaulle on these points, but he
agreed
in talks with Ball that the EEC seemed to be drifting

apart, a development that would present a real crisis
at

the GATT negotiations.^^

After threatening to walk out of the EEC in December
1963 if West Germany did not agree to a low, unified

cereals price, France made clear that its membership in the

Common Market was predicated on the notion that the other
five nations would import French farm goods and subsidize
its exports through an EEC agricultural fund.

But the

Bundestag opposed the low prices, out of concern for
removing protection before the Federal elections, and
opposed financing an inordinate share of the fund.
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Throughout 1964, therefore, agriculture
was at a
stalemate:
Bonn dragged its feet on market
organization
while France would not budge on negotiating
farm barriers
at the Kennedy Round until West Germany
accepted
the

unified prices.

Without the future levels of protection

set within the EEC,

said Mansholt, the Six could not yet

bargain with outsiders.

Despite Commission requests for

immediate discussion on grains prices, the matter
prevented
the Common Market from tabling exceptions in
agriculture
along with industrial goods as the GATT members planned
in

September 1964."^°
But even if the grains issue had been settled, the EEC
was unwilling to lower the CAP for non-members.

Since 20%

of EEC voters were farmers, there was considerable

resistance to reducing the variable levies.

The Common

Market's largest farm lobby, the Committee of Preferential

Agricultural Organization, even pronounced that the subject
of lessening farm protection was off-limits at the Kennedy

Round.

French Ambassador to the United States Herve

Alphand told an American audience that though low grains
prices would benefit U.S. producers, a guarantee of

proportional access for Farm-belt exports was not
possible 71
Such was the bad news for U.S. farmers, but Johnson,
like Kennedy, continued to sell the trade negotiations on

expanded exports.

In 1964, more acreage and farm
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employment was attributable to exports
than ever before,
which could rise even higher with the
removal of EEC
restrictions.
On the campaign trail, the President
proclaimed that U.S. agricultural exports had
broken all
records by rising $1 billion in 1964, or
20%, a 35% gain
since 1960.
It was no surprise that farmers expected
a
tough stance against European trade barriers.

Many in the American farm bloc claimed Herter was
selling them out by not insisting the establishment
of
rules for agriculture as he had for industry.

This belief

prompted several resolutions which opposed commodity
agreements as substitutes for reciprocal trade in farm
goods and attacked French restrictions of U.S. fruit.

A

related bill even called for the termination of the TEA two
years before its expiration date of 30 June 1967 in order
to evaluate the Kennedy Round, which some legislators were

now calling an "unforgivable economic stupidity"

"^"^
.

Except for Freeman, America had softened its policy on
EEC access guarantees but had not deviated from the

fundamental position of including farm with industrial

products at the talks.

The USDA wanted global market-

sharing and liberalization; if refused by the EEC, America
should withdraw from the Kennedy Round.

Prompted by

Herter, President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk

discouraged Freeman's view.

Herter thought such an

approach fatalistic, placing the U.S. in the uncomfortable

role of attacking European integration
or hinting of a
trade war. He offered a "flexible,
pragmatic" plan, in

place of the EEC's margin of support proposal,
to negotiate
tariff cuts on fixed duty items and access
on grains and
variable levy items by any method, including
world

commodity agreements

.

Herter also eased the pressure on Erhard to agree
on the
EEC cereals price.
Though offering to cushion the
Chancellor from domestic German farm recriminations by
announcing that low grain levels were demanded by the

United States, Herter was willing to proceed with
agricultural negotiations without
Europe agreed.

a

common cereals price if

Most important, with Johnson's approval in

October 1964, he decided to table the industrial exceptions
list without its companion farm list.

This move was

contrary to American policy all along of linking the two
sectors. 75

His decision reflected the deadlocked EEC talks on

grains which prevented the Six from negotiating with the

United States

.

But he also worried that the Kennedy Round

would lose momentum if farm problems delayed meaningful

bargaining on manufactured goods.

In addition,

Herter

realized that the Common Market might use a postponement to
put off decisions on its internal farm organization.

By

going ahead without agriculture, Washington could shift the
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burden of responsibility for continuing
the GATT talks onto
the EEC, and especially France. "^^
Herter's recominendation naturally irked
France.
By
dropping its insistence on proceeding
with the Kennedy
Round only if farm goods were considered
next to industrial
items, the U.S.
removed pressure from West Germany
to

unify cereals prices.

More adamant than ever, de Gaulle

again threatened to walk out of the EEC in
December 1964 if
there was no agreement on grains. Erhard finally
acquiesced, and in a major step toward integration,
the

Common Market decided on unified prices beginning with
the
1967 crop.

Yet the issue of funding agricultural subsidies

still posed a large problem.

Agriculture, asserted The

Economist, seemed "more than ever like the sick man of

Europe"

'^^
.

U.S.

retreat.

farm interests also reacted against Herter's

Freeman believed the policy might force France to

accept higher grain price levels than desired by America.

Eventually, Freeman backed Herter's decision and scrambled
to assure farmers that the basic policy of negotiating on

agriculture had not changed.

Farmers expressed outrage,

especially the anti-Johnson American Farm Bureau, which

pledged to block the President's farm legislation.

This

dissension, along with a protectionist attack on the

administration's free-trade policy from Republican vice-

presidential candidate William

E.

Miller just weeks before

the election might have worried Johnson.
rural and industrial vote handily.

But he won the

Nevertheless, the

agricultural stand-off dampened hopes for a
successful
Kennedy Round. 7
ft

The more promising negotiations in the
industrial sector

were also somewhat shaky by the end of 1964, as
each nation
presented its list of "exceptions" from the 50% linear
cuts. Britain,

exceptions.

Japan, Finland, the EEC,

and America tabled

EFTA members Austria, Sweden, Norway, Denmark,

and Switzerland did not reserve any products, but retained
the right to reduce their offers if they did not receive

reciprocity.

Commonwealth countries pleaded that their

basically agricultural economies precluded them from
subjecting their vulnerable industries to trade
competition.

Canada, with similar problems, drew up a list

of an equivalent value of goods in place of the linear

method.
The lists from nations which did table exceptions

portended of future disputes, especially between the
contracting parties and the Common Market.

As an

expression of disgruntlement over the "voluntary" export
restraints imposed by other nations, Japan reserved the
most goods

,

about one-quarter of its dutiable imports

the negotiations.
tariffs,

from

Britain's list covered 10% of its

including plastics and coal imports from America.
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After the public hearings on the U.S.
list ended in the
Spring of 1964, the inter-departmental
Trade Expansion Act
Advisory Committee eliminated even more
items from
the

exceptions list during October in order
to demonstrate an
intention to lower trade barriers. The U.S.
then exempted
18% of its dutiable imports, tabling cotton
textiles,

machine tools, optical instruments, watches,
and other
items falling under the escape clause.
Oil, comprising 8%
of the list, was not significant to the Round
since

Venezuela was not a member of GATT

.

And,

since Canadian

petroleum enjoyed an exempt status from quotas, America
considered the inclusion of oil on the list unrelated to
the upcoming debate on reciprocity."^^
The EEC's list stirred up controversy, though in defense
of Europe, the process of creating the list was complex.

Each of the Six reserved several items from the GATT talks,
while the Commission proposed a modest list.

France's

exceptions were the most numerous of the six nations.

After a marathon Council of Minister's session, a
compromise provided a list of exceptions shorter than those
of the individual countries but longer than the

Commission's.

Covering 10% of the EEC's dutiable imports,

however, the final product bothered the other GATT

parties 80
Though comprising the same percentage of U.S. imports
(excluding oil)

,

the list was much more encompassing and
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restrictive than those of the other nations.

For instance,

the EEC essentially eliminated 80% of
Norway's exports from
tariff cuts. Also, the list was complex,
divided into
three categories

There was a section for full exceptions,
including

machinery and commercial vehicles (detrimental to
U.S.
interests)

and a variety of other items.

Partial

exceptions, in which the EEC would offer less than 50%
cuts,

contained aluminum and magnesium.

Finally,

conditional exceptions would be removed on chemicals if

America eliminated the ASP; on autos, when Britain took
them off its list, on watches as soon as Switzerland
stopped banning the exports of watch-making equipment; and
on cotton textiles,

bargaining.

if all nations put them up for

The EEC argued that the latter two categories

would ensure reciprocity, but congressional advisor Thomas
Curtis later wrote that the tactic was another indication
of Common Market impediments to the Kennedy Round.

^"^

The EEC and the other nations would have to justify

their industrial exceptions during the next stage of the
negotiations, and the prospects for further conflict

between America and Europe were likely.

Over the past two

years, de Gaulle had exposed the differences between the

two trade partners.
realm,

In the larger political and diplomatic

de Gaulle's veto of British membership in the Common

Market signaled a dissatisfaction with U.S. efforts to link
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the Atlantic community together on
a more intimate military
and economic basis. Most Europeans
did not share
de

Gaulle's opinion that America plotted
to preserve its
domination in Europe by using Britain and
the idea of
partnership to bend the Six in favor of
U.S. policies.
They viewed the veto as a flagrant abuse
of his power
within the Common Market. Without a doubt,

a

however, de

Gaulle stymied the Grand Design, considerably
weakened the
effects of the TEA, and in many respects, put his
partners
in the EEC and the U.S.

on notice that the Kennedy Round

would be a difficult affair.
death,

And with the veto, Kennedy's

and Johnson's subsequent Vietnam-first policy, the

Atlantic community, as historian Frank Costigliola points
out,

was "gone in a flash. "^^

De Gaulle was able to control EEC policy; the ten months
of bitter and wasteful debate between America and the Six

over the French-induced tariff disparity issue attested to
his power.

But he also found himself confronted by Bonn

just when he had achieved one of his long-standing goals

-

placing the mini-alliance of France and West Germany at the
helm of the EEC.

Erhard's support of trade liberalization

in industry and protection of inefficient West German

farmers contradicted French objectives.

Thus,

de Gaulle

was mired in a two-front war against German aims within the

Common Market and U.S. free-trade designs externally.
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By the end of 1964, he appeared
to be winning on both
fronts.
Erhard had acquiesced to unified
grains prices,
while the Cominon Market had submitted
a list of exceptions
that prohibited tariff cuts on a large
number of items, he
held the bogey of tariff disparities over
America's
head,

and made clear to U.S. farmers that the CAP
was permanent
and directed at European self-sufficiency in
food

production.

By no means was the French input uncontested

among the Six, but the EEC Commission's policy
closely

resembled or was heavily influenced by Paris.
The impact of Gaullism on Atlantic trade relations
and

the Kennedy Round was largely negative.

Hegemony scholars

point to America's trade surplus with the EEC and growth in

agricultural exports to Western Europe as a justification
for the de Gaulle's

policies.

(and EEC)

resistance to U.S. free-trade

The argument is compelling, for the EEC overall

trade deficit with America rose to

a

record high of -2.3

billion in 1963 and improved only slightly in 1964.^^
deficit,

The

joined by strong domestic pressure on EEC members

to reserve markets for European producers gave the

Commission every right to request rules and table
exceptions that were in the Common Market's best interest.
But the U.S. was bargaining for the future, cognizant of
the implications on America'

s

prospective export

performance of the CAP and French resistance to lowering
the common external tariff. Chicken exports amounted to
418

only 3-4% of total U.S. farm exports
to the EEC, but the
implementation of the CAP would mean a loss
of sales to the
region.
The share of U.S. manufactured exports
in the
Common Market would drop as European industries
became more
efficient and productive.
In sum, the effect of EEC

integration and the resolution of European domestic

economic problems would shift to outsiders.

France might

succeed in convincing the other five members that the
EEC
was for the benefit of members at the expense of
outsiders.
The Six then could subordinate their commitment to

commercial liberalization under the Rome Treaty to

protectionism be setting restrictive rules at the Kennedy
Round.
Also, the hegemony argument does not take into

consideration the tremendous drain of NATO expenditures on
the U.S. treasury for the defense of Europe, which were

several times those supplied by the EEC.

Of course,

America received benefits from extending its power
throughout the world, but the payments deficit subjected
its overseas commitments to the threat of cutbacks and and

undermined domestic social programs

.

Without a large trade

surplus, poorer nations dependent on U.S. aid would suffer

and Europe's defenses would decline.

Support existed in

America for the withdrawals of troops and other aid, but
few Europeans, not even de Gaulle, desired such an

approach

Thus,

a

fair-trade policy of export expansion
for all
GATT parties seemed the wisest
course.
Washington was
willing to accept an exchange of more
manufactured imports
from Europe for access to agricultural
markets in the

Common Market.

With the submission of

a

slim U.S.

exceptions list and the determination to
trade according to
comparative advantage, the gains from
concessions granted
in the Kennedy Round would be equal
on both sides of the

Atlantic
Just as policy and trade factors support the
comparative

advantage school's case, so too does the disgruntlement
of
U.S. producers and legislators.

The fair-trade doctrine

was not working satisfactorily according to many
Americans.

Farmers criticized EEC protectionism and were extremely

disappointed at Johnson's decision not to compel a tabling
of agricultural offers alongside industrial exceptions.

Manufacturers chafed at both sides' lists, believing the
Common Market was unduly restrictive and the U.S. not

protective enough.

Congress' barrage of protectionist

bills to prevent a flood of European imports, while the

administration just as vigorously fought these and EEC
efforts to discourage free-trade, provides clear evidence
that the administration faced problems in promoting fair-

trade

.

Common Market policy in the preparatory stage dispelled
the idea that a hegemonic America dictated trade policy.
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When the TEA called for 50% equilinear
tariff cuts, the EEC
created a major conflict out of a relatively
subsidiary
issue by harping on tariff disparities.
When Freeman
pressed for access guarantees in agriculture,
he was flatly

denied by EEC official and private farm
interests.

Europe

also managed to postpone the agricultural
exception lists
and in general, called the shots at the Kennedy
Round

because of its unfinished farm organization.
Also, when Herter minimized U.S. industrial
exceptions,

the Six devised a novel, three-category list that penalized
its trade partners.

The U.S. had an edge in bilateral

trade with the Common Market, but the latter was trying

hard to begin a reversal of this pattern by adjusting the
negotiating rules in its favor.

Thus,

it is difficult to

discern American hegemonic behavior in the early stages of
the GATT talks.

On the contrary, Washington seemed

victimized by French-dominated EEC policy.
The setbacks took their toll on the Johnson

administration's faith in the Kennedy Round.

The President

remained "prudently confident of fruitful results", though
this statement was a far cry from the bounding optimism

after the TEA passage two years before.

The STR office

cautioned that France could kill the Round by vetoing EEC

policy and German reluctance to accommodate Paris on Common
Market farm issues weakened Bonn's advocacy of free-trade.
There was also growing support within the Commission for
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slower progress in the negotiations
in order to consolidate
EEC institutions. Herter predicted
average tariff

reductions of 30-35% instead of the original
50% authorized
by the TEA.^^
By late 1964, gloom pervaded the Kennedy
Round.

The

submittal of exceptions lists brightened the
prospects for
the negotiations, claimed The Wall Street
Journal but the
talks would be prolonged at least one and one-half
years by
disputes.
Business Week placed no bet that the conference
,

would even reach a final agreement.

Secretary of State

Dean Rusk also did not elevate hopes in remarking that
"the

Kennedy Round, like all great enterprises that are
underway, could come to nothing. "^^ Such was the dispirited

atmosphere in Geneva as the contracting parties prepared to
justify their exceptions.
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CHAPTER

7

THE AMERICAN RETREAT,

1965-1968

Negotiations over specific tariff
levels at the Kennedy
Round began in December 1964 when
the participants sought
to justify industrial exceptions
and confront the offers
tabled by others. This bargaining
phase culminated two and
one-half years later after delays,
confusion, and acrimony
among the participants. As the talks
dragged out
into 1966

and 1967, the differences between United
States and Common
Market trade policies were magnified.
As a result, the
negotiations became a business deal, neglecting
both the
grander political implications and often the
principle of

comparative advantage.
As in the two preceding years, the EEC and
America

shaped discussion, and internal constraints factored

heavily into their negotiating positions.

The trend toward

greater European domination in Geneva continued in the

bargaining phase.

The U.S. pressed its policy,

particularly in the agricultural sector, but found itself
stymied either by the EEC's internal problems or by its
external trade policies.

How successfully America attained

its objectives at the Kennedy Round in spite of Common

Market negotiating barriers drives to the heart of the
debate over U.S. trade policy.
In short, this debate centers on U.S. benefits garnered

from the GATT talks.

Hegemony scholars contend that
448

Washington compelled other nations
to accept its free-trade
policies. While conceding losses
in some sectors, America,

driven by domestic interests,
emerged with a bargain that
strengthened its dominance over the
international trade
regime
The comparative-advantage school
argues that the final
stages of the GATT talks witnessed
the coming-of -age of EEC
power and the simultaneous decline of
America's

capabilities in the regime.

The Johnson administration

fought against European protectionism,
lost, and failed to
sign an agreement satisfactory to producers
at home.

Proclaimed

a

triumph for liberal trade, the Kennedy Round

did not meet U.S. expectations and undercut
its trade
strength.

During the first six months of 1965, the newly-arrived
country delegations focused on the exceptions lists
offered
by the nations taking part in the linear tariff cut
exercise.

If not whittled down, these lists,

and

especially the extensive ones presented by the EEC and
Japan, would undermine the 50% across-the-board reductions

authorized by the TEA.

When the effort to narrow down the

lists proved ineffective, GATT Director Eric Wyndham White

proposed that the linear participants discuss separately
the key sectors which encompassed

a

large volume of trade

and were also the most sensitive items at the negotiations.
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At first, the U.S. feared the
sector approach n.ight
replace the 50% cuts with special
rules, encourage cartels,
or induce the EEC to refrain from
large reductions in the
hopes of reducing the tariff disparities
between American
and Common Market barriers.
Yet the U.S. backed the sector
plan for aluminum, pulp and paper,
cotton textiles, steel,
and chemicals, as a means to examine
more thoroughly all
the trade problems in each industry.
Besides, having
looked over the industrial offers, Herter
found many
"meaningful" potential concessions.
In any event, outlines
of the sector agreements did not emerge
until late 1966."^

While negotiators went to work in the five
sectors,
however, a cloud of uncertainty hung over the
Kennedy
Round, due mainly to French policy toward America
and the

Common Market.

De Gaulle's familiar domineering attitude

toward the Atlantic community and Europe drove the EEC in
1965 to a major crisis.

Paris still maintained that the

Kennedy Round had come too soon and might weaken the
integration process of the Common Market.

Since the

reduction of internal tariffs among the Six had not hurt

French industry, though, most Frenchmen began not to fear
as much the potential effects of external trade

liberalization
The problem, wrote American Ambassador Charles Bohlen,

was de Gaulle.

Moving progressively away from EEC

Commission and U.S. objectives, the general attempted to
450

retain French dominance among the
Six by discouraging the
shift of decision-making power to
the Commission in
Brussels.
He soon pushed his own "Grand Design",
promoting
European nationalism to counter what
he saw as American
"hegemony".
Disengagement from NATO, overtures to the
Soviet Union and China, and disrupting
the Kennedy Round
were some of the manifestations of his
policy.
Increasingly, French actions at the Kennedy
Round
revolved around the agricultural sector, and
particularly
grains.

The EEC's unfinished farm program was an
impetus

to Gaullist disruption of the talks and the
Common Market.

France disposed of 90% of its growing surplus of soft
wheat
by exports to non-EEC nations.

The country relied on an

export subsidy, paid in part by France and part out of the

Common Market's agricultural fund, to finance its shipments
abroad.

Yet,

in order to compete with historical grains

exporters, the French newcomer on the world grains market
cut its wheat prices.

Such reductions, however, raised the

subsidy required by farmers to maintain income levels and

placed an additional burden on the treasury in Paris.
Thus, de Gaulle sought to control the Common Market's

farm policy for the benefit of his farmers.

In order to

discourage production by other members, he had persuaded
West Germany to unify cereals prices at an acceptable level
by 1967.

De Gaulle next hoped to shift as much as possible

of France's share of the export subsidy to his EEC partners
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by persuading them to increase
the French share of the
agricultural fund. Furthermore, Paris
aimed to stabli ze
global wheat prices at a high level
to boost profits for
farmers.
To an extent, these objectives
met with the
disapproval of other EEC members and the
United States.^

Franco-American problems on agricultural exports
emerged
as a key potential area for disappointment
for Washington
at the GATT talks.
The foundation of America's fair-trade
farm policy had been the pursuit of access
guarantees
into

the EEC.

But this aim seemed doomed as the Six pressed
for

the Mansholt margin of support plan, which permitted
import
levies to fluctuate with domestic price supports,
protected

EEC producers, and withheld access commitments.

By

limiting Common Market production, the U.S. hoped to
receive assurances of its historical and growing share of
the EEC market.
in France,

Not only were controls naturally unpopular

though, but the Commission refused to grant

access because the EEC's own producers did not receive such

treatment

4

The administration stepped up pressure against EEC

restrictions.

Criticizing the Mansholt plan, USDA

Secretary Freeman found recognition in Europe that

a

"meaningful" access commitment was in order, particularly

after predictions that U.S. commercial wheat exports would
be halved and the French surplus increased in 1965.

Herter

added to EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein "in no
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uncertain terms" that America required
access commitments
or lessened protection under the
variable levies
and

opposed the margin of support.
France did not seek
But Mansholt'

s

a

Mansholt admitted that only

resolution of the farm trade issue.

views worried the administration.

When

he urged the U.S. to consider domestic
as well as

international trade factors, Herter reiterated
his pledge
to negotiate U.S. farm policy.
Since the Common Market
exported a relatively small amount of farm
goods to the
U.S., however, this offer was not significant.

Still,

Vice-President Hubert Humphrey later told Mansholt that
high priced domestic subsidies attracted political
pressure
that hurt efforts to liberalize trade.

Simply put, the

Kennedy Round would "flop" without progress in the
agricultural sector because Congress would never permit
U.S.

concessions on manufactures while cutting out the

American farmer from benefits.
Mansholt replied that America's large trade surplus and
farm exports made appeals against EEC protectionism seem
absurd.

Yet Humphrey explained that the problem was not

just economic but psychological, in that it gave the

impression that Europe was no longer interested in free
trade.

He might also have added that correcting the U.S.

payments balance, so America could fund its

disproportionate share of NATO and foreign aid commitments,

depended on rising farm exports to undergird the trade
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surplus.

Humphrey warned that Johnson had no
choice "but
to take stern measures unless Europe
is willing to play
fair on agriculture".^
In order to avoid a trade war and
test the EEC's

willingness to compromise in the farm sector,
Herter
persuaded President Johnson to forego the fixing

of farm

trade rules, as in the industrial sector, and
set 16

September 1965 as the date for presenting non-grain

agricultural offers.
move,

Domestic pressure necessitated this

since farmers and Congress demanded an indication
of

the administration's continued resolve to link cuts in

manufactures with agricultural concessions.

But the STR

also hoped to prevent the Common Market from offering the

bare minimum of concessions and forcing Washington either
to suspend the Kennedy Round or acquiesce to meager trade

liberalization on food goods.

Thus,

in the event the EEC's

offer was insufficient, Blumenthal recommended that other

nations withhold offers until the Six proposed acceptable

agricultural concessions.

7

In May 1965, the Kennedy Round participants also began

talks on a worldwide marketing arrangement to replace the

International Wheat Agreement of 1949.

Trade in cereals

were central to Euro-American problems in agriculture.

Wheat comprised only 15% of U.S. sales to the EEC.

But

America cared much more about feed grains, which amounted
to 42% of its exports to the Common Market and boomed from
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$197 million in 1960 to $476 million in
1966.

The future

of these exports under the CAP worried
America.

By most

estimates, France would seize a greater
share of the
market, limiting not only U.S. feed grains
but other
nations' meat and dairy exports and possibly
diverting them
to America.^

Guided by the fair-trade doctrine, the United
States
thus had three aims at the grains talks.
First was the
pursuit of access in import markets. The EEC proposed
base access on

a

to

"self-sufficiency ratio", in which member

states would provide 90% of its wheat and feed grain needs

and outside producers would supply the remaining 10%.

At

present, this ratio was 87% to the outside exporters' 13%.

When America pressed for a guaranteed quota at this latter
percentage, the Six refused and countered with the margin
of support plan, proposing limits on internal price and

income supports which would restrict imports.
Second, Washington sought a realistic world price level

for wheat.

In order to remain more competitive in the

global marketplace, Canada consistently dropped below the

wheat price levels set by the International Wheat
Agreement.

Meanwhile, the U.S. had observed the Agreement,

maintained higher prices, and subsequently lost
the market

.

a share of

Though America broke with the Agreement in

1965 in response to Canadian actions, and captured a

greater percentage of key wheat sales in the United Kingdom
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and Japan, the administration opposed
Canadian and
Australian aims at the Kennedy Round of
setting minimum
price levels for wheat significantly above
the world price.
Even more important for American exporters,
the U.S.

resisted an EEC request for

a

high minimum price for feed

grains which would jeopardize exports in this
growing area
of agricultural trade.

Third, America hoped to establish a multilateral
program

to share in providing food aid.

The commitment would both

prevent the EEC's excess production above the self-

sufficiency ratio from entering the world commercial grains
market and relieve the U.S. from its disproportionate

burden of aid to the LDCs

.

Experts worried that while

America gave away food, and thereby reduced its already
depleted wheat stocks, other nations would seize more of
the commercial market.

Asserting that the EEC was quite

capable of taking responsibility for food aid, the U.S. set
an annual target of 10 million tons,

supply

4 0%,

of which America would

the EEC 25%, and Britain, Japan, and others the

remainder
In short, America and other exporters wanted increased

outlets for grain surpluses through the aid commitment,

balanced production and consumption, and stable prices.
Above all, Washington sought access guarantees from the
EEC.

Early on, the talks on cereals sparked optimism in

I
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the otherwise gloomy assessments of
progress in the
agricultural sector.^

Optimism abruptly ended when France boycotted
the
decision-making activities of the EEC on 30

June 1965.

in

March, the EEC Commission had proposed an
ambitious program
for financing agricultural subsidies. Also
recommended was
a greater role for the European Parliament
in budgetary

decisions of the Common Market.

The member states also

went ahead with the timetable to install majority
voting by
19 67 as a replacement for the unanimous voting procedure,

which had allowed de Gaulle to wield his veto so

effectively against Great Britain.

The general could not

stomach these proposals because they enhanced supranational
control by the Commission and undercut his power to shape

European policy.
The other five countries, led by West Germany, countered
de Gaulle.

Since France would be the main beneficiary of

the farm subsidy fund to which they would make large

contributions, they demanded acquiescence to an expanded
role for the EEC in budgetary and political matters in

exchange

.

While de Gaulle refused to link the farm program

with political integration, Erhard and the Five refused to
separate them, and the general walked out of the EEC.

The

Common Market suspended operations, including participation
in the Kennedy Round, until the end of May 1966.
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In Geneva,

the GATT talks stalled without the
EEC

Commission's negotiating mandate from the
Council of
Ministers.
The contracting parties pondered
their
alternatives as the tabling date for agricultural

offers

approached.

The EFTA and Japan, as agricultural
importers,

were not enthusiastic about including the farm
sector in
the Kennedy Round and thus might jump at the
EEC crisis as
an excuse to withhold concessions.

Also, the Six would

feel no pressure to offer concessions once the
crisis
ended, which could prompt a withdrawal of offers
from other

nations and unravel the entire conf erence

"''^
.

After weighing the options, the administration decided
to present its offers.

Only Freeman recommended a

postponement of farm sector talks until Europe was ready.
But the STR reasoned that this "stiff-necked" approach was

useless.

Blumenthal argued that since "agriculture in the

Kennedy Round [was] not going to be

a

success story"

anyway, the U.S. should try to prevent any failure in the

sector from being marked as "our fault".
said,

The reasons, he

were due to domestic politics and diplomatic

problems. 13

Herter suggested presenting the offers but

withholding items of particular interest to the Common
Market.

When farm organizations and legislators agreed,

the President gave the go-ahead.
U.S.

On 16 September 1965, the

offered cuts of 50% on $500 million of $2.1 billion
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dutiable farm imports and withheld
$250 million pending EEC
action

After the tabling, negotiations were
suspended.
EFTA, Canada,

The

Japan, Australia and New Zealand
joined

America in the tabling exercise, hoping the
Common Market
would soon follow with concessions. This
scenario was
unlikely as de Gaulle continued to denounce the
EEC.

Director White called agriculture

a

GATT

"ghastly problem" that

would destroy the Kennedy Round if not solved.

By December

1965, much to the delight of U.S. protectionists, the

Geneva talks had reached
activity.

a

low point in morale and

As a European journalist noted, the Kennedy

Round had "run out of gasoline"

"''^
.

A break in the EEC crisis seemed imminent, however, when
de Gaulle failed to win a majority on the first ballot in

the French elections, partly because of disgust with his

obstructionism in the Common Market.
discuss EEC problems in January, 1966.

He promptly agreed to
Out of these talks

emerged the "Luxembourg Compromise" in which de Gaulle

acquiesced to the budget and voting procedures, lowering
internal tariffs further, and completing the EEC's

negotiating position at the Kennedy Round, while Erhard
conceded on the organization of the Common Market's farm
program.

In the end,

de Gaulle's dramatic exit from

Brussels won him few rewards.

1
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The Compromise gave the Kennedy
Round a shot in the arm,
though the EEC breakdown had halted
the negotiations for 11
months.
The GATT members now felt pressed
for time since
the expiration of TEA authority was
just over a year away
on 30 June 1967.
Reaching this deadline would be a great
feat, especially after the Common
Market, constrained by
the CAP, presented its disappointing
agricultural offers in
July 1966.

Freeman took

a

hardline against the EEC, urging a

reduction of America's concessions to the match
Europe's
offers.

Not only would these shallow offers limit U.S.

exports, he argued, but the LDCs would find more reasons
to

demand bilateral quotas and preferential trading
arrangements which were policies contrary to Washington's
aims of trade liberalization.

Freeman also warned that

giving into the EEC on politically sensitive farm goods

would provoke domestic repercussions."'"'^
Indeed, the American Farm Bureau, wheat farmers, and

fruit and vegetable growers watched developments at the

Kennedy Round in disgust.

The latter group,

for instance,

warned that the binding of the restrictive CAP at such a
high level of protection might prompt another chicken war.
Though total exports of fruits and vegetables to the EEC

had risen 42% from 1960 to 1965, sales in the former began
to fall in 1966 and the latter had already declined in
1963.

The U.S. National Fruit Export Council, backed by
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the Senate Agriculture Conuuittee,
opposed any agreement on
farm or industrial goods until American
commodities got
improved access in Europe. This view
parallelled sentiment
on Capitol Hill.
According to Senator John Sparkman (DAla.), the patience of Congress, ranchers,
and farmers was
not "inexhaustible" in regards to Common
Market

protectionism.

]

ft

The administration responded, but not to the
extent

desired by Freeman.

Herter attacked EEC tobacco

regulations, warning of retaliatory measures if U.S.

exports declined.

But he wisely resisted a tit-for-tat

response of withdrawing concessions.

Instead, he believed

that maintaining America's offer would pressure Europe to

improve its concessions; a skimpy offer would merely lower
all others and lessen the scope of the trade negotiations.

Many farmers besides the Farm Bureau also conceded that

beating the EEC with

a

stick was useless.

The Six were not

only committed to protect their own farmers but had not

finished formulating their collective agricultural policy.
By mid-1966, Herter and many farm interests began to

realize that the demand for access guarantees was

unrealistic 19
This emerging belief, however, did not ease frustrations

during negotiations in the non-grain farm sector in
September 1966.

The EEC offer was a bad one for America,

amounting to concessions of less that 10% on about one461

sixth of the Common Market's dutiable
farm imports.
is, the Six offered tariff cuts
on only
20%,

million,

That

or $40

of America's $1.5 billion worth
of non-grain

exports to the EEC.

Thus, Herter conceded to Senate

Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long
that every effort
had been expended to persuade the Common
Market
to lower

farm import barriers, with little result.

Confiding to

former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Herter
admitted
that he was "frankly, none too sanguine as to the
final
outcome" in the farm sector.

Discussion on industrial barriers held more promise than
food goods.

At the urging of Great Britain, the GATT

members negotiated and agreed to an Anti -Dumping Code

mostly as an attack on American use of this NTB.

Despite

congressional efforts to make the U.S. law more
restrictive, most of the country's exporters and the

administration approved of the Code as

a

way to prevent

other nations from invoking their anti-dumping acts once

tariffs provided less protections after the Kennedy
Round.

Tough talks in the five sectors also made headway in
1966.

The EEC was a focus in these talks, and yet the STR

also feared that the Six would substitute the sectoral

approach for trade liberalization under the 50% linear cut
rule.

Apparently, the Six saw the U.S. -Canada Automotive

Products Act of 1965, which removed trade barriers on
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automobiles and parts in order to create

a

single North

American market, as a model of how trade
might be
controlled rather than freed. ^2 ^here were

indications,

then, that the sector talks would be
rough.

Not a major exporter or importer of pulp
and paper and
aluminum, America had only a secondary interest
in these
sectors.
Nevertheless, the U.S. had some stake in exports.
In the former, Washington rejected plans
by the Nordic and

protectionist EEC nations to tie tariffs to prices in
sort of preferential trade agreement.

In aluminum,

a

the

three big American companies were not big exporters but

backed Canadian and Norwegian efforts against high Japanese
and EEC protective tariff s.^"^
Steel trade, however, was of critical importance to the
U.S.

since it had become a net importer.

Previously an

ardent supporter of the TEA, the industry reversed its

free-trade stance and pushed for quotas after 1962 on LDC
and

Japanese imports.

By this time, the gap between

rising imports and declining exports had widened, and the
ratio of imports to consumption rose from 5.6% in 1962 to
16.7% by 1968.

Figuring decisively into the influx of

imports were high U.S. prices, which had caused Kennedy's

celebrated confrontation with industry leaders in 19 62.

Britain and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
which represented the EEC, also suffered from various
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problems, including overcapacity, weak
demand, inefficient
organization, and costly raw materials.

Protectionism in steel was dangerous.
moderate tariff levels were not as big
subsidies and tax policies.

a

In reality,

problem as export

Yet a failure to cut duties,

which ranged from 9% in the ECSC and U.S. to
15% in Japan,
could instigate withdrawals in other areas at
the Kennedy
Round.
America entered the talks at a disadvantage.
The

country had bound, or fixed through previous
negotiations,
its steel tariffs, unable to raise them without

compensating other nations.

British and ECSC duties were

unbound, could rise against cheap Japanese exports, and

force Tokyo to turn increasingly to the U.S. market.
The ECSC posed a problem.

The Six offered tariff cuts

of 50%, but from the rate of 14% that existed before the

formation of the ECSC, not the 7% level in effect prior to
the industrial tabling exercise in November 1964.

Aiming

not to reduce duties at all, Britain viewed this ploy as a

convenient excuse to stall the steel sector talks.

America

opposed this policy, seeking fairer trade.
Progress in this sector ensued because of U.S. prodding.

Herter proposed to "target" tariff rates, in which each
steel product would be afforded adequate protection.

target plan essentially sought a harmonization of duty
rates, not so much lower rates but similar and more

acceptable levels.

Compelling Britain to take
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a

more

The

productive role in the sector, the scheme
also provided an
impetus for unifying the EEC common
external tariff in
steel, helped America bring its higher
duties in line with
more average rates, and quieted domestic
protectionist
criticism.
In short, the target plan addressed
all sides

of the steel trade issue in an equitable
way.

The plan's

success depended on intensive talks in early 1967.^^
Of prime concern also to Washington was the
cotton

textile sector.

Negotiations centered on reducing tariffs

and renewing the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement
(LTA)

,

due to expire in September 1967.

GATT Director and

Cotton Textile Sector Group Chairman Wyndham White had

recommended this linking of tariff cuts with a more liberal
implementation of the LTA.
Despite the proliferation of bilateral protectionist
quotas under the Arrangement, Asian exporters accepted its

renewal

.

An alternative to the LTA might be unilateral

restraints imposed by importers.

In addition,

low-cost

nations such as Pakistan, India, and Korea, and the UAR had
recently taken over markets previously held by Japan and

Hong Kong.

Thus, these latter two now had a stake in the

LTA status quo because it guaranteed them
U.S.

a

fixed share of

and European markets without having to compete against

the "newcomers".

Nevertheless, exporters demanded

liberalization of the LTA and more access in bilateral
trade and warned that the response to their demands would
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greatly affect whether they approved of
the Kennedy
Round.

Generally satisfied with the LTA, the Six
recognized
their obligation to permit more imports into
their markets.

America pressured the EEC toward this end, believing
that
Europe's overprotected market unfairly diverted
Asian
textiles into the United States.

The Common Market

preferred to cut tariffs rather than grant more access,
but
America hoped to win the Six over to Wyndham White's
linkage of the LTA to tariff cuts.^"^
Not only did Washington want Europe to buy more
textiles, but it sought to renew a basically unchanged LTA,

which had helped open up the EEC in the first place and
slowed American imports.

The LTA had also relieved the

White House from domestic pressure from producers, who

enjoyed rising profits in the mid-1960s.

These boom times

strengthened the administration's resolve against including
synthetics and wool in a quota agreement, despite the

insistence of textilemen and Congress. 2 8
Meanwhile, the fact that the textile industry had

enjoyed economic success and the U.S. had imposed
restrictions using the LTA more than any other nation made

America vulnerable to attacks from exporting nations
U.S.
1967,

.

The

still took in a large share of LDC cotton goods; by

imports had risen more than 30% since 1962 and were

9.5% of domestic consumption when they had been 7.2% five
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years before.

On the other hand, Washington
recognized its

weak bargaining position; without

renewal satisfactory to

a

the LDCs, the latter might withdraw
from the Arrangement
and render it ineffective. The "price"
America was willing
to pay for an extension of the LTA for
five years was a
more liberal import policy, particularly
increased

bilateral quota ceilings and growth rates and
lower
tariffs

Many LDCs rejected a renewal of the LTA before
being
granted tariff cuts at the Kennedy Round. As a result,
U.S.

the

sought bilateral agreements which promised an increase

of LTA quotas for the LDCs after its extension.

This

"policy of encirclement", wrote congressional advisor
Thomas Curtis, won Japanese and then LDC consent to its

two-fold scheme.

Unfortunately, the EEC could not agree on

a common textile policy

-

the Six bargained separately on

the LTA but collectively on tariffs

-

and they had problems

reaching bilateral accords with exporters.

To the

irritation of the LDCs and the United States, the Common

Market delayed the LTA renegotiation until March 1967."^°
The focal point of the industrial negototiations was the

chemical sector and the tariff disparities between U.S. and

British duties and the more moderate EEC rates.
was the American Selling Price (ASP)

,

At issue

the system of customs

valuation which increased duties well above the actual
value of four products: canned clams, wool knit gloves.

rubber footwear, and certain synthetic
organic chemicals.
Actually, the ASP was relatively
insignificant in trade
terms, applying to only 108 of over
800 U.S. chemical
tariffs and $43 million of the total
$958 million of
chemical imports. But the ASP became the
EEC's "cause
celebre" in Geneva because it was so blatantly

protectionist
Leading the attack, the Six insisted that
the

elimination of the ASP was

a

precondition for lowering

barriers to U.S. chemical exports.

Britain concurred, as

did Japan for the sake of its footwear exports.

France and

West Germany argued that synthetic organics were critical
since they suffered a trade deficit with America in this
category.

Prized by U.S. protectionists, the ASP was also

a useful counterweight against American efforts to reduce

CAP farm barriers.

As U.S. ambassador to the EEC

J.

Robert

Schaetzel reported, the ASP was an emotion-charged element
at the Kennedy Round, though European "preoccupation

substantially unrelated to the facts.

[was]

""^^

Schaetzel believed the EEC exaggerated the effect of the
ASP because the system covered an inconsequential amount of
trade.

Yet the anachronistic ASP had outlived its

usefulness.

U.S.

chemical exports had risen by nearly two-

thirds between 1962 and 1967, from $1.8 to $2.8 billion,
and totaled 9% of America's total sales abroad.

imports increased 20%, from $765 to $958 million.
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Meanwhile,

With a

three-to-one ratio of exports to imports,
the industry did
not merit protection.
But industry resistance to the
principle of comparative advantage
frustrated the
administration.

White House aide and trade advisor
Francis

Bator noted that though the ASP applied
to only

a

tiny

fraction of American imports, it was a
"protectionist
gimmick entirely out of line with our liberal
trade

posture"

Producers and their congressmen defied the
administration's fair-trade strategy.

Peter Rodino (D-NJ)

,

Led by Congressman

large delegations on Capitol Hill

lobbied the President against abolishing the ASP at the
Kennedy Round.

By 1967,

134 House members and 17 Senators

from 12 big industrial and Southern states had written
Johnson, and 40 legislators, mostly from New England,

exerted similar pressure on behalf of the footwear
industry.

Though there was no support for it in the House

Ways and Means Committee, noted STR deputy William Roth,
the Senate Finance Committee wanted the ASP retained "for
its own sake".

The system was the "trickiest political

issue", he said. 34
In June 1966, the Senate adopted a resolution sponsored

by Abraham Ribicoff (R-CT) and 12 others demanding that
NTBs such as the ASP should not be negotiated without the

consent of Congress.

Legally, they argued, the TEA did not

authorize bargaining over the ASP at the Kennedy Round.

This position also seemed fair to
Congress; Kennedy had

privately pledged in 1962 to retain
the ASP.
to boost U.S. chemical exports and
above

But in order

all,

conclude the

GATT talks, Johnson wished to work out
a difficult

compromise with the EEC to abolish the system.

^he ASP

had become a "cause celebre" on both sides
of the Atlantic.
These domestic problems affected U.S. bargaining
with
the EEC. Most important, the GATT members
based
negotiations at the Kennedy Round on reciprocity.

The

Common Market, however, had yet to offer concessions
on
chemicals.

In fact,

the Six flatly rejected a U.S.

proposal to convert ASP tariffs to ad valorem rates and
then proceed with 50% linear cuts, responding instead with
a long list of

exceptions and disparities regarding

chemical duty levels.

Still, the EEC held the bargaining

advantage since it imported from America

a

amount of chemicals than it exported.

Europe required an

"^^

much greater

acceptable deal.
The turning point came with America's two-package plan,

labeled "decoupage", meaning "cutting apart".

The U.S.

separated tariff cuts from the ASP because the latter'

elimination required congressional consent.

By tying the

two together, the entire Kennedy Round agreement would be

cancelled in the event Congress refused to annul the ASP.
Thus, the U.S.

insisted on reductions of EEC chemical

tariffs in return for American cuts.
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Then,

Johnson would

abolish the ASP in exchange for EEC
concessions of equal
value on NTBs such as road taxes. ^"^

Decoupage was

a

compromise that met European demands to

end the ASP and America's aims of lowering
barriers to
chemical exports. As Bator explained,
because the EEC
and especially France

-

-

had made such a big deal about the

ASP, the U.S. could now use it as a bargaining
chip for

more than it was really worth.

By the end of 1966,

however, only Switzerland and Britain had
responded with

offers in line with the decoupage package.

As in the other

industrial sectors and in agriculture, a chemical deal

would be thrashed out during the Kennedy Round "crisis"

period in Spring 1967, as the participants tried to reach
an agreement before time ran out on the TEA.~^^

Heading into the final stages, the Kennedy Round took on
much significance for Johnson in terms of alliance
politics, diplomacy, and the balance-of -payments

.

the alliance, relations were shaky with de Gaulle.

Within
The

general had stepped up attacks against U.S. investment in
Europe, hurt the dollar by instigating another gold run,

and criticized the Vietnam War.

By March 1966, he began

the French withdrawal from NATO that rocked the alliance.
In May 1967,

he vetoed British membership in the EEC for

the second time because he still believed that London was

tied too closely to Washington.
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France also led efforts to

counter U.S. "imperialism" by denouncing
the cultural and
economic "Americanization" of Europe.

Another blow to transatlantic links was
Johnson's
preoccupation with Vietnam and domestic programs.
Many
Europeans accurately pointed out that Johnson
neglected
their region as he focused increasingly on
Southeast Asia.
Only West Germany lent full support to the
intervention in
Vietnam.

Many agreed with German politician Kurt

Birrenbach that the President's concern with Great
Society
economic programs showed that Johnson had
interest in entanglements in Europe.

a

lessened

Johnson denied the

charge but acknowledged that he had a real public relations

problem in Europe.

'^'^

Above all, Washington noted by this time the EEC's power
to shape Atlantic policy.

Fowler,

Secretary of the Treasury Henry

for instance, feared that France would use the EEC

either to expel the U.S. from Europe or diminish American

strength in the area.

A National Security Council report

suggested that the heated controversies in the alliance

demonstrated Europe's desire for

a "voice"

in world

affairs, and stemmed from the region's integration "fed by

increasing European strength"

.

Such a trend came at the

expense of the United States.
In response, the U.S.

saw no reason why the EEC could

not contribute more of its fair share to alliance

commitments.

Vice-President Humphrey and Senators George
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McGovern (D-SD) and Stuart Symington
(D-MO) were among the
rising chorus of officials who attacked
Europe's reluctance
to shoulder more of the aid and military
burden.
Bator
reminded the President that the U.S. payments
deficit could
be converted into a surplus with a scaling
back
of defense

expenses.

Johnson acknowledged that a "showdown" with

Congress was in the offing if EEC protectionism
prevented
from paying part of its share with revenue earned
from

higher exports to the allies

.

'^^

The persistent payments deficit warranted the decade-

long stress on freer trade and equitable burden-sharing

with Europe.

Reaching

a

high of $6.8 billion in 1964, the

merchandise trade surplus fell to $4.95 billion the next
year and by 1966 was $3.81 billion.

Because of voluntary

restraints on capital outflows, limits on dollar sales by
the Federal Reserve Board, and export expansion efforts,

however, the declining trade surplus at first did not

worsen the payments deficit.

Thus,

in 1965,

these measures

created the first quarterly payments surplus since 1957,
reduced the deficit to $1.3 billion from the $3.1 billion
of 19 64,

and virtually halted the gold drain.

Yet during the next few years, these encouraging trends
faded.

Inflationary pressures caused by Great Society

programs and the rising costs of Vietnam from 1965 to 1967
caused imports to grow by 12%, while exports trailed at
7.7% because many other nations cooled down their economies

with deflationary policies.

Also, by 1966,

Johnson's

elaborate bureaucracy established to
promote exports ceased
meeting and thereby contributed to the
deteriorating trade
balance.
By 1967, the trade surplus dipped slightly
to

$3.8 billion.

The payments deficit rose again above
$3

billion and prompted another run on gold.^^
Trade with the EEC, moreover, did not help the
deficit,

and gave the administration reason to demand a
greater

European contribution to NATO and aid programs.

America enjoyed

a $2.28

In 1964,

billion edge in trade with the

Common Market, but this advantage steadily declined in the

ensuing years.
1968,

By 1967, the surplus had been halved and by

it was a mere 41 million.

EEC imports from America

grew 5.2% from 1964 to 1966, but its exports across the

Atlantic jumped nearly 20%.

In addition,

Europe was a much

more important customer for U.S. goods than vice versa.
For instance, the Six bought 18.2% of total American

exports in 1965 and sold only 7.1% of their goods.

The

critical EEC market, America's declining trade surplus, and

Europe's higher industrial output relative to U.S.

production showed the Common Market to be

a

competitive

power that could be expected to assume its fair share of
alliance commitments. 44

A good start in this direction, believed the U.S., would
be Europe's willingness to liberalize trade.

For his part,

Johnson had initiated a determined campaign to beat back
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protectionism during the mid-1960s.

Only two of the eight

products under the escape clause in 1962
remained under
protection by January 1967.
Included was

the sheet glass

restriction, which induced the EEC to free
U.S. chemicals
from the retaliatory limits imposed in June 1962.^^
But
this trade cooperation seemed a rare positive
note in the
increasingly discordant U.S. -EEC trade relationship.

Proponents of free-trade in the United States doubted
that trade liberalization would enhance this
relationship.
In a hearing on the Kennedy Round in 1966,

for instance.

Chairman Leonard Farbstein (D-NY) lamented that the hopes

inspired by Kennedy for Western unity through tariff
reductions had not come to much.

"On the face of it,

in

view of the apparent setbacks to our political and military
policies in Europe in recent years", he said, "we seem to
have misjudged the impact that [the TEA] would have" on

Atlantic relations. 4 6

The reason for this failure,

Secretary of State Rusk informed the President, was the
shift in the balance-of -trade power to the Common Market.

'^'^

U.S. ambassador Schaetzel pointed out more negative than

positive factors in assessing EEC trade policy.

Economic

problems in France, West Germany, and Italy in late 1966
might discourage movement toward opening their markets to
competitors.

A deal in agriculture could "be pulled off"

but only if the administration prevented "irate farm

interests and legislators" from disrupting the
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negotiations.

In any event,

he pleaded for Herter to end

his "bouts of dark gloom and excessive
anti-Coirunon Market
bias" developed over years of dealing
with the Six/^
But in general, U.S. officials were
not sanguine about

persuading the EEC to lower trade barriers as
the Kennedy
Round headed for its finish. The ouster from
power of
Erhard in West Germany in November 1966 took away
a free-

trade champion in the Common Market

.

George Ball

complained that EEC policy appealed to "the lowest common
denominator" of trade liberalization, particularly in the

agricultural sector.
in December 1966,

Herter,

just months before his death

remained only "guardedly optimistic"

about success at the Kennedy Round.

Congressman Curtis'

positive outlook in December had faded by mid-January 1967
as crises in the industrial and farm sector loomed.''^

Mounting problems in Geneva provoked criticism at home.
Senators Long of the Senate Finance Committee and Minority

Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Ill.) censured the White House
for its overly-generous trade policy, and Vance Hartke (DInd.)

called the TEA

a

"colossal failure".

Several experts

predicted that the Kennedy Round would be a bad bargain for
the United States and forecast an average tariff cut of 15%
to 18%,

a far cry

from the TEA'

s

50% goal.

In response,

William Roth, the new STR, pledged that any imbalances in
offers would be eliminated to assure reciprocity.

If not

possible, the U.S. would reject the final agreement.
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50

Yet by February 1967, there were
hopeful signs.
Johnson's rollback of sheet glass and watch
duties sparked
praise from the EEC and Switzerland and
boosted morale at
the Kennedy Round. When America found
that its total

industrial offers would result in

country prepared

a

a

$2

million deficit, the

withdrawal list to ensure reciprocity.

Though justified, the action could have undone
the

negotiations if not for the EEC's refusal to submit
similar withdrawal list.

Thus,

their offers, the Six showed
the "big issues".

a

a

opting instead to improve

willingness to bargain on

In order to leave time for an assessment

of the final package before 30 June, Roth set an informal

deadline for the end of March for an agreement on the

remaining points. 51
•

•

When this date passed, however, the Kennedy Round

entered a "crisis" stage lasting from April to June 1967.
When Roth flew to Geneva to take charge of the U.S.
delegation, the President set up a secret, inter-agency

"Command Group" to give the STR "appropriate backstopping"
at home and Johnson an "open shot" to make fair,

decisions.

critical

Directed by White House aide Bator, the group

consisted of an STR deputy and high-ranking State,
Commerce, and Agriculture Department members, and

communicated under the code name LIMDI S -POTATOES
elaborate structure sounded "like

a

.

This

battle plan", wrote

Bator to Johnson, but the Kennedy Round would face such
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a

"crunch" in the coming weeks that it
required close
attention, "cool nerves, and fine
negotiating judgment to
pull it off"
Concluded Bator, "not only five years
of
work, but your entire trade policy
is at
.

stake".

Though the crisis centered on U.S. -EEC
bargaining over
agriculture and chemicals, the U.S. managed
to forge

bilateral arrangements with the EFTA, Canada,
and Japan.
With the Outer Seven, America came out on top in
agriculture and about even on industrial items cut
by the
linear cut method.
Canada, which did not negotiate

according to the linear procedure, also received an
equitable deal.

Ottawa granted concessions on imports from

the U.S. amounting to $1.4 billion, while America cut

tariffs $1.25 billion.

A balanced deal in the farm sector

and the ant i -dumping code, both of top priority interest to
Canada, boosted its trade with the United States.

The U.S. -Japan bilateral talks resulted in 30-35% tariff

reductions, but this trade relationship underwent great
strain.

Japan's long list of exceptions and insistence on

negotiating VERs before it lowered duties placed Washington
at a disadvantage.

Experts judged that a discrepancy of

$500 million to $1 billion in offers existed in Tokyo's
favor.

America consequently withdrew offers in the cotton

textile and steel sectors to correct this imbalance.
Nevertheless, the U.S. still came out on the worst end of
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the deal, and last-minute haggling only
generated more ill
feeling on both sides.

Discussions with the Common Market yielded
a mixed bag
of successes and failures.
By early May, America's

frustration with the lack of progress on the "big
issues"
forced Roth to issue another deadline of May
9, after which
he would return home if no agreement was reached.
Causing

particular irritation was the EEC's submission of

a list of

withdrawals based on tariff disparities, the major point
of
conflict that had hung over the negotiations since 19631964.

Blumenthal abruptly laid the matter to rest by

reminding the Europeans that no rules on disparities

existed and threatened counter-withdrawals if the Six
invoked the list.
Still, negotiations proceeded in the five industrial

sectors.

There were substantial cuts in the pulp and paper

sector but disappointing results in the aluminum talks.

Both

sectors were of only secondary interest to the United

States, unlike discussions in steel, cotton textiles, and

chemicals 55
,

.

T

America's proposal of steel target rates, though leading
to some improvement in offers, eventually fell by the

wayside in early 1967 because others believed that the

projected tariff levels were too low for suitable
protection.

Yet in the end, each nation lowered tariffs to

a level in which all duties would be matched equivalently
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In sum,

Japan and Britain cut more than the
EEC and United

States
The average overall cut in the sector
was 37%, a solid
achivement.
Washington won reductions on its key steel
exports, with ECSC concessions covering
90%, or $709

million, of U.S. shipments to the Common
Market.

Nearly

70% of these cuts reduced tariffs from 25 to 49%.

The

subsequent outcry for quotas from the U.S. steel
industry

clearly marked the extent of American concessions.
as a result of the Kennedy Round accord,

Partly

steel imports rose

from 11.4 to 17.9 thousand tons from 1967 to 1968, a 63%
increase. 56

^

.

Despite its slightly higher tariff levels,

America was a fair-trader in steel.
In textiles,

the participants extended the LTA for three

years after considerable argument between the EEC and the
LDCs and Japan in bilateral talks.

Thus, America

prevailed; the LTA was not liberalized but importers cut

tariffs at the Kennedy Round by 21% and agreed to
time bonus quota.

a

one-

The U.S. lowered its synthetic duties

24% and 37% on yarn, but only 18% on fabrics,

6% on

apparel, and a mere 5% on wool due to domestic pressure
(though the average wool cuts in the sector were 2%)
In sum,

U.S. textile tariffs fell 15% while the EEC's

declined 20%.

Though the LDCs complained about the

agreement, there was no better alternative.

Besides,

cotton textiles soon diminished in trade importance for the
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Third World, replaced by man-made fabrics.

The

administration had managed to stave off pressure
from the
industry and mild prodding from Congress for
the inclusion
of all fibers in the LTA and for no tariff
cuts at
all on

textile duties.
rose until 1972.

Above all, U.S. imports in all materials

America certainly strained the bounds

of fair-trade in textiles, but was as reasonable
as

possible considering trends of rapid growth of LDC exports,
European protectionism, and domestic political pressure.
The chemical sector remained the toughest area of

bargaining on industrial tariffs.
1967,

By the end of April

the sector had stalled on the two-package decoupage

proposal.

America insisted on unconditional cuts by the

EEC on most chemical products while Europe tied reductions
to the elimination of the ASP.

The Six were unyielding on

this aim, rejecting a suggestion by Wyndham White that each

party cut tariffs 20% at the Kennedy Round and an
additional 30% once the ASP was abolished.^®

Noting that European demands would result in an

unbalanced deal clearly to America's disadvantage and
contradictory to the TEA'
at the Kennedy Round,

s

intent of attaining reciprocity

Washington played "chicken" with

Europe in the chemical sector.

Above all, the

administration feared that the EEC made implementation of
the entire Kennedy Round agreement dangerously contingent
on congressional action on the ASP.
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Roth warned in May

that the ASP issue could be a "stopper"
to the
conference.

Wyndham White broke the deadlock at the final
"marathon"
meeting of the Kennedy Round on 15 May 1967.
His

compromise entailed American cuts of 20% on its
low duties,
while the EEC reduced its high tariffs by 20%
(instead
of

30%)

,

and Switzerland and Japan maintained their initial

reduction offers.

Under

a

separate agreement using the

decoupage approach, the U.S. would eliminate the ASP,
convert duties under the system to normal valuation, and

then reduce low-tariff goods by an additional 30%.

Then,

the Common Market would reciprocate by cutting its high

tariffs another 30% and grant concessions on some NTBs
The final package benefited America by promoting the law
of comparative advantage.

Taking both the initial tariff

and ASP agreement together, the average cuts were 46-49%,

nearly meeting the TEA goal.

The U.S. was the victor,

whether each package, the combined settlement, or bilateral
trade is considered.

Since its imports were small relative

to exports, the country gained by granting $314 million in

concessions and receiving $796 million from others.

Though

its dye industry might be jeopardized by the elimination of

the ASP, the U.S. would enjoy rising exports starting in
1968.

60

Unfortunately, to the administration's disgust.

Congress later refused to repeal the ASP and America

appeared as a selfish trader in chemicals.
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The Common Market, however, was
unyielding in

agriculture, arguing that a similar effort
in farm trade
liberalization as in industry was untenable.
In the nongrain sector, the Six led others in offering
duty cuts
amounting to $238 million, or half the U.S.
exports

available for reductions.

On trade coverage alone, the

U.S. came out ahead and cut farm tariffs less
than others.

But CAP variable levies items were of major interest,
on

which no worthwhile concessions were obtained.

non-grain sector resulted in only

a

Thus, the

minor degree of

success
The EEC was the main reason for the disappointing

finish.

In addition to the small overall concessions,

there was little progress in the dairy and meat sector

because of the CAP in the former and the combined
restrictions of the Six and Britain in the latter.

American fruit growers, moreover, criticized the EEC's
token offers.

Nevertheless, Johnson rejected Freeman's

request at the end of the talks to withdraw America's offer
on canned hams as a means to balance the agreement,

realizing retaliation was senseless.

Overall, the Common

Market discouraged trade liberalization in the non-grain
farm sector.
The U.S. hoped for a more positive outcome in the

cereals sector, where exporters and importers had begun

negotiating an International Grains Agreement
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(IGA)

in

February 1967.
expectations.

Yet EEC rigidity undercut these

Exporters realized that the Kennedy Round

offered their last chance for some time
to secure an
acceptable aggreement from the Six on sharing in

the future

growth of the EEC market, price levels, and
food aid.
Problems persisted, however, in all three areas.
The Common Market flatly rejected the access
commitment.

Washington tried to fix the Common Market's selfsufficiency ratio at 87% by pressing for a quota for
outside producers to apply to the remaining 13% of the EEC
grains market.

Refusing this guarantee, the Six blocked

America's primary objective at the IGA talks.
Price policy remained a major difficulty.

Agreement by

Canada, Australia and the United States on global wheat

prices seemed likely after much haggling.

They set a

minimum price of $1.70 to $1.75 per bushel, but this level
ended up being too far above actual market prices in
subsequent years
a

.

A stalemate ensued over EEC demands for

minimum feed grains price, which was the key U.S. export

interest.

Such price supports, determined by the margin of

support proposal, would curb American exports of corn,
sorghums, and other feed grains. 64

Another impasse ensued.

Washington initially had advocated an annual 10 million
ton donable food commitment as

a

means of keeping the EEC's

surplus grains off commercial markets and establishing

fairer levels of aid burden-sharing among exporters.
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America hoped the Common Market would
provide one-quarter
of the aid, while the U.S. would
donate 40% and
other

participants the remaining 35%.

By Spring 1967, however,

the STR lowered the commitment to 4-6
million tons, though
the EEC pressed for 3 million.
Japan, as a grains
importer, wished to give a small share or a
cash

equivalent.

65

Again, American objectives were in jeopardy.

The deadlock of May 1967 naturally provoked
criticism at
home.

The Farm Bureau and wheat growers continued to

resist the marketing arrangement.

Most other farmers

backed U.S. efforts, but pressed for an acceptable grains
deal becuase there would be "nothing more disastrous than

having to face a closed door in Europe, carrying on the

Vietnam War, and trying to give aid to all the
underdeveloped of the world", cautioned James Patton,
leader of the National Farmers Union.

That is,

a

healthy

payments balance rode on a fair-trade settlement in the
IGA.
In effect,

the administration began to modify its policy

on grains by applying the fair-trade doctrine.

Ambassador

Schaetzel wrote from Brussels that the "nasty issue" of

agriculture could be resolved only if American farmers
awoke from their "dreamland" of believing that other

nations should trade according to the law of comparative
advantage.

The EEC's denial of access guarantees

demonstrated the inapplicability of this principle.
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White

House aide Bator also urged the President
to ignore
pressure from Freeman to withdraw from the Kennedy
the EEC remained obstinate on the IGA.

Round if

Washington still

insisted on equitable deals in both the industrial
and farm
sector, but increasingly realized a compromise in
grains

was in order 67

After the Command Group met and digested several LIMDISPOTATOES secret communications from the STR office in
Geneva, the administration settled on a compromise which

gave in to EEC policy.

America dropped its demand for

access guarantees in return for the Common Market dropping
the feed grains support price.

Actually, this strategy had

been developed some months before, but as the IGA reached

a

crisis stage, the Command Group had notified the President
of his options.
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The plan succeeded in breaking the

deadlock in the cereals sector, though in general not to
the advantage of the United States.
The grains deal, which 52 nations later endorsed in Rome
in August 1967 as the three-year IGA,

concessions.

reflected U.S.

The minimum wheat price level was still too

high to encourage efficient trade.

The food aid commitment

fell short of America's initial 10 million ton amount and

the sharing percentage.

The annual contribution was set at

4.5 million tons, with the U.S. supplying 42%, the EEC 23%,

Canada 9%, and the other nations the remainder.

Above all,

the U.S. failed to obtain an adequate self-sufficiency
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ratio or access guarantees in the Common Market.

America

retreated in the grains sector, abandoning its key
positions in the face of EEC pressure.
As later trade showed, the IGA did not help American

grains exports in European markets.

seemed

a failure,

The deal immediately

as wheat prices tumbled well below the

IGA minimum in 1967 and 1968 and distorted trade.

The high

minimum price also hurt U.S. wheat sales by reducing the
cost of the French and the CAP export subsidy and

stimulating production in the LDCs, thus decreasing

American wheat, flour, and rye sales.

The absence of

access commitments also reduced American feed grains in
Europe.

By 1969, these exports were less than half the

sales registered in 1966.

In any event,

the IGA did

attempt to rationalize trade in cereals, began

a

food aid

program, and above all, eased the way to a conclusion of

the Kennedy Round 70

Despite the agricultural imbalance, Johnson authorized

Roth to approve the GATT accord on 15 May 1967 after Bator

had warned that without U.S. consent, the other nations

would resort to "jungle warfare" and "spiraling
71
protectionism with parliaments holding the whip hand"

The President might "take some heat" from domestic farm,

textile, and chemical interests.

But the bargain was fair

enough in economic terms and surely not worth provoking

diplomatic backlash after four years of difficult talks.
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a

After some last -minute adjustments to
accommodate the EEC,
the contracting parties signed the
Kennedy Round agreement
just hours before the TEA expired on
30 June
1967.

On the one hand, the results were
impressive.

The GATT

members not only negotiated in certain difficult
areas but
forged an agreement that promoted closer
relations.
Specific successes included the chemical package,
the IGA
aid program, and the Anti-Dumping Code as well
as an

initial stab at NTBs

.

Most experts, the American and

European press, the Johnson administration, and GATT
officials lauded the Kennedy Round as the "highwater mark
of international trade cooperation", the "most successful

trade negotiations in history", and an "historic

compromise" 73
The Kennedy Round encompassed $40 billion in trade, more

than eight times that of the Dillon Round.

The major

industrial nations cut tariffs on manufactures by an

average of 35% on $25.7 billion out of

dutiable imports.
50%.

a

total $37 billion

Two-thirds of these reductions were by

Lowered to an average of

9%,

rendered virtually meaningless.

industrial tariffs were

Tariff disparities were

also no longer an issue; only .8% of U.S. duties were above
30%,

when once 7.5% were higher.

And, the tariffs of both

the EEC and EFTA ended up half of the level existing before

they formed into blocs.

Above all, no nation gained
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inordinately over another; the accord was
balanced and
reciprocal 74

American industrial tariffs alone came down
64% when the
most significant GATT round in 1947 had resulted
in a 54%

decrease and an overall cut by all participants of
20%.

Granting concessions on $6.4 billion worth of manufactured
imports,

and $2 billion to the EEC, the U.S. received in

return reductions on $6.7 billion of its exports, and $2.7

billion from the Six.
it gave to America.

Only Japan got more concessions than
The largest cuts were in advanced

technology items; transportation equipment, machinery, and
chemical, all beneficial to America.

'^^

On the other hand, parts of the agreement revealed

little progress toward trade liberalization.
for the LDCs was meager.

The record

They had initiated an "Action

Program" to stimulate exports by reducing or eliminating

quotas and tariffs which restricted access to the North.

Though the U.S. granted concessions amounting to $900
million,

it resisted joining the emerging consensus for

tariff preferences, and its advocacy of the LTA hurt Asian
producers.

Tropical products were also losers despite the

special authority in the TEA.

Though GATT delegate John

Evans asserted that the LDCs profited from the agreement,

they thought it was a bust.

Even Wyndham White singled out

the gains for the poor nations as too modest.
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STR Roth cited the small cuts in aluminum,
steel, and

cotton textiles and the EEC's unwillingness to lower

barriers to a few high-tech goods, such as business
machines, as disappointments. Some of them were setbacks
for the United States.

In the latter field,

electronics

tariff cuts were minor, which both hurt U.S. exporters and

helped domestic producers in curbing imports from Japan,
However, excluding mineral fuels, U.S. exports would gain
$541 million while imports would rise $537 million,
$7 million surplus in the non-farm sector.

just a

Without the

repeal of the ASP, however, the export increase would drop
to $487 million, thus netting America a loss in trade from

the Kennedy Round. 77
The equivalent depth of reductions and broad coverage of

the industrial sector did not occur in agriculture, which
was the biggest defeat for U.S. objectives.

Though the

volume of trade subject to tariff reductions was

f our-to-

one in America's favor, the average duty cuts were 20%,

while industrial tariffs were reduced 35%.

The CAP

prevented cuts on a host of U.S. exports, including grains
and poultry, and Washington won no access guarantees to

assure future levels of farm sales.
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The EEC blocked the

fair-trade doctrine in agriculture
This setback spurred a dangerous reaction against the

EEC and free-trade in general.

Freeman and the USDA tried

to put the best face on the agreement, calling it
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a

"modest

success" in which U.S. aims had been realized
"to some
extent".
Yet the "lessons" of the Kennedy Round were

largely negative.

Freeman learned that no longer could

America hope to lower European farm trade barriers by
invoking the benefits of free-trade.
Instead, he detected a divergence in philosophy

concerning commerce in the agricultural sector.

Nations

such as the United States traded according to the law of

comparative advantage, while the EEC adhered to the law
only in certain cases, and the LDCs produced to exist.
These approaches created a "disturbing" conflict which

undergirded the problems at the Kennedy Round and boded ill
for future American export prospects.
U.S.

bloc,

farmers agreed.

Major exporters within the farm

such as the Farm Bureau and big grain dealers,

opposed the IGA partly in principle against state-run

marketing agreements and partly because it curbed liberal
trade.

Above all, they realized that their exports were

left completely "at the mercy" of EEC policy.

Since the

Kennedy Round failed to obtain meaningful concessions on
CAP variable levy items, claimed the Farm Bureau, the

results were moderate, "at best".
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Opinion on Capitol Hill concurred.

Carlson (R-KS)

,

Senator Frank

the key farm-state member on the Finance

Committee, reserved judgment on the overall package but

criticized the IGA.

On behalf of the House Republican Task
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Force on Agriculture, Congressman Odin Langen
(R-Minn.)
called the Kennedy Round a "failure", blasted
the

administration's negotiating behavior, and joined
other
legislators in declaring that the American farmer
had been
"sold out" in Geneva.
In the industrial sector,

lukewarm views.

opinion ranged from disgust to

Textilemen recorded their "deep

disappointment" that the LTA renewal did not include all
fibers, while chemical interests agreed with protectionist
O.R.

Strackbein that the ASP package was

loosed against the American economy. "^^

a "time

bomb

Most exporters

were only mildly optimistic, expecting a boost in sales but

doubting the gains would be drastic.

A number of

businessmen predicted little impact from the results,
either because NTBs placed more significant restrictions on

their products or because exports were of little importance
and concern relative to the domestic market.

The Wall

Street Journal reported that the business community had

greeted the Kennedy Round with "fear, hope, confusion

bit

-

and

ig yawn" 83

Besides the expected denunciations from protectionists.
Congress unleashed

a

broad-scale attack against the

agreement and Johnson's trade policy.

Of particular

concern was the proposed elimination of the ASP and its
effect on chemical and footwear imports.

Though most

legislators promised at a congressional briefing by the
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administration to reserve judgment, many were disturbed
by
the Kennedy Round results.
Senators Pastore and Ribicoff
and Congressman Gerald

R.

Ford (R-MI)

,

for instance,

questioned why America had granted concessions in
vulnerable import sectors such as textiles, chemicals, and
steel.

This sort of disgruntlement erupted soon afterwards in a

backlash against free-trade that, to

a large extent,

determined U.S. trade policy over the next decades.

By the

end of 1967, no fewer than 729 House bills and 19 in the
Senate proposed quotas on over 20 imported goods.

At one

time, remembered White House aide DeVier Pierson,

97 of 100

Senators had endorsed one or more of these bills.

Senator

Vance Hartke (D-Ind.) explained that the Kennedy Round had
been the equivalent of "unilateral disarmament" by the

United States.

Until the administration grew tough at

negotiations, he announced. Congress would "insure that

trade is fair" by matching foreign NTBs with America's
own 85
•

The last 18 months of the Johnson presidency witnessed a

full-scale effort by the administration not

,

ironically, to

consolidate the gains of the Kennedy Round but to defend
the agreement against protectionists.

Free-traders such as

Senator Jacob Javits prepared to "do battle" against
protectionism, but the opposition was strong.

For

instance. Chairman Long of the Senate Finance Committee
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joined forces with Congressman John Dent and
other

restrictive traders in denouncing the Kennedy
Round and
pushing for quotas.
The first major movement in this direction came
in July
1967, when Long ordered a study of the steel industry's

import problem and then took the opportunity to denounce

EEC barriers to U.S. exports when he began hearings on
quotas in October.

The STR office reported mounting

protectionist sentiment in both political parties'
leadership and in key committees on Capitol Hill.

The push

for quotas became so pervasive that the EEC, Canada, Japan,

Britain, the Nordic nations, and most of the Latin American

countries expressed concern.
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The quotas proposed in 1967 and 1968 applied to many
items, but the major ones were for steel,

textiles.

oil,

and

An Omnibus Quota Law, following the procedure of

the Meat Act of 1964, would also trigger quotas on any
imports that reached a certain level.

Senator Ernest

Rollings (D-SC) introduced the textile quota, but Wilbur
Mills also proposed to "improve" the LTA by tying import
increases to U.S. consumption.

Oil-state legislators

sought to freeze the 12.2% limit of the Kennedy-Kerr

agreement into law and steel interests suggested

Free-traders were alarmed.

a quota.

John Hight of the Committee for

a National Trade Policy proclaimed that the bills amounted
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to a "trade policy crisis greater than any
in the last 30
88
years"
The administration reacted with firmness out
of a

defense of the Kennedy Round accomplishments and as freetraders.

Treasury Secretary Fowler told Long that engaging

in a "quota war" was a "fool's game", especially for
a

nation that enjoyed a large but shrinking trade surplus.
Quotas only caused retaliation.

Bator echoed this

response, writing the President that "an export-surplus

nation can't win a serious war of import restrictions
has too much to lose.

-

it
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Johnson agreed, and would not permit the drive for trade
liberalization, the gains of the Kennedy Round, and efforts
to improve the payments balance be destroyed by

protectionism.

He feared an "economic cold war" in which

"everybody stagnates".

Thus, not wishing to invite

"massive retaliation" from abroad, Johnson declared that
the quota bills would not "become law as long as

I

am

President and can help it". 90
Yet this courage exacerbated a tricky legislative

problem for the President.

He sent a two-year extension of

the TEA to Congress in 1968, including an elimination of

the ASP and liberalization of the adjustment assistance

provision.

The latter had been an "abysmal failure"; to

date, not one of the several petitioners had qualified for

relief because the criteria were too rigid.
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A revision

would not pose a problem on Capitol Hill,
but the ASP issue
would.

The situation in Congress was "very rough',

reported aides, and even "dismal" because of complete
lack
of Democratic leadership for free-trade in the
Senate.

The

Kennedy Round and the sinking trade surplus had taken its
toll on enthusiasm for trade liberalization.

Vietnam and

inflation had instilled similar frowning on any other major

endeavor by the Johnson administration in

1968.^"'"

Thus, the TEA did not enjoy the upbeat atmosphere like

its predecessor in 1962.

At hearings before the House Ways

and Means Committee, it became apparent that the ASP posed
as an insurmountable obstacle.

The threat of protectionist

riders attached to the bill prompted Mills to delay

reporting it out until it was "clean".

But by July, many

members of his committee opposed another free-trade
initiative, as they watched the trade surplus plummet to
$611 million, the lowest level since 1955.

Aide DeVier Pierson reported

a

"Mexican stand-off" in

the House; both the trade bill and quotas were stalled.

In

the end, the White House opted for the TEA'S death (and the

retention of the ASP) in the committee for defeat of the
quotas,
oil.
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including the "big boys" of textiles, steel, and

A brand of inter-branch accommodation which

essentially nullified a new policy, the deal drew the
curtain on the trade initiatives of the 1960s.

The Kennedy

Round, the "high-water mark" of free-trade, had unwittingly

opened the door to protectionism and initiated

a less

liberal phase in America's trade history.
The political fall-out after the Kennedy
Round signified
its success in liberalizing trade, but it
also pointed to

America's inability to cope with competition from
abroad.
Once the country directed the trade regime, but by
the

late

1960s America had turned inward and vacated the leadership

role to the EEC.

Europeans increasingly feared that the

U.S. might withdraw "into its shell" and loosen its

economic and military commitments in the alliance and

around the globe.

The EEC, by 1968,

stepped up efforts to

prevent such an occurrence by campaigning against U.S.
protectionism. 93

The administration was at a loss to

reassert American command over the international trade
regime

More than any other sign, the balance-of -payments
deficit indicated this impotency.

The problem reached

crisis proportions in 1968; the collapse of the British
pound, the large outflow of dollars for Vietnam, and the

ensuing run on gold spelled disaster.

Remedies included

imposing mandatory controls on capital outflows,

consideration of

a

tourist tax, and import surcharges, and

negotiations for allied offset payments to help fund

American troops abroad.
Johnson also concentrated on boosting exports, but to no
avail.

Much to his frustration, Americans still neglected
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overseas markets
1963 to 1968.

-

exports averaged only 4% of the GNP fr om

The Commerce Department complained about

"export-lazy" beer, machinery, clothing, lumber, and
even
auto industries; the U.S. trade performance remained
"far

from reassuring".

The push for quotas and the still-born

TEA of 1968 only aggravated the problem.

Worsened by the

declining trade surplus, domestic inflation, and the
crumbling monetary system, the persistent deficit

eventually led to more drastic, and restrictive, measures
by the Nixon administration in 1971.^"^
The Kennedy Round was partly responsible for the nagging

deficit and the American abdication of leadership over the

trade regime.

Especially after the EEC crisis of 1965, and

even before, the talks had lost their luster and grandeur.
No longer thought of as part of a grand design for the

Atlantic community and global commercial order, the GATT
conference became a zero-sum game, in which one side gained
at the other's expense.

This attitude carried over into

the post-Kennedy Round period, particularly in the United
States.

The Kennedy Round was a success in terms of freer world

trade and global relations.

Large tariff cuts in

manufactures, the grains agreement, and a serious look at
NTBs were only some of its achievements.

The talks

permitted closer bonds between the EFTA and the Common
Market and enhanced Japan's status as a major industrial
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trade partner.

Considering the disturbances in the

alliance caused by Charles de Gaulle, moreover,
the Geneva
accord "provided a sort of comforting continuity
and

momentum toward agreement in at least one area" of
Atlantic
relations, wrote congressional advisor Curtis and his
aide. 95

"No monument to partnership",

contended William

Diebold in 1972, the Kennedy Round nevertheless was

a

"landmark" in U.S. -EEC relations.

Most observers also believed that the negotiations were
a

triumph for the European integration movement.

Gaullism

failed to obstruct the EEC's participation in the talks or

dismember the Common Market.

Instead, the Six worked as a

"unit" and thereby strengthened the concept of regional

consolidation.

Washington even asserted that this "growing

maturity" tightened the bonds of the Atlantic community for
the benefit of all traders.
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Without a doubt, however,

the EEC's solidarity made it a tougher bargainer and more

resistant to U.S. trade aims,
EEC policy prevented the White House from making good on
the promises made in 19 62 of bringing benefits for the U.S.

economy through trade negotiations

.

The rout suffered by

American agriculture at the hands of the EEC, Gaullism, and
concessions in the industrial sector made Kennedy's

prediction of domestic economic prosperity, reduced
unemployment, and an intimate Atlantic partnership seem
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overblown by the end of the decade.
Geneva blocked the TEA'

s

European bargaining in

effectiveness.

Most significant, the rise of U.S. imports at

a

rate

much higher than exports may be blamed to a large
extent on
American concessions in Geneva. The Kennedy Round might
have been good for the trade regime, but it was "too much
of a good thing" in the eyes of many American producers.
In part,

it caused the country's first trade deficit in the

postwar years in 1971.^^ Indeed, the talks were not so good
for the U.S. trade balance.
In short,

an assessment of the Kennedy Round results and

subsequent reaction in the U.S. gives more credence to the

comparative-advantage than the hegemony school argument.
The latter school's viewpoint was validated in specific
sectors.

For instance, Washington forced and won a

revision of the restrictive LTA, gained in the critical
chemical sector (especially by not repealing the ASP)

,

and

looked forward to continued growth of many capitalintensive exports.

America's sheer size and share of the

world trade volume enabled it to determine much of the
final outcome in its favor.

Without a doubt, moreover, the country grew more selfish
after the talks.

The quota bills, defeat of the TEA, and

reversal of organized labor from its erstwhile support for

free-trade to protectionism demonstrated this behavior.
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In addition to retaining a trade edge in key industrial and
500

farm sectors, the United States also held

a

positive

overall world trade balance and an edge
with the EEC,
though both surpluses were dwindling. A flagging

giant,

America was still
acted as

dominant force in the trade regime and

a

a hegemon,

argues the hegemony school.

Yet the facts of the Kennedy Round do not fully
bear out

the hegemony view.

First, the final product fell short of

the goals set by the TEA.

America's supposed hegemonic

interests would be served by 50% tariff reductions in the

industrial sector,

a

diversion from the U.S. to Europe of

the tropical commodities of Latin America, and assured and

growing access into European agricultural markets.

Though

many duties on manufactured goods were set at or came close
to the 50% aim, America achieved none of these objectives
at the Kennedy Round.

Second, Washington's efforts in the name of free-trade

had unintended, often the opposite, effect of the initial

objectives in 1962.

The U.S. lowered its own import

barriers and touched off

a

protectionist backlash.

And,

in

its pursuit of trade liberalization for the sake of

national security, postwar tradition, or even

a

much-needed

victory to offset the Vietnam, monetary, and domestic
political and economic quagmires, the administration forged
an agreement which hurt U.S. trade interests.

The trade

surplus plunged into a deficit by 1971 for the first time
in the twentieth century.

501

Third, the Common Market prevented America from acting
as a hegemon.

The EEC wielded much,

and perhaps more,

leverage than its counterpart across the Atlantic,

As T,K,

Warley points out, the American assumption that Europe's
interest of reducing tariffs on manufactured goods gave the
U.S. equal leverage to bargain down EEC agricultural

barriers was wrong.

Washington was "defeated on grounds of

its own choosing" in the farm sector by European

resistance.

In the end,

the U.S. was unwilling to halt the

Kennedy Round, but its primary objectives of equalizing
industrial with agricultural concessions had

f ailed.

''"'^^

For these reasons, but mainly the latter, the

comparative-advantage school's counter-argument that the
U.S. did not and could not behave as a hegemon seems

plausible.

For the first time since before the war, Europe

came to the bargaining table equal in stature and nearly

equal in trading strength to the United States.

The United

States had to reckon with a fully-blossomed "New Europe",
and,

in the final tally, the EEC won its aim of lowering

industrial tariffs while maintaining agricultural barriers.
To an extent, Europe redefined the fair-trade doctrine to

suit its interests.

Clearly, as U.S. officials and

producers gradually came to realize, America could "no
longer call the tune" at trade negotiations.

community plurality was established fact.
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CONCLUSION
John F. Kennedy hoped that free-trade would reinvigorate

the domestic economy, balance international payments, and

unify the West.

Indeed, trade increased in dimensions not

recorded since the Cobdenite era one hundred years before.

America's push for liberal trade was responsible for this
growth and a stronger alliance.

Yet the days of U.S.

leadership, and certainly predominance, over the global

trade regime were numbered.
House,

When Kennedy was in the White

"American liberal capitalism still seemed capable of

mastering any challenge

.

.

The falling trade

.

surplus, an ailing economy at home, financial crises, the

Vietnam War, and internecine conflicts among the allies
destroyed this confidence by 1968.
Indeed, Congress turned hostile to the Kennedy- Johnson

trade program.

In 1973,

at hearings on the successor to

the Trade Expansion Act, Senate Finance Chairman Russell

Long declared that the "history" of the TEA had been
unfavorable.

America had counted on trade partners and its

own negotiators to strike an equitable bargain for all

participants through GATT

.

The end result, though, was the

first U.S. trade deficit since 18 94, a huge payments
deficit, and a more protectionist EEC.

Not only was "the bloom off the rose of the 'Atlantic

partnership'". Long said, but the U.S. objected to being
524

the "least favored nation in a world full of

discrimination".

He pledged that "the next decade of our

trading relations will be different from the last" after
Congress passed tougher, more restrictive legislation.^
The very name of the bill, the Trade Reform Act, indicated

the swing U.S. opinion had taken from a decade earlier when
the country accepted trade expansion.

Kennedy's dream of promoting prosperity and allied unity
by an Atlantic partnership seemed fanciful only six years

after he had announced his Grand Design.

Despite Johnson's

vigorous defense of liberal trade, no longer did Washington
appear as the generous leader of the alliance.

giving allies a "free ride"

,

Tired of

Congress considered

withdrawing troops from Europe and passing retaliatory
trade legislation to counter EEC restrictions and balance
the payments account.

Observers at home and abroad feared

that America stood on the brink of isolationism after a

thirty year hiatus.

3

The momentum toward trade

liberalization had halted, closing

a

chapter in American

postwar trade history.
In order to determine the factors which caused this

transformation and the role of U.S. power in the global
arena, this study examined the trade policy at four levels-

of-analysis
individual.

:

international, governmental, societal, and
The examination concentrated on two inter-

related objectives:

understanding the trade policy
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decision-making process and analyzing the effects of U.S.

policy on the international trade regime.

Though some

questions remain partially or fully unanswered, enough

evidence exists to draw conclusions.
Four models provided the test cases for the decision-

making structure.

Bureaucratic politics was not sufficient

to explain policy evolution and implementation.

One reason

was that Executive branch agencies were not loci of

decision-making during the passage of trade bills.

Though

internal discussion occurred over the scope, content, and

timing of the Trade Expansion Act, the bureaucracy did not
play nearly as important a role in the policy process as
the President and Congress.

Interdepartmental turf wars

were not a decisive factor in formulating trade policy.

Compromises for settling bureaucratic fights were not

needed because administration members essentially held the
same views on trade.

The model applied more to the Kennedy

Round, especially when the Department of Agriculture

lobbied for a tougher stance against the EEC but was beaten
back by everyone else

.

Even in this case, there was

conflict only over tactics; the STR and State Department

agreed with Freeman about CAP restrictions, though they
were not as vociferous in their complaints.

With only

minor deviation, the entire bureaucracy advocated trade
liberalization and an equitable settlement at the GATT
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talks. This unified view stemmed from presidential

influence

Analysis at the individual level revealed the
irrelevance of the bureaucratic politics model and the

applicability of interest intermediation.

Simply put, the

president, congress, and to a lesser extent interest groups

decided trade policy.

Since 1934, the White House has

consistently advocated liberal trade.

Kennedy's

internationalist bent and pre-war observations of the
effect of protectionism on the world economy confirmed his

free-trade views.

His successor became an adherent by

suffering under high tariffs imposed by the industrial
East.

Johnson's populist strain meshed easily with

Kennedy's internationalism, particularly since both were

New Deal Democrats and supporters of the Reciprocal Trade
Act

Cold war exigencies sustained both presidents' support
after 1945.

The need to strengthen Europe and Japan and

build a prosperous alliance capable of stabilizing the West
through freely exchanged goods and services, attracting
LDCs,

and fending off Soviet aggression were the paramount

concerns of both presidents.

The rest of their

administrations, and much of Congress, agreed that security

undergirded the need for liberal trade.

Thus, there was no

contention over the basic lines of policy advocated for the
trade regime by the United States.
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At first glance, a conflict between this free-trade

ideology and practical politics seemed natural and

unavoidable for the two presidents.

To be sure, Kennedy

expended much political capital on his trade program.

Yet

the fair-trade doctrine rationalized a deviation from
liberalism, dealt effectively with protectionists, and at

the same time promoted lower tariffs.

Neither president

was a doctrinaire free-trader in the State Department mold.

Both were

sawy politicians

who knew how and when to

accommodate powerful private interests and their

reresentatives on Capitol Hill.

Free-trade ideology guided

the presidents; fair-trade political strategy fulfilled

their objectives
This critical political element puts in doubt the model
of corporatism.

This synthesis describes how efficient

exporters exploited their partnership with government by

minimizing interest group conflict and channeling benefits
their way.

No doubt Kennedy advocated the TEA with these

interests in mind.

He expected them to take advantage of

trade opportunities in the EEC, expand exports while

limiting investments, and thereby add to the trade surplus.
The Kennedy Round reaped advantages for these capital-

intensive producers, though less than initially hoped for
in the agricultural sector

Decision-making did not function along corporatist
lines.

For instance, the Committee for a National Trade
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Policy, the free-trade lobby of Big Business, only provided

information and promotional assistance for the TEA
campaign.

The administration did not bring the CNTP into

the White House for policy discussions, though many Kennedy

and Johnson officials were former members.

Also, Kennedy

was often at odds with these free-traders, particularly

when he placated protectionists with special programs and
import restrictions.

The private sector was a large

factor, but was outside the actual policy process.

Nor did the evidence show that a private-public

partnership of class alliances or combinations with similar
ideological or economic aims existed in the trade regime.
Such an arrangement might be found in the investment,
financial, or aid spheres, all of which were subject to

control by elite segments of the government and the private
sector,

such as bankers

multinational firms.

,

insurance companies

,

or

The OECD fostered global cooperation

and attempted, as Charles Maier notes, to "de-ideologize"
the marketplace and ensure that economic efficiency

prevailed over divisive political squabbling.^
trade.

But not in

On the contrary, competition among national

economic groups occurred at the Kennedy Round, and brought

politics into the negotiations.

Gaullist efforts to

promote French agriculture and the interests of the Common
Market over American objectives, in addition to disrupting
the talks for nearly

a year,

were the most dramatic
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examples of political issues entering discussions over
trade.

Many rising exporters were stymied by domestic

interests on both sides of the Atlantic.

For instance, De

Gaulle and the EEC Commission prevented efficiently-

produced U.S. food goods from free entry into European
markets and thus denied American Big Agriculture its major
objective.

Congress refused to repeal the ASP, to the

detriment of foreign chemical concerns
Sector agreements in industry would seem prime

candidates for the corporatist model.

America forced

a

Yet in textiles,

deal not only on the LDCs but on the

Europeans, while steel and chemicals were subject to

private and political pressure back home and limited in
many cases by protectionism.

Trade did not appear to be

peacefully carried out by international firms, as
corporatists assume, but constrained by domestic interest
groups and the diplomatic aims of foreign heads-of -state

Skepticism also arose over the corporatist argument

because

a

consensual relationship among private interests

was hard to find in many cases.

The American economy was

so diverse that a unified outlook was frequently non-

existent even in the export sector.

The growing trade

surplus, large industrial plant and farm resources, and

efficient productive capabililities indicated that the U.S.

should be a country eager to sell abroad.
TEA showed otherwise.
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Debate over the

In essence,

the U.S. remained aninef f ective trader,

sending overseas only 4% of its GNP throughout the 1960s
and buying about the same amount.

American business

interests were indifferent or opposed to foreign trade.

Even many farmers, who were the best exporters, inclined

toward protectionism or selling in the domestic market.
Ostensible corporatist industries such as electronics and
chemicals were dominated by import-competing, protectionist
elements.

Big Labor's advocacy of free-trade depended

largely on adjustment assistance; when this aid proved
ineffective, the AFL-CIO switched to the protectionist
camp.

Such apathy, opposition, and diversity undercut the

corporatist argument.
These various attitudes and the influence of

protectionist import-competitors gave credence to pluralist
models of decision-making.

Based on the notion that the

American economy was rife with competition and conflict,

pluralism points to a triangular relationship of interest
groups. Congress, and the White House in trade policy

decision-making.

Politics plays a prominent role and

indeed, was the determining factor in the 1960s.

Though the RTA gave the president greater autonomy in
trade, he still had to win authority from Congress through

legislation.

Congress never surrendered control over

policy during the postwar years.

On the whole, legislators

did not restrict the president, but established procedural
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safeguards to protect vulnerable interests from import
injury.

The White House acquiesced by the fair-trade

approach.

5

The Kennedy tactics on textiles, lumber, oil,

carpets and glass
and chemicals

-

-

and in export sectors such as chickens

reflected this process.

Thus,

domestic

politics, more than economic factors, determined decisions
on many sectors in foreign trade.

The TEA campaign revealed that the inter-branch rather

than the bureaucratic and regulatory politics model applied
to the decision-making framework.

The latter paradigm made

Congress too malleable in the hands of private interests;
if logrolling was prevalent, how did such a free-trade bill

ever pass Congress?

The presidential-congressional

accommodation exposed how the White House wielded the fairtrade doctrine to preserve its liberal trade policy, while

legislators cast votes for the TEA after protecting, or

getting credit for protecting, their constituents.
Thus, Executive-Legislative branch bartering prevailed.

Textile legislators won the seven-point program, refused to

bow to pressure from voters for quotas, and many supported
the TEA.

The six-point lumber plan was enough for

Northwestern politicians, and they did not press overly
hard for import limits from Canada.

The oil deal satisfied

interest groups, yet only came to fruition when Kennedy

bargained with Senator Kerr.

And, even ardent

protectionists voted for the TEA after Kennedy raised
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tariffs on carpets and glass.

The President horse-traded

protection for TEA votes, and Congress obliged.
The validity of the inter-branch model was further borne
out on the liberal trade side.

Kennedy accommodated

chicken-state legislators when they threatened to vote
against the TEA.

He wrote Chancellor Adenauer of his

concern and later started in motion the policy that

eventually led to the Chicken War.

Until he realized that

Common Market obstinancy made pleas against European

protectionism hopeless, Johnson also plugged away for a
liberalization of the CAP at the Kennedy Round.
all,

presidential appeals for free-trade as

a

But above

weapon in the

cold war attracted support from Congress.
In effect,

Congress listened to Kennedy's constant

reminder that the TEA served national security, and

continued to support liberal trade for this reason even
after the Kennedy Round disappointments.

At the heart of

the trade program were worries about affording U.S.

military and aid commitments.

A trade surplus would help

provide funds to maintain these expenditures, especially as
the country fought a seemingly losing battle against its

international payments deficit.

Free-trade would also

prevent the alliance from disintegrating into hostile trade
blocs,

susceptible to Soviet influence, while

a

prosperous

capitalist system would lure poor nations to the Western
side.

Kennedy's Grand Design promoted profits for

Corporate America, but not merely to enhance the
economic
status of efficient producers, as corporatists
ultimately
imply.

Anti-communism lay at the basis of export expansion

and liberal trade.
The administration realized that placing its free-trade

drive in the context of the U.S. -Soviet conflict would be

effective since cold warriors existed in great numbers on
Capitol Hill.
made.

An inter-branch accommodation was ready-

Naturally, many legislators cast votes for the TEA

because it was part of

a

long line of traditional U.S.

trade policy, combatted potential depressions, and helped
export interests.

But remarks by the free-trade bloc

during 1962 showed that economic gains were not an end in

themselves but an integral building block for Western
defenses against communism.

The appeal of the Grand Design

made the presidential relationship with Congress much
smoother
Still

,

these leaders were elected officials, concerned

about satisfying constituents.

Thus,

legislators looked to

the President for help in protecting certain producers.
Similarly, the President, hoping to pass the TEA, viewed

Congress as the most important factor.

Less certain was

the extent to which presidential elections concerned

Kennedy and Johnson, although

conjectural evidence pointed

to a natural concern for the effects of trade policy in

overcoming political weaknesses in selected regions.
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In

any event, inter-branch bargaining demonstrated a pluralist

arrangement in U.S. trade policy.

Domestic political deals permitted liberal trade
agreements.

Despite some protectionist deviations for

vote-getting purposes, the U.S. preserved the openness of
the trade regime.

Fair-trade was responsible for this

liberalism, as the structure of GATT permitted trade

expansion as long as national commercial interests were not

demonstrably injured.

Although the regime underwent

considerable strain after the Kennedy Round, the

contracting parties did not form into restrictive blocs.
The persistence of freer trade and gradual, reciprocal, and

equitable tariff cuts based on the non-discriminatory most-

favored-nation rule was

a

triumph for American trade

polxcy
That the U.S. succeeded was remarkable, considering the

turn inward prompted by its declining trade standing.

Regardless of its military superiority during the 1960s,
the United States had fallen from the zenith of power.

The

country was no weakling, unable to meet competition from

Europe and Japan.

America still bought and sold in more

volume than any nation, and its GNP was only slightly less
than all others' output combined by 1971.

7

In addition,

America held much leverage over the trade order.

The

country was not as reliant on exports and imports as its
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trade partners, and held the lure of its large market
over
their heads.
Indeed,

scholars debate whether U.S. "hegemony" dwindled

in terms of capabilities.

Historian Paul Kennedy claims

that the decline in America's relative wealth, output, and

trade was inevitable from the 1960s on, as Europe and Japan

recovered from the war.
less,

But the U.S. was not producing

others just made more.

America in the trade regime,

however, was not the hegemon defined by Immanuel

Wallerstein as being when "one power can largely impose its
rules and its wishes

...

in the economic, political,

milxtary, diplomatic, and even cultural sense".

America

did not follow this course at the Kennedy Round, quite
simply because it lacked the capability.

Without a doubt, the period 1960 to recent times
suggests a drop in American fortunes.

The ratio of U.S.

national income to the total of all market economies'
incomes fell from 1960 to 1970, as did its share of world

production of petroleum, steel and iron ore, and wheat.
From 1960 to 1980, America's production as a percentage of
the global GNP plummeted from 34% to 22%, while the EEC's
rose from 18% to 22% and Japan's from 3% to 10%.

As

Stephen Krasner writes, the U.S. was not a second-rate

country but "became more like

a

normal nation-state.

longer does American power dominate in virtually every
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No

issue-area.
on others

No longer can the U.S. simply impose its will
Q

.

The same held true in trade.

America's merchandise

trade of $6.8 billion in 1964 had turned into

a

deficit of

-$2.2 billion in 1971 and -$6.4 billion the next year.

The

few surpluses in succeeding years were aberrations; after
1976, the trade deficit was never higher than -$31 billion

afterward and plummeted to -$125 billion or more during the
latter half of the 1980s.

The balance-of -payments

predictably followed suit.
billion.

In 1962 it had been -$3.6

Ten years later it declined to -$11.2 billion and

then took off into the huge debts of the 1980s, even as

military spending fell.
with the deficit.

Higher oil prices had much to do

But the structure of trade, established

partly by the concessions granted at the Kennedy Round and
the rising strength of Europe and Japan, was largely

responsible
The Common Market and Japan outpaced U.S. trade.

EEC

and Japanese exports of manufactured goods grew faster than

American sales between 1967 and 1980.

In addition,

the

Six's share of world exports fell during the same period to
28%

(but only 34% counting the enlarged nine-member

Community).

Japan's portion rose to 7.1%.

The U.S. share

was 12.1%, a drop-off from the 19.3% of 1967.

Also, while

America's trade and payments deficit grew to tremendous
proportions, the enlarged EEC enjoyed surpluses on both

accounts until 1984, when it went into the red.

Japan

recorded deficits in trade but booming surpluses
with the
United States, especially in the 1980s.
Bilateral trade hurt the American merchandise trade
account.

America ran a growing deficit with Japan from

1965 onward, rising from -$1 billion to -$5.3 billion in
1976 and -$54.4 billon by 1986.

The U.S.

surplus with the

EEC fell to $28 million by 1972 but rose to large surpluses

throughout the 1970s.

Yet,

the edge was not large enough

to overcome the overall trade debit with Japan, other Asian

and African nations, Canada, and West Germany.

And,

by

1983, America suffered a deficit of -$1.3 billion with the

Common Market which grew to -$17.4 billion two years
later

These figures reflect on American power beyond the
1960s.

On the surface, the trade surplus with the Common

Market demonstrated that Washington did not suffer from the

Kennedy Round.

But this conclusion ignores the fact that

America's overall trade balance was in deficit throughout
most of the post-Kennedy Round years.

It also neglects the

overall payments deficit which all postwar presidents

failed to reverse.
This problem had reached serious proportions by the end
of the Eisenhower presidency,

and though Kennedy and

Johnson managed to reduce the deficit periodically, their
successors could not prevent it from growing out of
538

control.

Domestic inflation, oil prices, and international

monetary breakdowns were partly responsible

•

But a main

reason for the deficit was that America still funded
a
large bulk of military and economic assistance, while
allies financed much less.

the

This situation cut into the

U.S. trade surplus with Europe and only worsened the

account with Japan.

America paid dearly for its leadership

over the Western alliance, which benefited its trade

competitors
Therefore, Kennedy and Johnson demanded trade

liberalization in order to expand U.S. exports, which in
turn would help pay for allied defenses and development

programs in the less-developed countries.

Their

administrations pressed diligently for fair-trade based on

comparative advantage, especially with the EEC. Europe,
however, was building the Common Market, protecting this

new organization by tariffs and the CAP.

European

integration conflicted with the American for freer trade,
and Washington was largely the loser.
Trade in agriculture indicated this pattern.

U.S.

exports of grain, poultry, and other variable levy items

dropped by 47% after 1965 when the CAP was fully
implemented.

Non-levy commodities such as oilseeds and

fruits and vegetables rose, but only due to increased

consumption within the Six.

In short, American farmers

were unable to retain their historical share of the EEC

market as their portion fell from 13.5% to 10.7*
by the
last half of the 1960s alone.
^^^^^^ essentially snubbed
American pleas for liberal trade in agriculture.
Not only did the Common Market decline in importance
for

American sales, but Europeans also began to compete with
the U.S. in food trade.

The world's largest poultry

importer in 1962, the EEC became the largest exporter by
1982.

It also gained ground on U.S.

grains sales.

Not

surprisingly, America's agricultural surplus with the

Common Market gradually sank throughout the 1970s and
1980s.

1

The EEC success story in building its farm system

had deleterious effects on U.S. trade.
Europe's ability to confront American trade aims

successfully showed at the very least that Kennedy and
Johnson overplayed their trade cards.

Both promised

benefits from mutual tariff cuts with the EEC, especially
in sectors in which U.S. efficiency was prevalent,

agriculture.

naive to boot.

Yet they misjudged,

like

and were politically

They took into consideration neither the

domestic restraints on European officials, the

effectiveness of Gaullist obstructionism, nor the fact that
the EEC would logically resist dismantling the CAP while it
was still under construction.

15

For starters, Washington

led U.S. farmers down a path of inevitable disappointment.
In effect,

the Grand Design, though plausible and

unselfish, was unrealistic for Europe at the time.

De

Gaulle was the extreme manifestation of Common
Market

resistance to U.S. policy.

But the EEC Commission

naturally placed the building of the Community's
infrastructure before the forging of an Atlantic
partnership.

Europeans also worried about the effects of

the dominant supplier provision, which might dilute the EEC
and bring in an overwhelming flood of American goods.

Agreeing with the diplomatic intention of the Grand Design,
they chafed uncomfortably at its threat to their

integration process
The Common Market also had legitimate reasons for its

restrictive policy, especially in agriculture in which
employment was much higher than in America.

In other

words, Washington was not an innocent victim of European

ruthlessness, suffering at the hands of EEC protectionism

and Gaullist political antics.

Most of the Six were as

globally- and liberal-minded as America.

Furthermore, the

U^S. pursued its interests as doggedly as the Europeans,

seeking an edge in the industrial and farm sectors.

1

The Kennedy Round boiled down to a test of wills among

the Atlantic powers.

The talks became a "contest between

European and Atlantic ideas", wrote Harold van

B.

Cleveland, and not surprisingly, the EEC stressed the
former.

17

In the final analysis,

•

trade liberalization
.

"revealed an unexpected depth of trans-Atlantic economic
tension", argued David Calleo.

1

Waning U.S. leadership

failed to enhance alliance solidarity in the 1960s.

The

Grand Design disappeared, unrealized.
This very failure, however, signified that America was

not a hegemon in the international trade regime, and thus

validated the comparative-advantage school's argument that
U.S.

leadership brought gains for all traders.

In Geneva,

the EEC largely won the big battle over agricultural
barriers, while all linear nations stood to gain in the

industrial sphere.

As an example of hegemonial muscle-

flexing, wrote Andrew Shonfield, the Kennedy Round "was a

curiously unsatisfying one for [America,
power."

In the longer-run,

]

the hegemonial

the U.S. trade and global

economic position grew weaker while other nations and the
trade regime enjoyed rising prosperity.
Scholars have described the U

.

S

.

1

-European relationship

in the immediate postwar period as one of "consensual

American hegemony", in which Europe accepted Washington's
leadership as a necessity for economic recovery and

national security but did not lose its identity or overall

policy objectives

.

Michael Hogan, for instance, described

the "considerable degree of autonomy" enjoyed by Europe
20
under the American-led Marshall Plan.

A decade after

this aid program ended, Europe had converted this autonomy
into sheer power under the aegis of the Common Market.

Since the formation of the EEC, the Western trade order

had become more pluralistic and power more equitably

distributed, in large part due to American policy.

Washington responded to the EEC by attempting, according
to
Joseph Kraft, to plug "into the dynamism of Western Europe
and the Common Market: the Old World called in to redress
the balance of the New".^^

The open and flourishing trade

regime attested to the success of this approach.

Yet by

the late 1960s, U.S. officials questioned whether their
support for the Common Market monolith had been in

America's best interests.

Former White House aide Francis

Bator wondered if the alliance could "avoid the risk of an

economic cold war between

a

growing EEC and ourselves"

Europe's impressive capabilities in the trade regime

fulfilled an important U.S. postwar objective.
the EEC emerged as a fierce competitor.

Thus,

Ironically,

justifiably

content that its leadership had made European recovery
complete, America nonetheless eyed the future with

apprehension by the late 1960s.

The country continued to

trade, but could not forestall its fading economic fortunes

that President Kennedy had warned about in 1962.

At the

time, he did not realize that the American retreat had

already begun.
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